Picture: Ukrainian Armed Forces, 14th UAV Regt

In March 2026, Ukraine’s strategic air campaign targeting Russian energy infrastructure — oil-related facilities in particular — reached a new peak. By some estimates, Ukraine launched more long-range drone strikes than Russia that month, employing over 7,000 systems, some reaching as deep as 1,500 kilometers into Russian territory.

The veracity of these figures is difficult to confirm. Still, the campaign's results speak for themselves, likely crossing thresholds earlier phases did not reach: cumulative damage to Russian energy infrastructure now appears to be outpacing Russia’s capacity to repair and replace it.

This post assesses what Ukraine’s deep-strike campaign has achieved in recent months, how Ukraine got there, and what the implications might be.

The damage

Ukraine’s long-range drone campaign against Russian oil infrastructure has escalated sharply since January 2026. Early strikes targeted the Ilsky refinery in Krasnodar and the Almetyevsk oil processing unit in Tatarstan. The campaign intensified in late March and early April, hitting a broader set of targets: the Baltic export terminals at Ust-Luga and Primorsk, the Yaroslavl refinery near Moscow, the Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez refinery in Kstovo (which supplies roughly 30% of Moscow-region gasoline), and — most recently — the Sheskharis terminal and the Caspian Pipeline Consortium facility in Novorossiysk.

The cumulative impact has been substantial. Russian oil exports fell 43% in the week of 22–29 March, from 4.07 to 2.32 million barrels per day, costing an estimated $1 billion in lost revenue for that week alone. Reuters estimates strikes on refineries have reduced Russian refining capacity by approximately 17%, or 1.1 million barrels per day. At peak disruption, roughly 40% of Russian export capacity was offline, though this figure reflects the combined effects of the Druzhba pipeline closure, tanker seizures, and drone strikes.

Independent verification of specific damage figures remains difficult. That said, the intensity and success of Ukraine’s deep-strike campaign have very likely reached levels not seen since the start of the war.

How we got here

The success of Ukraine’s deep-strike drone campaign is not accidental. It reflects sustained planning and shaping efforts, compounded by industrial bottlenecks on the Russian side.

First, in late 2024, Zelensky made conventional long-range drones and mini cruise missiles a major priority in Ukraine’s defense industrial policy. Production ramped up through 2025, and Ukraine may have reached critical mass by early 2026. Ukraine’s inability to shift a meaningful share of production toward heavier and more capable missile systems remains a constraint. Still, shortfalls in individual system capabilities have likely been partially offset by deploying ever-larger numbers of lighter systems en masse against Russian facilities.

Second, Ukraine has pursued a highly effective suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) campaign, systematically degrading Russia’s integrated air and missile defense capabilities. Analysts from Tochnyi, in a highly recommended report, indicate that between June 2025 and March 2026, Ukraine conducted confirmed engagements against 237 air defense-related targets, including launcher units and radars, and 196 radar and electronic warfare systems, in each case very likely severely damaging or destroying them.

The consequences of these air defense suppression strikes are non-linear. Given Russia’s vast geographic expanse, overlapping air defense coverage is difficult to maintain, and individual losses can lead to the total loss of control over an area, immediately multiplying the attack vectors available to Ukraine. Russia’s apparent unwillingness to redeploy assets from the dense air and missile defense ring around Moscow — likely out of concern about bringing the war’s realities closer to the regime’s doorstep — is compounding the problem.

Third, Russia’s already overstretched war economy likely finds it difficult to mobilize the resources — in raw materials and manpower — needed to meaningfully increase air defense production, at least not without directly affecting output in other areas. Technical constraints further limit Russia’s ability to quickly repair infrastructure damage, particularly when strikes have damaged more advanced components. Contacts in the Norwegian oil industry have told me that while Chinese technology provides some relief, it cannot fully replace the lack of spare parts from Western suppliers.

Implications for the war

The strike campaign alone does not win Ukraine the war, nor does it eliminate Russia’s economic potential. Russia’s refining capacity remains among the largest in the world, with excess capacity to buffer the domestic fuel supply. Gasoline prices have risen, and export bans have been imposed intermittently, but fuel availability has not collapsed. Some manufacturing and processing capacity is also being dispersed eastward, beyond the reach of Ukrainian long-range drones and cruise missiles.

These points are valid, but these efforts cannot shield Russia’s war-industrial system from the blow. Dispersal is slow, costly, and logistically inefficient; it does not restore destroyed capacity and introduces supply chain friction that compounds production shortfalls. Capital expenditure on new facilities also reduces fiscal resources available for the primary war effort. Surplus capacity was already being drawn down before the deep-strike campaign intensified in 2026. Most critically, export infrastructure cannot be relocated. Primorsk, Ust-Luga, and Novorossiysk are fixed assets that will remain as vulnerable as they are central to Russia’s economy.

The cumulative effects of these constraints are real, bearing meaningfully on Russia’s budget and planning even if they fall short of collapsing its capacity to wage war. In this regard, the analogy to the Allied strategic bombing campaign against the Nazi German war economy in World War II, which I have drawn previously, remains as valid as ever.

The success of Ukraine’s effort cannot be judged solely by the absolute reduction in output achieved. It must be judged against what remains of Russian capacity relative to where it would be without the campaign. Nazi German war-industrial output continued to rise through mid-1944, yet remained significantly below what it would have been absent Allied bombing. Similarly, Russian oil-related revenues have not collapsed, but are measurably lower than they would otherwise be, and the Russian state’s fiscal planning around oil income has been materially undermined.

Parallels and contrasts to the Iran War

There is an instructive parallel and contrast to draw between Ukraine’s use of airpower against Russia and that of the United States and Israel against Iran. In both cases, actors have attempted a strategic air campaign to bring the adversary to its knees.

In the American and Israeli case, this involved counterleadership and counterforce strikes targeting fielded forces, command and control, and production facilities, intended to achieve swift effects. The campaign succeeded in part, notably in degrading Iranian launch capacity and likely reducing Iranian missile and drone production, but fell short of the decisive results American and Israeli planners likely had anticipated. Iranian warfighting capacity had been significantly diminished by the time the ceasefire took effect, but it had not been broken. In that sense, the strategic air campaign failed in its primary purpose: translating the use of force into a decisive political outcome.

In the Ukrainian case, the strategic interdiction campaign has been ongoing since 2024. The results have not been decisive, but the instrumentality of the effort — the link between military action and political aims — is considerably clearer. The effects are latent rather than decisive, yet they constitute one of the most effective tools available to Ukraine for degrading Russian capacity and generating coercive leverage.

This contrast offers a broader insight into the utility of strategic airpower, including in the missile age. Strategic airpower need not be decisive to matter. In the vast majority of cases, it cannot produce decisive effects in the first place. Rather than outright dismissing its utility on those grounds, however, as has become fashionable, analysts would do better to recognize and account for the latent, war-shaping effects that strategic airpower can produce.

Picture: U.S. Central Command

Over the last few days, credible reports indicate that Iran managed to hit several American radar systems in the Gulf region.

The most prominent, and so far the only confirmed hit, struck the AN/TPY-2 radar at the Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, which serves as the primary sensor for the THAAD missile defense system. Iran is also reported to have damaged the AN/FPS-132 early-warning radar at the U.S. base in Al-Udeid, Qatar, and may have targeted additional sensor sites across the region.

While the exact circumstances remain unconfirmed, early reports suggest these attacks were carried out primarily with Shahed-type long-range drones. This raises the question of why the United States and its allies were so unprepared for this type of threat and how relatively simple systems can inflict hundreds of millions of dollars in damage across separate strikes.

This post discusses why these strikes were able to succeed and how states can posture in the future to prepare effectively for large-scale, long-range drone threats.

The long-range drone challenge in the Middle East

In principle, Iranian long-range drones, including the Shahed series, should be relatively easy to defeat. They are slow, follow relatively predictable routes, and lack advanced stealth features. Yet several structural factors make long-range defense in the Gulf more difficult than it might first appear.

Before the war, regional missile defense was highly optimized for ballistic missile defense. The Gulf states invested billions in sophisticated early-warning, tracking, and engagement solutions to address what was seen as Iran’s primary threat, namely ballistic missiles.

Existing infrastructure is, of course, not useless, but it is also not well-suited to the long-range drone threat. Shahed-type systems can approach their targets at relatively low altitudes, sometimes only tens of meters above the ground. Detecting these types of targets can be difficult for non-optimized radars because low-altitude flight places them within the radar horizon and against heavy ground clutter.

Many of the region’s existing radars were instead optimized for long-range air surveillance, pointing up into the sky rather than for persistent low-altitude coverage. What results is not an absence of capable sensors, but coverage gaps and suboptimal detection geometry against slow and low-flying drones. Alternative sensor solutions, such as the acoustics-based early-warning network deployed by Ukraine, do not exist in the region.

Pre-war hubris?

Part of the explanation for why Iranian long-range drones have been effective, paradoxically, probably also lies in Israel’s success in intercepting Shahed-type drones during the 2024 and 2025 conflict episodes. Here, Israel was able to intercept hundreds of drones repeatedly, without a single drone reaching its target, let alone causing serious damage.

That success, however, was heavily shaped by geography. The long distance between Iran and Israel led to travel times of up to 10 hours, while Israel’s small size created highly predictable attack vectors, simplifying interception. In fact, Israel and allied aircraft intercepted most incoming long-range drones long before they arrived in Israeli airspace, notably inside Jordan.

With the conflict now extending to Iran’s immediate neighbors, these geographic advantages no longer apply. Shahed travel times are much shorter, while the Gulf’s large geographic expanse creates many more potential attack vectors that must be defended simultaneously. As a result, while most long-range drones are still intercepted, some inevitably slip past defensive systems.

Existing long-range drone defenses

At present, the United States and the Gulf states appear to rely primarily on manned aircraft to intercept incoming long-range drones. This approach makes sense given the region's geographic realities, as only large numbers of patrolling or scrambled aircraft can provide sufficient levels of area defense.

This initial layer appears capable of intercepting the vast majority of incoming drones, sometimes at relatively low cost. For example, intercepting incoming Shaheds with rotary-wing aircraft, such as the AH-64 Apache, costs roughly 5,000 to 10,000 USD per flight hour, plus a few thousand dollars for gun ammunition.

Even using an F-15E fighter jet, which costs up to 30,000 USD per flight hour, together with an AIM-9X Sidewinder priced at roughly 400,000 to 500,000 USD, is arguably acceptable given the economic advantage of the United States and its regional partners, as well as the potential cost of repairing or replacing whatever infrastructure might otherwise be struck.

That said, most fighter jets currently appear to use APKWS missiles to combat long-range drones, which cost only about $30,000 each. This greatly improves the cost-effectiveness of these missions and renders cost concerns largely moot.

While manned aircraft have proved effective, some long-range drones slip through this initial layer. If that happens, surface-to-air missile systems provide a second layer. As noted by many commentators, interception attempts at this layer can be very expensive, given that the Gulf states do not deploy suitable point-defense systems for low- or lower-cost engagements, while the United States has only a limited number of suitable assets in the region, such as C-RAM.

Whether employing these more expensive systems is cost-inefficient is not always clear-cut. The United States would likely have been willing to allocate dozens of Patriot interceptors to prevent hits on its AN/TPY-2 and AN/FPS-132 radars. That said, regardless of whether the defended target justifies the cost, the engagement attempt will be expensive, and the expended munitions, given long production lead times, will be difficult to replace.

Pre-war reporting suggests that the Gulf states, together with the United States, were interested in acquiring dedicated counter-UAS systems that could have effectively complemented the upper missile defense layers to defend against long-range drones. However, procurement processes proved too lengthy, creating the now obvious capability gap at the start of the war.

It is also worth remembering that both Jordan and Qatar gave up their fleets of 60 and 15 Gepard systems in 2023, when Germany and the United States purchased them for transfer to Ukraine. Both countries could have made good use of these systems in the ongoing war.

How to defend long-range drone threats

Despite these challenges, the ongoing Iran War, as well as the war in Ukraine, increasingly clarify what a future missile defense posture designed to address a large-scale long-range drone threat must look like, including in Europe.

First, states must be able to establish an effective first layer of airborne area defense. Manned aircraft are broadly suitable, though large fleets of unmanned aircraft, with lower maintenance and per-flight-hour costs, combined with lower-cost air-to-air missile capabilities, would be preferable. Several low-cost ground-to-air interceptors currently under development in Europe and beyond could, in principle, be adapted for this role.

Second, states need to deploy affordable point-defense systems with a low cost per interception to deal with long-range drones that slip through the initial layer. These systems will necessarily be point-defense in nature, as costs tend to increase with engagement range. In other words, the objective is not to create a second area defense layer, which is not feasible, but rather to establish a redundancy layer for critical targets. How many targets can be defended in this way depends on the level of investment a state is willing to make.

Third, since it may not be feasible for a state to provide dedicated ground-based missile defense for every potential high-value target, the public sector may need support from the private sector. Just as discussions are underway about whether airports should be able to counter small quadcopter-type drones that threaten civilian air traffic, a broader debate may be required about whether large industrial actors and companies — under specific circumstances — should be authorized, or even required, to acquire defensive capabilities designed to counter larger and more potent drone threats.

The objective is not to privatize defense, but to recognize that as drone threats proliferate and civilian infrastructure becomes an increasingly common target for drone strikes in war, the military alone may not be able to provide the level of protection required across all sectors. This may be particularly relevant for countries such as Norway, which are geographically large and host significant numbers of dispersed critical infrastructure sites. Needless to say, this would require major policy reforms.

Ultimately, it must also be acknowledged that a perfect drone defense solution capable of intercepting every incoming system at all times and in all places does not exist.

Ukraine’s experience with drone defense shows that even with extensive operational experience, gaps can still emerge. Even on days when “only” 90 Russian long-range drones arrive, operator error, chance, technical problems, or other factors allow individual drones to get through. That is the nature of air defense. For this reason, defensive components must always be complemented by other capabilities, ideally to make clear to an adversary that an attack is not worthwhile and to retain the ability to generate effects within enemy territory should deterrence fail.

Picture: U.S. Central Command via X

In the early hours of 28 February 2026, Operation Epic Fury commenced with large-scale U.S. and Israeli air strikes against Iranian military, command, missile, and infrastructure targets.

Since then, the United States and Israel have conducted extensive operations against Iran, while Iran has retaliated with missile strikes against U.S. bases, Israel, and regional neighbours. This post offers an initial assessment of the missile war, which has defined the early stages of this conflict, in terms of missile and interceptor availability and its implications for Ukraine.

The race to the bottom

The central military dynamic between Israel and the United States on the one hand and Iran on the other can be understood as a race to the bottom. Iran is seeking to deplete regional missile defence arsenals while inflicting damage. In contrast, the United States and Israel are attempting to locate and destroy Iranian transporter erector launchers (TELs) before they can fire, while also degrading command and control and Iranian missile production capacity.

“TEL hunting”, as this mission is commonly described, has historically proven extremely difficult. Efforts during Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom produced limited results. Israel’s air campaign against Iran last year arguably marked the first instance of an air interdiction campaign successfully targeting enemy TELs at scale.

That success now appears to be repeating itself, with dozens of videos published by U.S. and Israeli official channels showing the destruction of Iranian mobile launchers. The Israeli Air Force has stated that it alone has destroyed over 300 missile launchers since the beginning of the war. Successful counter-TEL operations are likely enabled, to a large degree, by pre-war intelligence on TEL storage bases and dispersal routes, and by the presumed large number of medium- and high-altitude UAVs operating above Iran with near impunity, providing continuous surveillance.

Iranian ballistic missile strikes

As expected, Iran has responded with missile and long-range drone attacks against U.S. bases in the region, Israel, and regional neighbours, particularly Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Targets have included military and civilian infrastructure, as well as population centres.

Although much remains obscured by the fog of war, compared to the 12-Day War and earlier missile exchanges between Iran and Israel, Iran’s ballistic missile launches have appeared more unevenly spaced, significantly smaller in scale, and less coordinated. This likely reflects the effects of the ongoing U.S. and Israeli strike campaign, which has degraded not only TEL availability but also command and control, complicating theater-wide coordination of missile operations.

As a result, Iran has presumably had to rely more heavily on increasingly small units operating under forward-delegated authority and executing pre-authorized strike plans, while at times acting on their own initiative.

In total, Iran probably launched around 600 to 700 ballistic missiles in this war so far, which is comparatively limited. During the 12-Day War, Iran appears to have expended roughly 500 to 600 ballistic missiles. However, in that conflict, Iran relied entirely on medium-range ballistic missiles needed to strike Israel and did not employ short-range ballistic missiles. Given that, in the present conflict, short-range ballistic missiles are a viable means of striking regional U.S. allies, and that the confrontation is arguably more existential from a regime-survival perspective, one would, in principle, expect incentives for more extensive use.

In addition, during the 12-Day War, Iran regularly managed to launch salvos of 40 to 50 ballistic missiles at a time, including several days into the war. Current video footage of interceptor launches, for example, during a strike on Doha, Qatar, late in the evening of 28 February, suggests that double-digit ballistic missile salvos have still occurred, though likely not at the previously observed scale, and have remained the exception.

Indeed, since 1 March — i.e., within 24 hours of the beginning of the confrontation —, Iranian ballistic missile usage appears to have decreased sharply. The UAE, which has received the brunt of Iranian ballistic missile attacks and has been relatively transparent about the number of missiles launched at its territory, reported 165 ballistic missiles during the first two days. In the subsequent three days (at the time of writing, 4 March), the UAE reported only 9, 12, and 3 ballistic missile launches against its territory, respectively. Long-range drone launches are reportedly similarly decreasing.

Regional missile defense

Whether the United States and regional allies can outlast Iran until its ballistic missile capabilities are sufficiently degraded depends to a large extent on allied interceptor depth.

How many interceptors the Gulf states deployed at the beginning of the conflict, and how many interceptors the United States brought to the theater in defense of regional bases and allied infrastructure, remains classified. However, reasonable estimates can be made based on how many interceptors the Gulf states were authorized to purchase in the years prior to that.

The table above provides an estimate of ballistic missile interceptor stocks that the Gulf states were authorized to purchase prior to the beginning of the war. Note that this estimate represents a theoretical maximum. There is no guarantee that states will purchase the maximum authorized quantities from the United States. Indeed, often it is less, possibly around 50 to 80 percent.

That said, given that the Gulf states have considered the Iranian ballistic missile threat one of the primary, if not the primary, threat scenarios, it is easy to imagine they may have invested accordingly and procured large shares of authorized ballistic missile defense equipment.

As noted above, according to official UAE information, the country detected 165 Iranian ballistic missiles during the first two days of the war. Assuming that each detected ballistic missile was engaged, and an average of 2.5 interceptors were allocated per projectile, this implies an interceptor use of roughly 410. The UAE likely did not bear the full burden of these engagements, however, as the United States also deploys Patriot fire units on its territory. If the UAE accounted for roughly half of the allocated interceptors, depletion over the first two days would amount to around 200 interceptors. Depending on whether the UAE purchased 50 to 100 percent of the interceptors it was authorized to acquire, this would correspond to roughly 20 to 40 percent of its stockpile.

This example illustrates that concerns about the availability of ballistic missile defence interceptors were entirely justified. Had the intensity of Iranian ballistic missile attacks observed during the first two days continued at the same pace, Emirati interceptor inventories would likely have been severely depleted within a few days to a week. The same logic applies to the other Gulf states.

However, given that the intensity of Iranian ballistic missile attacks appears to have declined sharply, very likely due to TEL attrition, the situation now appears far less alarming. While it may still be premature to dismiss Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities entirely, the Gulf states — with the possible exception of Bahrain, given its comparatively small arsenal — have reason to expect that they can endure the conflict without approaching interceptor exhaustion. Even Bahrain will likely remain in a manageable position, assuming continued U.S. support and missile defense deployments on its territory.

Indeed, rather than ballistic missiles, long-range drones have exposed capability gaps in the defense postures of the Gulf states. Neither the Gulf states nor the United States deploy optimized interceptor systems in sufficient numbers, relying instead on manned aircraft to intercept incoming Shahed-type drones. Nevertheless, individual drones have repeatedly penetrated defenses and struck military and symbolic targets, including the U.S. embassy in Riyadh, which overall does not reflect well on U.S. and allied militaries.

Implications for Ukraine

The primary implications for Ukraine are twofold.

First, demand for Patriot interceptors will increase as the Gulf states seek to replenish their arsenals after the war. This will most likely not affect existing delivery contracts unless U.S. decision-makers intervene directly to reallocate production slots. Still, it will increase competition for limited production slots for Patriot PAC-3 MSE and PAC-2 GEM-T interceptors.

Both Lockheed Martin and Raytheon are expanding their production lines. Lockheed Martin, in particular, is attempting to surge capacity, with plans to increase PAC-3 MSE production from roughly 600 to 2,000 interceptors per year by 2030. Raytheon is expanding PAC-2 GEM-T production from about 300 units annually to around 420 by 2027, supported by a new licensed production facility in Schrobenhausen, Germany, operated by MBDA Germany.

Even so, unless the supply increase outpaces the surge in demand, acquiring Patriot interceptors will not become easier, including for Ukraine. With several European, Asian, and Middle Eastern customers, as well as the United States itself, competing for limited production slots, it is unlikely that interceptor lead times will decrease in the near term. At present, these are estimated at 1.5 to 2.5 years.

Second, the war in the Middle East exposes a capability gap in the arsenals of the Gulf states in the area of long-range drone defense. Reporting suggests that the Gulf states had already begun trying to address this gap in the years before the war, drawing lessons from Ukraine’s experience against Russia and noticing Iran’s diverse long-range drone arsenal. Yet procurement cycles proved too slow to close the capability gap in time.

After the war, whose outcome remains uncertain, Gulf states will likely move quickly to close this capability gap. Ukrainian companies may be well-positioned to offer battle-tested counter-drone technologies to Gulf customers. At the same time, they will likely face intense competition from European missile defense startups, as well as from established European and American primes seeking to offer their own drone defense systems to Middle Eastern buyers.

Picture: Fire Point via X

On the night of 20 to 21 February, Ukraine launched several FP-5 Flamingo land-attack cruise missiles into Russia. At least one missile is confirmed to have struck the Votkinsk missile plant, a state-owned defense enterprise and one of Russia’s most important missile factories, located roughly 1,400 kilometers inside Russia from Ukraine and about 300 kilometers east of Kazan.

Ukraine has targeted Russia’s missile and long-range drone industry before, notably the Yelabuga drone production facility, using long-range drones, which appear to have caused only limited damage, however, due to the relatively low warhead yield of the systems employed. Ukraine has achieved greater success targeting parts of the missile and drone supply chain, particularly chemical precursor materials used to produce explosives and solid fuels.

The attack on Friday night marks the first time that Ukraine has successfully struck a core target of Russia’s missile industry directly using a heavy missile capability. Satellite imagery suggests the strike caused major damage to at least one building, although the precise extent of the destruction cannot be verified at this stage.

This post discusses the implications of the attack, what it means for the Flamingo missile, and explores the potential for future Ukrainian counter-industry operations using deep strike weapons.

Votkinsk missile plant

The Votkinsk Machine Building Plant primarily serves as a final assembly and component-manufacturing site for solid-fuel ballistic missiles. Production covers strategic intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and theater ballistic missile systems, as well as major subcomponents such as rocket motors and airframes.

In the strategic missile domain, the facility is the main producer of the RS-24 Yars ICBM and the RSM-56 Bulava SLBM. The site is also likely a primary production facility for the Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile.

For theater-range ballistic missiles, the facility is the principal production site for 9M723 short-range ballistic missiles used by the Iskander-M system. Some reporting also links the plant to the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal, where it is likely involved at the component manufacturing level.

Russian missile supply chain disruption

The Votkinsk facility is an industrial campus comprising dozens of production buildings and laboratories. Open-source reporting indicates that Workshop 19 was struck during the attack, creating a hole of roughly 30 by 24 meters in the roof. The building reportedly houses a galvanizing and metal-forming shop that performs electroplating, stamping, and surface treatment of structural components prior to final assembly. Its role lies upstream in the production chain, preparing airframe sections, fasteners, and possibly electronic housings used across several missile programs.

Even limited damage could therefore slow multiple assembly lines at once if relevant components become unavailable for an extended period. The short-term impact, however, depends on existing stockpiles or the availability of alternative subcontractors. Given that Russian missile plants appear to operate continuously in three shifts (indicated also by the reported casualties during the night attack), it is plausible that substantial inventories of upstream components exist within the supply chain.

The medium- to long-term impact will depend on how quickly equipment that could have been destroyed can be replaced, including chemical bath systems, wastewater treatment and filtration units, stamping presses, CNC machines, and industrial ventilation infrastructure, among others, as well as how rapidly production lines can be recertified. Russia may be able to replace some equipment domestically, but for certain critical systems, it remains dependent on foreign suppliers, with China likely serving as the primary fallback.

Flamingo lethality

The extent of damage depends on how much machinery was ultimately affected. The Flamingo cruise missile is known to be equipped with a 1,150-kilogram payload, likely carrying TNT equivalent explosives on the order of roughly 600 kilograms.

Assuming that 10 pounds per square inch (psi) of overpressure is required to mechanically destroy equipment in the workshop, the warhead would have a lethal radius of about 30 meters. If 5 psi is considered sufficient to render equipment nonfunctional, the lethal radius could extend to around 35 meters. Lighter damage to machinery may have occurred at distances of up to 55 meters, while beyond that, blast effects are likely negligible, at least for heavier equipment. Given that the building spans roughly 130 meters in length and 55 meters in width, and depending on how the machinery is distributed inside, blast damage is likely to have been localized rather than affecting equipment throughout the entire structure.

Critically, video footage from the night of the attack shows large smoke plumes rising from the building, supporting unconfirmed reports that a fire broke out in the workshop after the strike. Traces of fire damage are also visible in satellite imagery taken afterward. If a fire did occur, and depending on how long it burned, large sections or even the entire building may have been lost.

Given the substantial fuel capacity of the Flamingo, which, according to the manufacturer, enables a range of up to 3,000 kilometers, and considering that the plant lies only about half that distance from potential launch areas, it is possible that significant unburned fuel was dispersed and ignited upon impact, increasing the likelihood of a fire.

The state of Flamingo

The strike on the Votkinsk plant marks the first confirmed successful use of the Flamingo against a high-value target and, in some ways, represents a comeback for the missile and its manufacturer, which have faced growing criticism in recent months.

Since August 2025, Fire Point has claimed a production rate of one Flamingo cruise missile per day, with plans to expand output sevenfold and eventually reach an annual production capacity of 2,500 missiles. At the same time, the Flamingo’s public footprint has remained limited. Where Ukraine has struck high-value targets, it has often continued to rely on long-range drones. Imagery of downed Flamingos and reports from Russian military bloggers about Flamingo strikes have also been scarce, suggesting a relatively low usage rate, though this ultimately remains difficult to verify from open sources.

In addition, when the Flamingo missile was previously confirmed in use, such as during the attack on an FSB outpost in northern Crimea in September 2025, it showed technical shortcomings, particularly in accuracy. Of the three missiles launched, only one landed close to the likely nominal aimpoint, while the other two impacted roughly 80 to 100 and about 200 meters away.

The confirmed Flamingo strike now suggests that production lines remain active and that the missile continues to receive funding and support from Ukrainian decision-makers. There were also reports that efforts had been underway to improve its accuracy. Although Flamingo was never intended to deliver pinpoint precision, the demonstrated accuracy levels in previous strikes were likely viewed as underwhelming.

From the Votkinsk attack alone, it is not possible to determine whether such accuracy improvements were achieved. The struck building is a comparatively large target. If the center of the structure represented the nominal aimpoint, the missile missed by a distance of roughly 20 to 25 meters, which would likely be acceptable for the Flamingo. That said, it is also possible — though perhaps less likely — that another building was targeted and that the missile impacted this structure by chance.

It is also unclear how many Flamingos were launched at the target and how many ultimately arrived in the target area. Video footage from the night of the attack suggests that several missiles were launched simultaneously, though they may have been assigned to different aimpoints. Given the site's high value, it is at least plausible that multiple missiles were directed at it, with most intercepted by air defense systems around the facility and one penetrating the defenses. As noted in an earlier post, the Flamingo’s design produces a relatively large radar cross-section, which makes it vulnerable to interception.

The future of Ukrainian counter-industry targeting

The attack on Russia’s missile industry comes at a time when Ukraine’s missile defense interceptor stocks, particularly for ballistic missile defense, are running dangerously low, and Ukraine’s partners appear unable to supply more. Nothing demonstrates this better than Europe’s current inability to find and deliver 30 PAC-3 MSE interceptors to Ukraine.

Ukraine’s ability to shift toward counter-industry targeting to preempt Russian missiles at the industrial base before they can be launched is therefore not an added benefit but a necessity. The fact that Ukraine has not yet been able to do so, partly because its partners have not sufficiently enabled it in this domain, represents a major failure of European and Western policy.

Effective counter-industry targeting will remain a major challenge. Fully taking a missile plant, such as the one in Votkinsk, out of commission would require dozens, if not hundreds, of missiles striking the target. In addition, accurate intelligence is required to locate high-value equipment so it can be struck precisely.

What currently works in Ukraine’s favor is that Russia’s defense industries, especially missile production, remain highly centralized and, unlike Ukrainian facilities, have not yet been dispersed or moved underground, although this may become a Russian response if Ukrainian counter-industry strikes persist or accelerate.

Conclusion

In the present situation, there are no silver bullets for Ukraine. Nevertheless, Ukraine’s now demonstrated ability to threaten high-value industrial targets deep inside Russian territory is a positive sign. It also remains to be seen whether the Flamingo will emerge as Ukraine’s most important heavy deep-strike weapon, though it is encouraging that the missile remains in production and is likely to be improved.

For European partners, Ukraine’s current security situation illustrates why heavy deep-strike capabilities are so necessary. While missile defense can provide effective localized protection for high-value targets, it cannot protect the entirety of Europe’s territory, especially over prolonged periods.

If European governments believe they could be involved in a prolonged war of attrition against Russia in the coming years, preparing for such a scenario, including by acquiring the deep-strike capabilities needed to target enemy production, is anything but optional. Europe’s current capability gap in this area, therefore, remains highly concerning.

Picture: Special Operations Forces Command of Ukraine

At the end of January, the German news outlet Welt reported on the success rate of Helsing’s HX-2 drone. According to official figures cited in the report, the operational-level strike drone achieved hits in 5 of 14 operational cases, for a 36 percent success rate.

The report sparked considerable debate in Germany and beyond about the effectiveness of modern strike weapons. Some observers interpreted the comparatively low success rate as a sign of unmet expectations or possible performance issues, while others emphasized the limited data basis and the absence of meaningful comparative benchmarks.

Regardless of how individual positions are assessed, the case highlights the methodological challenge of interpreting success rates for modern strike weapons based on small samples. Moreover, the episode reveals a broader shortcoming in the debate over the success rates of modern strike capabilities, which too often fails to account for the correlated nature of failures in strike warfare.

Correlated and uncorrelated failures

In statistics, probability theory distinguishes between correlated and uncorrelated failures.

Uncorrelated failures occur when outcomes represent independent draws from the same probability distribution. Each event, typically called a “trial”, carries its own random risk of failure, and observing one outcome provides no information about another. Variation across outcomes reflects sampling noise around a stable parameter, leading to increasingly predictable aggregate behavior as the number of trials increases.

This may sound abstract, but the intuition is simple. Assume a strike operation, for example a drone strike against an enemy unit, has an overall success probability of 50 percent. If failures are uncorrelated, each repetition of the trial is governed by the same probability, regardless of previous or subsequent outcomes. Over many strikes, roughly half will succeed, and half will fail, with deviations from this pattern reflecting random chance rather than shared underlying conditions.

In contrast, correlated failures arise when multiple observations share a common source of uncertainty. Instead of each trial being governed by a fixed probability, outcomes depend partly on “latent” conditions that affect many trials at once. When those underlying conditions shift, successes and failures cluster rather than appearing evenly dispersed. The key distinction, therefore, is the presence of shared variance that links outcomes through a common driver.

Again, this may sound abstract in theory, but it is straightforward in practice. Consider the same drone strike example with a 50 percent success probability. If failures are correlated, the probability is not constant across strikes but varies with shared conditions, such as ISR availability, operator performance, manufacturing flaws across individual production batches, enemy air defense availability, or weather, among others. In this case, some strike salvos may experience broadly favorable conditions and achieve many successes, while others encounter degraded conditions and produce clusters of failures. Over time, the average success rate may still approach 50 percent, but outcomes will appear far more uneven, with salvos tending to succeed or fail together rather than resembling a sequence of independent coin flips.

Modeling strike operations

For modelling purposes, used to derive military and political implications from strike operations, the structure of the operation and the availability of data often shape whether analysts treat failures as approximately independent or as driven by shared conditions. In practice, this choice affects whether mission success is modelled as a fixed probability, which lends itself to binomial-style reasoning, or as a variable quantity that can produce correlated outcomes across trials.

For example, analysts modelling a nuclear counterforce strike may have defensible reasons to approximate outcomes with a binomial framework under specific assumptions. A nuclear counterforce operation is, by definition, a single, large-scale nuclear strike rather than a sequence of iterative salvos, thereby reducing concerns about temporal correlation. If analysts assume stable targeting data, well-characterized weapon performance, and tightly controlled operational procedures, it can be reasonable to treat individual strike outcomes as approximately independent for the purpose of tractable modelling.

This does not imply that failures are truly independent in practice. Weapons may still be affected by the same underlying problems, but analysts can capture these effects indirectly by adjusting the overall success rate of nuclear forces, for example, by introducing a conservatively ranged systemic error term, rather than modelling every shared risk explicitly.

The uncorrelated failure assumption largely breaks down in many conventional strike scenarios, however, because outcomes are shaped by shared operational conditions that cannot be ignored. Conventional strike campaigns often unfold over multiple waves, rely on distributed sensing and communication networks, and operate in environments where signal availability, ISR quality, and defensive countermeasures fluctuate over time.

When these shared conditions degrade — or not —, large numbers of weapons can experience similar performance problems at once — or not —, producing clusters of success or failure that a fixed probability model struggles to capture.

Understanding modern strike operations

The point is not that observers of strike campaigns must be statisticians to draw valid inferences about weapon performance. The analytical challenge lies instead in distinguishing between correlated and uncorrelated failures, since this distinction shapes how operational outcomes should be interpreted.

When analysts treat correlated failures as independent outcomes, for example by reducing performance to single percentage figures, they risk overstating predictability while understating the likelihood of extreme outcomes (broad success or widespread failure). Averages can obscure the fact that operational results often cluster under shared environmental or technical conditions. This may encourage overly confident judgments about strike effectiveness, especially when conclusions rely on limited or selective data.

In the HX-2 case, the reported success rate of 36 percent is difficult to interpret given the limited information about the causes and structure of failures. Available reporting points to recurring technical problems, including instability of the video link and sensor limitations. These issues may indicate correlated failures linked to shared system constraints rather than independent events. At the same time, the small sample size and lack of contextual detail make it impossible to determine whether the observed outcomes reflect typical performance, temporary technical constraints, or unusually unfavorable operational conditions. It therefore remains unclear whether the reported figure represents performance near the lower or upper bound of expectations or closer to an operational average.

A comparison with Ukrainian long-range drone operations illustrates how larger datasets can reveal patterns that remain hidden in smaller samples. Public reporting often estimates the success rate of individual systems, such as the FP-1 or the AN-196 Liutyi, at below 10 percent. More relevant than the precise success rate, however, is the volume of documented strikes, which makes recurring dependencies visible. Across hundreds of salvos, operational conditions such as air defense density and electronic warfare appear to have shaped outcomes across entire waves of attacks (technical problems, notably systemic error, constitute a less widely reported failure source). As a result, even large salvos have often produced limited to no effects, while a small number of successful salvos have been able to generate significant damage, suggesting that aggregate success rates emerge from clustered patterns that cannot be reduced to independent outcomes.

Similar dependencies may exist in the HX-2 dataset, but without additional information, they cannot be demonstrated. As a result, any assessment necessarily remains preliminary, particularly with respect to strong claims about system-level performance. This reflects a broader limitation of open-source analysis, where incomplete data often prevents analysts from distinguishing between independent and correlated outcomes. At a minimum, it is important to recognize these constraints to maintain analytical discipline when evaluating modern strike operations. In practice, however, this is often neglected.

Conclusion

The open-source assessment of modern strike weapons requires a combination of statistical analysis, contextual knowledge, and operational data. Simple metrics that merely divide the number of deployments by the number of successes often fail to capture the underlying uncertainties and dependencies.

Even for methodologically proficient analysts, the scarcity of high-quality data needed to analyze the dependencies among outcomes poses a central challenge. Individual success or failure rates should therefore be interpreted with caution. This applies not only to the HX-2 but also to other long-range strike capabilities whose performance is often the subject of speculation, such as the Ukrainian FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile.

Picture: LPP

The war in Ukraine has highlighted the utility of a new class of missile systems, often referred to as “mini cruise missiles”. These systems share many characteristics with heavier, legacy land-attack cruise missiles, but are offered at a substantially lower price point, typically around USD 150,000 to 300,000.

A growing number of manufacturers in Europe and the United States are offering mini cruise missile solutions. The year 2026 may prove decisive in determining how market share is allocated in this increasingly important and competitive missile segment.

This post examines the use cases and rationales for acquiring mini cruise missiles and provides an overview of U.S. and European manufacturers competing for market share in Europe in 2026.

What are mini cruise missiles, and how do they differ from long-range drones?

Mini cruise missiles resemble heavier cruise missiles in overall form, featuring a long, slender fuselage, relatively small wings that often deploy after launch, and air inlets for an air-breathing engine, typically a turbojet. Functionally, they combine relatively long range with medium-to-high subsonic speeds and a small-to-moderate payload, depending on the design.

These characteristics distinguish mini cruise missiles from long-range drones, which usually operate at lower subsonic speeds and therefore rely on larger aerodynamic surfaces to remain airborne. This flight profile typically yields a weaker stealth profile and a smaller payload capacity. Long-range drones also tend to be less sophisticated in system architecture, often reducing terminal accuracy and increasing vulnerability to hard and soft-kill air defenses, including electronic warfare.

That said, the boundary between mini cruise missiles and long-range drones remains blurred. As long-range drones become faster, more survivable, capable of carrying larger payloads, and more expensive, their capability profile increasingly converges with that of mini cruise missiles, and they are employed in similar roles.

Why are mini cruise missiles useful?

Mini cruise missiles fill the gap between affordable, expendable long-range drones and costly, high-end missile systems, including heavy cruise and conventional ballistic missiles. They retain the affordability and expendability of long-range drones while, in principle, offering higher survivability and lethality, though the magnitude of these advantages is context-dependent.

Two use cases stand out. First, they are attractive when long-range drones lack sufficient lethality or survivability, but employing heavy missiles would be excessive and cost-inefficient. In such cases, mini cruise missiles allow scarce high-end systems to be reserved for targets that truly require their capabilities.

Second, in contested environments where drones are unlikely to survive, and the payoff of firing limited stocks of expensive missiles is uncertain, mini cruise missiles offer a compromise between cost and survivability, enabling attempts at target neutralization without incurring prohibitive losses if the attack fails.

Mini cruise missiles are unlikely to replace either drones or heavy missile systems. Instead, they serve a largely complementary role. An exception may apply to the role of mini cruise missiles in the arsenals of smaller states with constrained defense budgets. Here, mini cruise missiles may allow states that were previously priced out of the market to acquire deep missile arsenals. In this case, the capability is not merely complementary but enabling.

The mini cruise missile market in Europe and the United States

A growing number of American and European manufacturers are entering the mini cruise missile market, including established firms and newer startups and scale-ups. Given the potential demand, this expansion is unsurprising.

A conservative estimate suggests that European NATO states alone could require around 20,000 mini cruise missiles in peacetime, and considerably more under worsening security conditions. At an average per-unit cost of USD 150,000 to 300,000, this implies a European market of roughly USD 3-6 billion.

In the United States, startups Zone 5 Technologies and CoAspire are developing mini cruise missiles for the U.S. Air Force under the ERAM program (Rusty Dagger and RAACM), which aims to field a low-cost cruise missile by late 2026. Both systems are also expected to be supplied to Ukraine, which has approval to purchase up to 3,350 ERAM-type missiles.

Kongsberg recently acquired a majority stake in Zone 5 Technologies, likely to market the Rusty Dagger and comparable products to European customers, with potential for local production. Anduril has signed extensive cooperation agreements with Taiwanese, Polish, and German manufacturers to develop localized variants of its Barracuda mini cruise missile. Lockheed Martin and Kratos are pursuing parallel efforts, though without confirmed customers.

In Europe, Destinus currently offers the combat-proven Ruta mini cruise missile, which has seen extensive use in Ukraine, while Czech firm LPP plans to field the Narwhal by 2026. MBDA has presented the CROSSBOW concept, which could enter production by mid-2026 if a customer emerges. MBDA Germany’s RCM², which the German armed forces will likely procure in the mid to late 2020s, occupies a higher-end niche (likely costing between USD 500,000 and USD 1 million) that bridges the mini cruise missile segment and more expensive missile systems.

European manufacturers may benefit politically amid strained transatlantic relations, but only if they can scale production and secure resilient supply chains. Some states may also consider Ukrainian missiles, especially if the war in Ukraine slows and Ukrainian manufacturers have excess production capacity to spare. In that case, improved export variants of mini cruise missiles like the Peklo, Bars, or Palianytsia could become viable options for European customers. However, this appears unlikely in the near term.

Conclusion

Several European states are likely to pursue a mini cruise missile capability in 2026. Given the number of new market entrants alongside established firms, it is reasonable to describe the mini cruise missile segment as one of the most competitive areas of the global, and especially the European, missile market.

By the end of 2026, it should be clearer which actors are emerging as leaders in this segment and how American competitors compare with their European counterparts. That outcome will likely also say a great deal about the future structure of the European missile market and the role the United States will play within it.

Picture: Saab

In October 2024, reports first indicated that the Bundeswehr was interested in acquiring the Taurus Neo land-attack cruise missile, the successor to the Taurus KEPD 350 that had been widely discussed in the context of potential deliveries to Ukraine.

On 17 December 2025, the German Parliament will convene to vote, among other items, on allocating funding for the Taurus Neo. Importantly, this funding does not yet constitute a firm missile order. Instead, it supports preparations for eventual serial production, apparently providing some 400 to 500 million Euros to support this effort.

This post outlines how the Taurus Neo will differ from its predecessor and examines what the project reveals about the European missile industrial base.

Taurus KEPD 350

The Taurus KEPD 350 in its original configuration is powered by an American P8300-15 turbofan engine from Michigan-based manufacturer Williams International, offering high thrust with relatively low fuel consumption.

The missile carries a robust midcourse guidance suite that combines a satellite-assisted inertial measurement unit, terrain-contour matching (TERCOM), and image-based navigation via an imaging infrared seeker that compares encountered landmarks to pre-stored maps. This system is an early precursor to the AI-assisted image-based navigation used in modern drones and missiles, although it lacks learning, feature abstraction, and online adaptability of AI-based systems. Terminal guidance uses the same IIR to home in on specific aimpoints, delivering very high levels of accuracy as repeatedly demonstrated in test launches.

The KEPD 350 is fitted with the MEPHISTO multi-effect warhead from German manufacturer TDW, which combines a shaped-charge primary with a secondary penetrator warhead capable of defeating buried and hardened targets.

Around 2018, half of Germany’s KEPD 350 fleet underwent a midlife overhaul that replaced the original satellite receiver with a more jamming-resistant M-Code GPS receiver, also fitted to the export variant KEPD 350K supplied to South Korea. The remaining missiles in Germany’s inventory will be overhauled under a second modernization contract awarded in 2025.

Germany’s new cruise missile: The Taurus Neo

The Taurus Neo will likely introduce major changes to most components used in the Taurus KEPD 350.

The largest change concerns the engine, which is to be replaced entirely. This task is difficult because capable turbofan engines are difficult to come by, especially in Europe, which has long neglected its mini turbofan industry. Early reports suggested the German-Swedish manufacturer Taurus Systems GmbH might source a replacement from Japan, while new information now indicates that a European engine manufacturer may be the preferred option, though uncertainty remains.

European engine manufacturers could likely build the turbofan technology needed for a heavy missile such as the Taurus Neo, which requires significantly more thrust (>6 kN). However, because this type of engine does not currently exist in Europe, a new development would be necessary, entailing development risk — one the Bundeswehr appears willing to accept.

A newly developed engine would likely be state-of-the-art, meaning that modest performance gains from advanced manufacturing and improved materials can be expected relative to the more-than-two-decade-old Williams International turbofan, increasing the missile’s range, perhaps by 10 to 20 percent. If a substantially greater range is desired, structural modification to provide additional internal fuel volume will likely be required.

The Taurus Neo will reportedly also receive a new IIR seeker. This makes sense, given that Taurus’ original seeker was designed in the late 1990s, based on cooled mid-wave infrared sensors with relatively low pixel resolution, limited processing power, and narrow spectral range. Replacing it with a more modern solution will provide for better image recognition and clutter rejection, ultimately increasing the missile’s accuracy both during the midcourse and terminal stages of flight. In regard to the IIR sensor, it is also very likely that the missile’s mission planning software will integrate AI solutions, similar to other modern missile systems.

The warhead system may remain largely unchanged and very likely retain the for its time highly advanced void-and-layer-counting fuze system used in the Taurus KEPD 350. This being said, the penetrator warhead’s mechanical fuze (called PIMPF) could be replaced with an electronic fuze similar to the one used in the American JASSM and JASSM-ER cruise missiles. This would improve reliability, handling safety, and the accuracy of detonation timing.

If weight or especially space becomes an issue in Taurus Neo, it would be possible to consider removing the primary shaped charge warhead. This would reduce lethality against more complex target types, notably those incorporating layered steel and concrete elements, though the vast majority of targets, including hardened ones, could likely still be engaged with high effectiveness.

Lastly, hardening the missile against electronic warfare reportedly is a priority for the Taurus Neo, which is sensible given Russia’s demonstrated skill at soft-killing Ukrainian missile systems, including Western provided ones that incorporate advanced M-Code satellite receivers (for example, some GMLRS variants). That said, with TERCOM and improved image-based navigation, Taurus Neo should already be capable of operating in GPS-denied environments.

Taurus Neo and the European missile industrial base

Following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine and the demonstrated need for large numbers of missile systems, it became clear years ago that Germany’s missile arsenal would require quantitative expansion if Germany were serious about providing the continent’s conventional backbone. At the same time, Germany delayed committing to new missile orders and, to date, no confirmed orders exist.

In 2022 and 2023, the lack of orders could partly, if not primarily, be explained by limited political will to invest in “offensive” missile capabilities and a clear preference to prioritise missile defense. By mid-2024, this explanation weakened, as publicly available data suggested that the industry was prepared to restart production, and a change in the German government in 2025 appeared to create a more favourable environment for missile procurement.

The fact that by the end of 2025, still no firm order for new Taurus missiles exists appears to relate to a significant degree to the drastically changed security environment in Europe, which not only sees Russia as an existential threat, but has lost confidence in the United States as a reliable defense-industrial partner.

Political scientists know that basing arguments on counterfactuals is risky. Still, it is plausible that if the geopolitical rupture between Europe and the United States in 2025 had not occurred, Germany would not have devoted such effort to decoupling the Taurus Neo’s supply chain from U.S. manufacturers, even at the cost of development risk and longer delivery times. In that case, 2025 might have seen a firm Taurus Neo order rather than a funding allocation to prepare production.

Delivery timing-wise, this matters. Already in 2024, when Taurus Neo was first publicly mentioned, it was stated that the first deliveries were not expected before 2029. At this stage, certification of a new production line and delivery of initial missiles will likely extend into the early 2030s, even if the funding vote next week enables the manufacturer to ramp up capacities ahead of a formal contract by stockpiling critical materials, acquiring needed equipment and facilities, and likely hiring and training workers.

Germany’s decision to reshuffle the Taurus supply chain is costing time it does not have, while simultaneously revitalising Germany’s and Europe’s missile industrial base in key areas. Given persistent uncertainty about the United States’ future military and defence-industrial role, the decision appears justified.

Picture: Office of the President of Ukraine

Around this time last year, I reviewed Ukraine’s newest additions to its conventional long-range strike arsenal. One year later, Ukraine’s missile and long-range drone capabilities have expanded and diversified further. In addition, more reliable information is now available on the capability profiles of Ukraine’s conventional long-range strike weapons employed throughout the war.

This post offers an updated 2025 overview of Ukraine’s conventional long-range strike arsenal, including all confirmed missile and long-range drone systems with ranges of 150 kilometers or more. Programs based on speculation or lacking sufficient public data are excluded.

Missile categorization

I group Ukraine’s conventional long-range strike weapons into three categories: heavy, medium, and light one-way effectors.

Heavy effectors deliver large payloads, defined here as 200 kilograms or more, enabling them to credibly threaten a wide range of targets in single strikes. Their main drawback is that these systems are often more expensive and complex to manufacture than lighter alternatives.

Medium effectors carry smaller but still substantial payloads, defined here as 100 to 200 kilograms. They deliver significant destructive power, but are generally less lethal than their heavier counterparts, especially against structurally hardened targets. Several systems in this category are sometimes described as “missile drones”, though that term is misleading. Based on their specifications, “mini-cruise missile” is more accurate, since they share most characteristics with traditional cruise missiles but are generally smaller than many pre-war designs.

Light effectors have a payload capacity below 100 kilograms. This greatly reduces their lethality against hardened targets, and the small lethal radius often makes it difficult to compensate for terminal inaccuracies. That said, these systems are relatively easy to produce and affordable.

Key trends at the end of 2025

The image above provides an overview of Ukraine’s conventional long-range strike arsenal at the end of 2025 by plotting individual missile and long-range drone systems according to their range and payload capacity. Imported systems are indicated in red; indigenously produced ones in blue. For readability, the graph omits the FP-5 “Flamingo”, which is an outlier due to its outsized payload and range (1,150 kilograms and 3,000 kilometers), but it is discussed below.

Note that these two variables alone reveal little about survivability or accuracy. They do, however, offer basic insight into the types of targets these systems can reach and destroy.

At the end of 2025, the vast majority of Ukraine’s conventional long-range strike weapons will fall in the light category. Ukrainian manufacturers have produced a diverse range of systems capable of striking deep, most notably long-range drones, but they still struggle to integrate payloads of 100 kilograms or more.

Twelve systems currently fall into the light category, while only nine (including the Flamingo, omitted from the graph) fall into the medium and heavy categories. In addition, Ukraine remains largely dependent on Western deliveries for heavy missile systems. The only three Ukrainian programs of record included here — Flamingo, Sapsan, and the Long Neptune — each face uncertainties.

As Ukraine’s conventional long-range strike program enters 2026, maturing and scaling production of indigenous heavy missile solutions will remain a top priority. Given potentially growing pressure from the United States to accept an unfavorable negotiated settlement, these missile systems can provide a major source of independent strategic leverage.

Below, I briefly review each confirmed conventional long-range strike capability in Ukraine’s arsenal. I provide a picture or digital rendering when no copyright issues prevent me from doing so; otherwise, I include an external link.

Ukrainian heavy missiles

ATACMS

Picture: Lockheed Martin Corporation

Ukraine first received ATACMS short-range ballistic missiles, produced by U.S. manufacturer Lockheed Martin, in October 2023 and has since been provided with three variants.

The first confirmed variant was the M39 ATACMS, with a range of 185 kilometers and a 560-kilogram cluster munitions warhead containing 950 M74 bomblets. The M39 variant is guided by inertial navigation (INS) only.

The second variant, first confirmed to have been used in April 2024, was the M39A1 ATACMS, with a range of up to 300 kilometers, an integrated satellite receiver (GNSS), and carrying a reduced cluster payload of 300 M74 bomblets.

The first unitary-warhead ATACMS variant was first used in May 2024. Most likely, this was either the M48 or the slightly more modern M57. Both variants feature INS/GNSS guidance, a 227-kilogram WAU-23/B unitary warhead, and a range of up to 300 kilometers.

At the end of 2025, Ukraine is unlikely to retain a substantial reserve stockpile of ATACMS ballistic missiles.

FP-5 “Flamingo”

Picture: Fire Point

In August 2025, manufacturer Fire Point unveiled the FP-5 “Flamingo” land-attack cruise missile. The missile was first used in September 2025, though with mixed results.

The missile reportedly features a 1,150-kilogram warhead and a range of up to 3,000 kilometers. The missile is guided by INS/GNSS during midcourse and is not known to incorporate a terminal guidance seeker.

Although the manufacturer has made ambitious claims about mass-producing the missile when it was first unveiled, use of the missile has so far not been widely reported.

R360L Neptune-D

The R360L Neptune-D (also known as the Long Neptune) was first unveiled in August 2025 and is an enlarged, land-attack-optimized version of the R360 Neptune anti-ship cruise missile, which had reached initial operational capability in mid-2021, just months before the full-scale invasion. The Neptune was developed by Ukrainian manufacturer Luch Design Bureaus.

Ukrainian reports put its range at up to 1,000 kilometers and its warhead at 260 kilograms. Public accounts indicate the missile has an enhanced guidance suite, potentially including a terrain-contour-matching (TERCOM) altimeter to provide redundant navigation in GNSS-denied environments. The missile may carry a land-attack optimized guidance seeker similar to other modified Neptune variants, though this remains unconfirmed.

Sapsan

Picture: VoidWanderer/Creative Commons Licence

The Sapsan is a short-range ballistic missile developed and produced by Ukrainian manufacturer Pivdenne Design Bureaus. Ukraine announced in May 2025 that the Sapsan completed combat testing and moved toward serial production in June 2025. Nonetheless, the program’s status remains highly uncertain.

Sources commonly estimate the range at 300–500 kilometers and the payload at about 480 kilograms. Guidance is provided by INS/GNSS. Some reports suggest integration of a terminal guidance seeker, but this remains unconfirmed.

Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG

Picture: Ukrainian MoD, Screenshot from video

Ukraine’s first heavy missile system was the Storm Shadow land-attack cruise missile, first used in May 2023. From July 2023 onward, Ukraine began receiving French and later Italian SCALP-EG land-attack cruise missiles, which are virtually identical.

The missile is manufactured by MBDA and carries a 450-kilogram multi-effect warhead, comprising a primary shaped charge and a secondary penetrator, which provides significant hard-target kill capability. Its guidance suite is robust and redundant, combining INS/GNSS and TERCOM for midcourse guidance, and an imaging-infrared seeker for terminal guidance.

Given that France, Italy, and the UK very likely did not stockpile range-restricted export versions, Ukraine almost certainly received the baseline variant with an unclassified range of 560 kilometers. Unless the missile was retroactively range-restricted, for example via software updates, Ukraine should have access to the full range.

By the end of 2025, Ukraine is likely to retain only a small potential stockpile of Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missiles, since most delivered rounds have probably been expended, and European partner stocks are largely exhausted.

Ukrainian medium missiles

‘Bulged’ Neptune

Picture: Ukrainian MoD

In October 2025, Ukraine unveiled another modified Neptune variant featuring conformal fuel tanks that create a bulged profile, though the variant has not yet been officially named. Similar to other Neptune variants, the missile is presumably manufactured by Luch Design Bureaus.

The missile appears to retain the original diameter and overall geometry, with external tanks added for fuel, which suggests it likely keeps the baseline Neptune’s 150-kilogram warhead. The range remains unconfirmed, though an extension to 400-600 kilometers appears plausible. It is also possible that the variant carries a land-optimized terminal guidance seeker, as was reported for earlier Neptune modifications.

Palianytsia

The Palianytsia, a mini-cruise missile produced by Ukrainian manufacturer Ukroboronprom, was unveiled in August 2024, but details about the weapon system did not emerge until September 2025.

The missile reportedly has a range of 600–700 kilometers and a payload capacity of up to 100 kilograms. It is guided by INS/GNSS and is not known to be equipped with a terminal guidance seeker.

R360 Neptune (mod. 1)

Picture: Wikimedia Commons

In August 2023, reports first indicated that Ukraine was using modified versions of the R-360 Neptune anti-ship cruise missile.

The missile likely retains the original 300-kilometer range and 150-kilogram warhead of the baseline variant but is reported to feature an imaging-infrared seeker optimized for engaging land-based targets, replacing the active radar seeker of the original version.

It is unclear if production of this Neptune variant continues or if it has been discontinued in favor of later variants (i.e., the “Long” and “Bulged” Neptunes).

Ruta

Picture: Destinus

Ukraine was first reported to have received Ruta cruise missiles in early 2024. The missile is produced by European manufacturer Destinus at production facilities in the Netherlands and Spain.

According to the manufacturer, the Ruta has a range of over 500 kilometers and a payload capacity of up to 150 kilograms. Reducing the payload can extend its maximum range. The missile is guided by INS/GNSS; integration of terminal guidance seekers is possible, but is not the standard. AI-supported image-based navigation is planned for future variants to provide redundant navigation in GNSS-denied environments.

Ukrainian light missiles and long-range drones

AQ-400 Scythe

Picture: Terminal Autonomy

The AQ-400 Scythe long-range drone, produced by Ukraine-based manufacturer Terminal Autonomy, was first delivered to the Ukrainian armed forces in December 2023.

The drone reportedly has a range of 750 kilometers (some reports put it up to 900 kilometers) and typically carries a 43-kilogram warhead. The AQ-400 Scythe is guided by INS/GNSS, with optional terminal guidance via an electro-optical seeker and an operator in the loop when a radio line-of-sight to the operator is available.

AN-196 Liutyi

Picture: Ukrainian Armed Forces

The AN-196 Liutyi, a long-range drone produced by Ukrainian manufacturer Ukroboronprom, was first unveiled in October 2022.

Later models reportedly have a range of up to 2,000 kilometers and a payload capacity of 75 kilograms; an earlier variant had a range of 1,000 kilometers and carried a 50-kilogram warhead. The Liutyi is guided by INS/GNSS. Integration of a dedicated terminal guidance seeker is not publicly confirmed.

Banshee

Remains of downed Banshee long-range drones were first discovered in February 2024. The system is manufactured by the British company QinetiQ and is a weaponized version of target drones produced by the same manufacturer.

The drone reportedly has a range exceeding 100 kilometers, with some Ukrainian sources estimating a maximum range of up to 200 kilometers. It has a payload capacity of seven kilograms and is guided by INS/GNSS. Integration of a terminal guidance seeker has not been reported.

Bars

The existence of the Bars mini-cruise missile was first confirmed in April 2025. Its manufacturer is unclear, though open sources describe it as a Ukrainian private-sector innovation.

The missile is reported to have a range of 700 to 800 kilometers and to use INS/GNSS guidance without a dedicated terminal seeker. The payload is unconfirmed, but most open-source accounts report a small warhead of roughly 50 to 60 kilograms.

Dart 250

The Dart 250 long-range drone was unveiled in late 2024 and reportedly underwent testing that year in Ukraine. The system is produced by British manufacturer Modini.

It reportedly has a range of up to 250 kilometers and carries a 25-kilogram payload. The Dart 250 navigates primarily via INS/GNSS and can reportedly locate targets in GNSS-denied environments. Integration of a terminal guidance seeker has not been reported, except for a separate EW variant equipped with a passive radio seeker able to home in on jamming frequencies.

FP-1

Full-scale production of the FP-1 long-range drone, built by Ukrainian manufacturer Fire Point, began in October 2024.

The FP-1 reportedly delivers a 60–120-kilogram warhead to a range of up to 1,600 kilometers and is guided by INS/GNSS. Integration of a dedicated terminal guidance system has not been reported.

LORD

Picture: Destinus

The LORD long-range drone, produced by European manufacturer Destinus, first appeared in coverage from mid-2023 onward.

Relatively little is known about the LORD. Range estimates vary from 750 to 2,000 kilometers. Given the drone’s lightweight design and large wingspan, the higher figure may be feasible but likely represents an upper bound. The drone is reportedly able to carry a 9-to-20-kilogram payload. Navigation is provided by INS/GNSS, and some sources report integration of AI-supported image-based navigation.

Modified two-seater aircraft

In April 2024, Ukraine began using converted two-seater aircraft as long-range drones.

For example, modified Aeroprakt A-22 light aircraft are reported to have a range exceeding 1,000 kilometers and a payload capacity of about 60 to 100 kilograms. On A-22s the payload is integrated into the airframe and the aircraft is programmed to fly directly into the target. Other modified two-seaters carry externally mounted payloads that are dropped on the target during overflight. These aircraft are reportedly guided by a simple INS/GNSS package.

Morok

The Morok long-range drone was first unveiled in late 2023. No single commercial manufacturer has been publicly identified. Open reporting credits Ukrainian volunteer engineers, charity fundraising, and SBU- and military-adjacent groups with developing and financing the long-range drone. Some reports suggest that the Morok is based on the RZ-60 target drone.

The Morok reportedly has a range of 800 kilometers and a payload capacity of around 30 kilograms. Its guidance suite is said to include INS/GNSS, and no dedicated terminal guidance seekers have been reported.

Pekklo

Picture: Office of the President of Ukraine

The Pekklo mini-cruise missile was unveiled in December 2024. The missile is produced by Ukrainian manufacturer Ukroboronprom.

It reportedly has a range of about 700 kilometers and carries a 50 to 70 kilogram warhead. The missile is guided by GNSS/INS, with no official confirmation of a terminal guidance seeker.

UJ-22 Airborne

Picture: Ukrjet

The UJ-22 Airborne is a multi-purpose unmanned aircraft system first presented by Ukrjet in June 2021. A weaponized one-way attack variant was reportedly first used in April 2023 in strikes against Moscow.

The long-range drone has a range of 800 kilometers, is guided primarily by INS/GNSS, and carries a payload of about 20 kilograms. Some variants reportedly incorporate electro-optical seekers for remote terminal guidance.

UJ-25 Skyline

Picture: Ukrjet

The UJ-25 Skyline is a weaponized version of the UJ-23 Topaz target drone, produced by Ukrainian manufacturer Ukrjet. It was first observed publicly in September 2023 and saw its first combat use in December 2023.

The UJ-25’s range is not publicly confirmed but likely spans several hundred kilometers, perhaps 300–900 km. It reportedly carries a 10-kilogram warhead and is guided by INS/GNSS, with possible operator-in-the-loop terminal guidance via an electro-optical seeker and datalink.

UJ-26 Beaver

Picture: Ukrainian MoD via X

The UJ-26 Beaver, a long-range drone produced by Ukrainian manufacturer Ukrjet, was first unveiled and employed in May 2023.

The drone reportedly has a range of up to 1,000 kilometers with a 20-kilogram payload and is navigated by INS/GNSS. A variant unveiled in 2025 reportedly adds an imaging-infrared seeker for remote terminal guidance via datalink.

Picture: Fabian Hoffmann / Missile Matters

Earlier this fall, Helsing, Europe’s prime AI defense startup, showcased a new unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) at a launch event in Tussenhausen, near Munich, Germany — the CA-1 Europa.

What sets Helsing apart from its competitors, at least in the announcement accompanying the product launch, is its emphasis on the CA-1 Europa fulfilling a deep strike requirement for its operators. This suggests a role for the UCAV that goes beyond the collaborative and supporting functions with manned aircraft emphasized by other industry actors in the field, pointing instead to a strike mission intended to generate independent effects.

This coincides, likely not by accident, with the Bundeswehr recently issuing a requirement for a “Jagbomberdrohne” (fighter bomber drone), which, as the name implies, refers to a system capable not only of supporting airborne assets as a loyal wing man but also of independently executing strike missions.

This raises important questions: What is the future role of UCAVs in deep strike missions, and under what circumstances might they prove superior to traditional one-way deep strike systems? Can these types of UCAVs fill Europe’s deep strike requirement and perhaps compensate for its inferiority in traditional missile systems?

Factors affecting performance

Whether reusable UCAVs or one-way effectors, such as cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, or long range drones, are preferable for deep strike missions depends on several factors. The most important are unit cost, the likelihood of loss, the likelihood of destroying the target if the system arrives, and, for UCAVs, recurring operating costs for maintenance, refueling, and sortie generation.

Expected attrition is arguably the decisive variable for UCAVs. A reusable aircraft only makes economic sense if it can survive more than a single mission. UCAV attrition is also more structured than for missiles: there are losses on the way to the target and losses on the way out. In many scenarios the return leg is likely more dangerous, because the defender has been alerted, has a rough idea of the aircraft’s location following the strike, and may have had time to mobilize air defenses.

The second key variable is lethality once the platform arrives. Here a UCAV has a potential advantage. It can carry several payloads (for example, several guided or unguided bombs), and, if it survives over the target, it can engage multiple aimpoints in a single sortie. In principle, a single UCAV that reaches its target and performs as planned can therefore deliver effects comparable to several one-way effectors. If immediate battle damage assessment is available and the UCAV’s payload capacity allows it, it may also be possible to begin a second attack run to maximize success probability.

To compare performance in a transparent way, we can start by looking at expected costs. Assume a target with three aimpoints that all have to be destroyed to achieve critical damage. If each aimpoint is serviced by one missile, we can calculate the expected cost of the strike package as

Assume each missile has a 95 percent reliability, a 90 percent chance of penetrating enemy air defences, and a 90 percent chance of destroying its aimpoint once it arrives. Those three numbers multiply to a 77 percent chance that a single missile neutralises an aimpoint. On average, this means that about 3.9 missiles are needed to score three successful hits. At an expected cost of 3 million USD per missile, the expected cost of the strike package is roughly 11.7 million USD.

This model is a simple heuristic. It assumes that every missile has the same success probability and that each shot is independent. In reality, success probabilities often depend on the tactical situation, the defender’s alert state, and correlated failures within a salvo. The calculation also glosses over targeting issues by treating the extra “0.9 of a missile” as if it somehow knew exactly which of the earlier missiles would fail. In reality, operators would have to assume they do not know which missile or missiles will fail and allocate more than one to each aimpoint if they want to secure higher kill probabilities. Still, it is the standard expected value calculation used in reliability and attrition modelling for single-use systems and gives a useful first-order benchmark.

For UCAVs the situation is more complicated. Because a UCAV can survive the mission and return, and because it generates ongoing operating costs, it is not enough to ask how much one sortie costs. Instead, we want the long run expected cost per destroyed target, averaged over the UCAV’s whole life until it is lost. This requires a more detailed attrition model.

Assume a UCAV costs 15 million USD, each mission imposes an operating cost of 30,000 USD, and each munition costs 50,000 USD. For this example, assume the following: a 10 percent chance that the UCAV has to abort and return early due to some unforeseen event without being lost; a 5 percent chance that it is lost due to systemic failure (for example, engine or software problems); a 10 percent chance that it is shot down on the way to the target; and a 20 percent chance that it is shot down on the way back (reflecting the higher danger once the defender is alerted). If the UCAV reaches the target, assume it has a 90 percent chance of destroying the target, using three or more bombs against the three aimpoints.

Under these assumptions, the probability that a sortie both reaches the target and destroys it is about 69.5 percent. The overall probability that the UCAV is lost on that sortie, either due to systemic causes or enemy action on the way in or the way out, is about 29.6 percent. From these two numbers we can calculate the expected number of successful missions per airframe before it is lost. In this example, that figure, usually written as K, is about 2.33. In other words, each UCAV can be expected to deliver roughly 2.3 successful strikes before it is destroyed.

We can then calculate the long run expected cost per successful strike as

The first term in this model spreads the UCAV’s acquisition cost over the expected number of successful missions. In other words, it amortizes the 15 million USD purchase cost across the 2.33 successful missions the aircraft is expected to fly before being lost. The second term adds the average operating and ammunition cost needed to achieve one successful strike, taking into account that not every sortie will succeed.

In the numerical example above, the total long run UCAV cost per destroyed target, including acquisition, operating costs, and a representative ammunition cost, comes out at roughly 6.7 million USD per successful strike. Compared with the expected cost of the missile strike package of about 11.7 million USD, the UCAV delivers the same effect for roughly 43 percent less expected expenditure. Under these specific assumptions, employing a UCAV rather than one-way missiles is therefore more cost effective.

When are UCAVs less efficient?

Several conditions can push the expected cost of UCAV employment above that of one-way missiles, which directly follow from the model. Three factors matter most.

First, UCAVs become uneconomical when the expected number of successful missions per airframe falls too low. Because cost effectiveness scales with reuse, anything that pushes the loss probability toward or above the success probability will rapidly eliminate the UCAV advantage. High outbound attrition, high inbound attrition, or a combination of both will collapse K (i.e., the number of expected successful missions). Even modest increases in survivability penalties on either leg can push the amortized cost above that of a missile package. In the example above, scaling attrition rates by a factor of 1.8 to 18 percent inbound attrition and 37 percent outbound attrition, makes UCAV use unsustainable.

Second, UCAVs become less attractive when missiles have high per-shot success at low marginal cost. If a state can reliably achieve mission success with cheap or modestly-priced one-way effectors, the relative benefit of reuse shrinks. Low missile procurement costs, combined with adequate and lethality and penetration rates, shift the breakeven point toward expendable systems. In these cases, firing even a large number of inexpensive missiles or long-range drones may outperform flying a large, costly UCAV into a moderately dangerous environment.

Third, UCAVs lose ground when mission design prevents them from exploiting one of their main advantages. If the UCAV cannot overfly the target to distribute strikes, or if the target consists of only one aimpoint, the system’s operational flexibility becomes less relevant. Operating costs also matter, though at the margins. High maintenance burdens, limited availability, or high sortie generation costs can erode a potential cost advantage.

Of course, it is important to account for a major advantage of UCAVs not captured in the cost model, namely their ability to perform multiple roles and functions. Even if expected attrition in deep strike operations rises to unsustainable levels, it may still be possible to operate UCAVs for less risky tasks, including intelligence gathering in less contested areas of the theater, something one-way effectors inherently cannot do.

Overall, this discussion suggests that UCAVs may have a role in deep strike missions and can outperform traditional deep strike capabilities under certain conditions. They appear most competitive when the target is complex (i.e., it requires striking multiple aimpoints), expected attrition is low, and the best alternative is using high cost one-way effectors. Larger and relatively undefended industrial facilities deep behind the frontline that are out of range for, or lack vulnerability to, the small payloads often carried by more affordable one-way effectors may fit these characteristics.

Picture: MBDA Germany

Earlier this year, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz announced his ambition to make the Bundeswehr the strongest conventional military in Europe, pledging “all the financial resources it needs.” With the debt brake reformed and the floodgates of military spending opened, this ambition now appears within reach.

One area long neglected in German defense spending is conventional long-range strike weapons. That, however, finally seems to be changing. This post reviews Germany’s announced and ongoing procurement projects in the conventional long-range strike domain.

Tomahawks for the Bundeswehr?

According to a list obtained by Politico, Germany plans to procure 400 Tomahawk Block Vb cruise missiles for roughly €1.15 billion. These Tomahawks would be divided between land- and sea-based components.

For the German Navy, Tomahawk would serve as an interim capability to meet its deep-strike requirement in the near to medium term, until the 3SM “Tyrfing”, a land-attack cruise missile currently in joint development with Norway, enters service in the mid-2030s. Tomahawk missiles would presumably be deployed aboard F123 and F124 class frigates, which are equipped with 16 and 32 MK41 vertical launch system (VLS) cells, respectively.

In total, the German Navy operates four F123 and three F124 class frigates, providing up to 160 VLS cells at sea if all vessels are deployed simultaneously. Assuming a Tomahawk loadout share of 20 to 30 percent, which is typical for U.S. Navy ships, the German Navy might have between 30 and 50 missiles at sea at any given time. That said, it is unlikely that the entire fleet would be deployed for strike missions simultaneously.

The Politico article also indicates that Germany is interested in acquiring three ground-based Typhon launchers for €220 million. Given the price tag, it is likely that the list refers to three Typhon batteries, each consisting of four launchers, one Battery Operations Center, and associated support vehicles. With each launcher capable of carrying up to four Tomahawks, this would theoretically allow for up to 144 ground-based launches at a time, though salvos of this size would be unlikely in practice.

The Block Vb Tomahawk, which the Bundeswehr appears to be interested in, is one of three Block V variants and comes equipped with the Joint Multiple Effects Warhead System (JMEWS), which combines a primary shaped charge with a secondary penetrator warhead, providing the missile with hard-target kill capability.

This is a somewhat peculiar choice, as the Bundeswehr’s hard-target kill requirement is arguably already met by the Taurus KEPD 350 and its presumed successor, the Taurus Neo, both of which are equipped with the highly optimized MEPHISTO penetrator warhead system. Moreover, the Block Vb is a more complex and likely more expensive design than the baseline Block V variant, which has been selected by other recent export customers, notably Australia and Japan.

Unless the Bundeswehr has a specific hard target set located at a range of over 1,000 kilometers in mind — one that cannot be effectively engaged with baseline Tomahawk variants — it arguably makes little sense to pursue the Block Vb variant. I may offer some speculation on what this hard target set might entail in a future post.

Other missile project: Taurus Neo, Joint Strike Missile, and JASSM-ER

In addition to the planned Tomahawk procurement, previously leaked documents have revealed that the Bundeswehr intends to acquire 600 Taurus Neo cruise missiles for approximately €2.4 billion.

Taurus Neo is the successor to the Taurus KEPD 350, of which the German Air Force currently fields around 600 units. It remains unclear what portion of this stockpile is currently serviceable, as part of it is undergoing maintenance and lifecycle upgrades.

There are some open questions regarding the Taurus Neo’s engine. According to reports, work is underway to replace the American-origin turbofan engine used in the original system with an alternative of comparable performance. In this context, Taurus Systems GmbH (a joint venture between MBDA Germany and Saab) has been in discussions with Kawasaki to supply a replacement engine. Well-informed sources also indicate that the manufacturer is in talks with additional potential suppliers, including from Europe. However, sourcing a mini-jet engine with similar thrust specifications and efficiency levels outside the United States remains a significant challenge.

While both the Tomahawk and Taurus Neo procurements are not yet officially confirmed (though they now appear highly likely), Germany has already placed orders for two cruise missiles that will arm its future F-35A Lightning II fleet.

The first is the AGM-158B/B2 JASSM-ER, of which Germany was authorized to purchase up to 75 units. It is likely that the full amount was ordered. The JASSM-ER features advanced low-observability characteristics, is equipped with a penetrator warhead providing hard-target kill capability (though it lacks a primary shaped charge), and has an unclassified range of 1,000 kilometers.

The second is the Joint Strike Missile (JSM), for which Germany placed an order for an unspecified quantity in June 2025. Based on a per-unit cost estimate of $2.5 to $3.5 million, this would correspond to approximately 185 to 260 missiles.

The JSM is a modern land-attack cruise missile designed to fit within the internal weapons bay of the F-35A. This allows the missile to be deployed without compromising the F-35’s radar cross section, theoretically enabling the aircraft to penetrate adversary weapons engagement zones before releasing the missile. The JSM has a range exceeding 500 kilometers when flown in a high-high-low altitude trajectory.

Challenges and capability gaps

What these developments indicate is that, at the very least, funding is now clearly moving in the direction of conventional long-range strike. While the balance between offensive strike capabilities and missile defense remains heavily skewed in favor of the latter (a rough estimate would be a ratio of around 4:1) the gap has begun to narrow. Still, several challenges remain.

First, most of the newly ordered missile systems, along with those under consideration, will not be delivered quickly. While there is a good chance that Lockheed Martin and Kongsberg will be able to fulfill the JASSM-ER and JSM orders — at least in part — with the arrival of the first F-35s in 2026 to 2027, the first Taurus Neo is not expected to leave the production line before 2029. Moreover, the Tomahawk Block Vb variant has not yet reached initial operational capability, which means that production and delivery cannot begin immediately. The U.S. Navy currently expects fleet release by 2028 to 2029.

Taken together, these factors suggest that even with orders placed in 2025, Germany’s missile arsenal is unlikely to reach a level of robustness before the early 2030s.

In addition, Germany, like many other European countries, has yet to address its capability gap for a high-velocity missile system capable of striking time-sensitive targets, in particular at operational depth.

ATACMS, which may soon be license-produced by Rheinmetall in Europe, is one potential option. However, it is an aging system that has shown vulnerability in Ukraine. The Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) might offer a more modern alternative, but it remains unclear whether the United States would be willing to export it to Germany, given that it has already denied a similar request from Norway.

Germany and the United Kingdom have recently announced plans to jointly develop a “deep precision weapon” with a range of 2,000 kilometers, which may partially address this gap. Still, this system is more likely to evolve into an expensive capability (according to rumors, a hypersonic boost-glide vehicle) aimed at high-value strategic-level targets, rather than one suited for engaging the wide range of targets located closer to the frontline and rear area. In any case, the project appears to remain in the conceptual phase for now, with production and delivery still years away.

Within the European Long-Range Strike Approach, Germany also appears to be interested in a ground-launched cruise missile with a range of 2,000 kilometers, which would offer a European alternative to Tomahawk. As with the British-German development effort, however, the missile remains in the conceptual phase.

Germany has so far also not made any public efforts to acquire an affordable long-range strike capability like a mini-cruise missile or long-range drone, which are needed to saturate enemy air defenses, and to efficiently engage lower-cost targets that do not warrant an expensive cruise or ballistic missile.

That being said, Rheinmetall’s potential cooperation with Anduril for the local production of Barracuda mini-cruise missiles may indicate a certain level of interest in this type of capability on the part of the German customer. A fully European alternative could be offered by the Dutch manufacturer Destinus, which supplies both mini-cruise missiles and long-range drones to Ukraine and has recently sought to expand its customer base across Europe.

All this indicates that the Bundeswehr still has work to do before it can credibly position itself as a serious missile power. Given the critical role conventional long-range strike weapons now play in modern warfare, German decision-makers would be well advised to act swiftly and build on the progress already made.

Importantly, just as crucial as the capabilities themselves is the doctrine guiding their use. It is therefore essential that German decision-makers complement their acquisition efforts with a coherent missile strategy and already now devise clear guidelines for employment that takes into account both opportunities and risks.

Picture: U.S. Army

A few days ago, the Financial Times reported that Ukraine’s ballistic missile defense intercept rates had dropped from around 37 percent in August to just six percent in October, despite a lower number of ballistic missile launches.

This coincides with Russia achieving several significant strikes against Ukraine’s defense industry, including four plants producing drones and drone components, as well as politically sensitive targets such as the EU’s representation in Kyiv and the Cabinet of Ministers building, where Russian ballistic missiles managed to evade Ukrainian defenses.

This post offers some insights into the most plausible explanations for the declining performance of Ukraine’s ballistic missile defenses and explores possible measures to address the problem.

The Russian ballistic missile threat

Two types of Russian conventional ballistic missiles are frequently employed against Ukrainian targets: the ground-launched 9M723 short-range ballistic missile and the air-launched Kh-47M2 Kinzhal medium-range ballistic missile.

The 9M723 entered into service in 2006 and has an official range of 500 kilometers. The Kh-47M2, which is essentially an adapted and slightly modified version of the 9M723 for air-launched use, entered into service in 2017 and has a range of around 1,500 to 2,000 kilometers.

Both ballistic missiles are more accurately described as unitary “aeroballistic” or “quasi-ballistic” systems. While their trajectories resemble a ballistic arc, they are not perfectly ballistic, and both missiles are capable of executing aggressive terminal maneuvers, particularly along the lateral axis of flight (i.e., sideways movement relative to the ground).

These maneuvers are intended to complicate and, ideally, defeat enemy interception. The more unpredictable the flight path, the more kinetic energy interceptors must expend to stay on course, and the harder it becomes to apply predictive guidance. This stresses guidance algorithms, reduces reaction times, and ultimately increases the likelihood of a miss.

The ability of Russian ballistic missiles to perform terminal maneuvers is neither new nor surprising. The American MGM-140 ATACMS, which entered service roughly 15 years before the 9M723, is equally capable of such maneuvers. In addition, Western ballistic missile defense interceptors — including the PAC-2 GEM-T, PAC-3 MSE, and Aster-30B1/0B1NG — were specifically designed with this threat profile in mind.

Nevertheless, according to reporting by the Financial Times, Russia has succeeded in adapting the trajectories of its ballistic missiles in ways that further complicate interception and defeat.

Trajectory adaptations

One reason for the increased success in penetrating Ukraine’s ballistic missile defenses, according to Financial Times reporting, is the use of steeper terminal trajectories than previously observed.

This is at least a somewhat plausible explanation. As noted by me in the FT article, these trajectory adjustments are relatively easy to implement through the onboard computer and mission planning software. In other words, hardware modifications, which are more difficult to execute and risk disrupting established supply chains, are not required.

Just as Western manufacturers continuously mine data from Ukraine to refine their ballistic missile defense algorithms, Russian missile developers likely do the same for their offensive missile systems. They may have observed that missiles launched on steeper terminal trajectories achieved higher penetration rates compared to those on shallower paths and subsequently replicated this success at scale.

Why might steeper trajectories be more successful? One explanation is that a steeper trajectory increases the vertical speed of the incoming missile, shortening the engagement window during the missile’s terminal approach. This reduces the time available for interceptors to detect, acquire, and adjust their vertical momentum, especially if they were previously more optimized for shallower trajectories.

While shallower trajectories should, in principle, allow for greater lateral maneuverability, this advantage may be less relevant against interceptors like the PAC-3 MSE, which are known for their high agility. It is therefore plausible that Russian designers concluded — and saw empirically confirmed — that if lateral maneuvers can be countered, reducing reaction times through steeper trajectories offers a better chance of success, even at the cost of more limited lateral maneuvering.

Alternative explanations for declining intercept rates

Two other plausible explanations stand out for the reduced success rates of Ukraine’s ballistic missile defense.

First, Russia may increasingly use its ballistic missiles outside Patriot or SAMP/T defended areas. In other words, rather than trying to overwhelm Ukraine’s ballistic missile defenses, Russian operators choose to strike where Ukraine is known not to deploy them for lack of available systems.

For example, recent months have seen increased use of ballistic missiles against frontline targets and those in the immediate rear area. Unless Ukraine is actively maneuvering Patriot or comparable systems in these areas for SAMbush attacks (using long-range air defense assets to surprise enemy aircraft near the frontline), its shortage of ballistic missile defense systems forces it to prioritize deployment areas much deeper behind the frontline. In this case, Russian ballistic missiles striking frontline targets will remain naturally undefended.

Similarly, Ukraine is known to protect only a few major cities and critical infrastructure sites, while many others remain undefended. This is one reason why Ukraine has stated a nominal requirement of at least ten additional Patriot fire units to establish minimal nationwide coverage (in addition to the seven to eight it already deploys).

To produce a clearer assessment of ballistic missile defense performance, Ukraine would need to release data not only on how many ballistic missiles Russia launched and how many were intercepted, but also on how many intercept attempts were made. This data, however, is not provided, which is one reason why the quantitative figures have limited utility without additional context and qualitative insights to support them.

Second, due to Ukraine’s severe interceptor shortage, Ukraine is likely to allocate only one interceptor per incoming ballistic missile in engagements. In contrast, when Ukraine first received Patriot, the AFU often launched two or even three interceptors per target, as shown in at least one video that surfaced on social media.

Regardless of the individual interceptor’s success rate, launching multiple interceptors significantly increases the overall probability of intercept. When Ukraine is limited to one interceptor per target, the likelihood of successful interception naturally declines.

Admittedly, this may not explain the recent drop, as interceptor shortages have persisted for months and were already a factor in August, when intercept rates were reportedly higher. Still, it remains an important consideration when assessing the current and future effectiveness of Ukraine’s ballistic missile defense going forward.

Ultimately, the declining intercept rates are likely the result of a confluence of factors, only some of which are observable from the outside and without access to classified sources.

Lessons and implications for Ukraine and Europe

This episode illustrates the ongoing cycle of adaptation and counter-adaptation that remains central to warfare, including in the conventional missile domain. Just as Russia has likely used intercept data to enhance the penetrability of its missile systems, Western manufacturers are almost certainly analyzing the same data right now in an attempt to negate the temporary Russian advantage and raise intercept rates once again.

That said, there are clear limits to what missile defense — particularly against ballistic missiles — can achieve. Even if Lockheed Martin and Raytheon succeed in restoring PAC-3 MSE’s single-shot intercept rate to around 60 to 70 percent against Russian ballistic missiles, where it reportedly stood before the recent drop, the offense-defense cost balance remains inherently skewed against the defender.

Ukraine’s offensive missile capabilities must therefore be accelerated in parallel with efforts to strengthen its missile defense. Enabling Ukraine to target the ballistic missile supply chain and production facilities inside Russia, where feasible, should be a priority.

This is also a critical lesson for European states as they prepare for war with Russia. A point of diminishing returns has arguably been reached, where further European investments in an imperfect missile defense architecture offer only marginal gains at great cost. Instead, European states must finally commit to large-scale production and acquisition of conventional counter-strike capabilities that can deny Russian advances and credibly threaten retaliation.

Picture: Destinus

Earlier this year, Czech engine manufacturer PBS announced a significant foreign direct investment in the United States. In the first phase, PBS will invest $20 million in a turbojet production facility in Roswell, Georgia. In the second phase, a further $90 million will be invested to scale production and relocate the supply chain to the United States.

While this investment is relatively small in the grand scheme of things, especially compared to the multi-billion-dollar investment projects currently underway in the defense sector on both sides of the Atlantic, it is a bad sign for Europe. This post explains why.

Mini jet engines and cruise missile propulsion

Jet engines are power units that propel airborne vehicles. Unlike rocket motors, which carry their own oxidizer, jet engines make use of surrounding air drawn in through an inlet. Inside the engine, this air is compressed, mixed with fuel, and ignited, producing thrust that propels the vehicle forward.

Jet engines are a critical and arguably the most complex component of the cruise missile supply chain. While jet engine production is demanding in general, the miniaturization required to fit one inside a cruise missile presents an additional challenge.

In general, two types of jet engines exist: turbojet and turbofan engines. In a turbojet engine, nearly all the drawn-in air passes through and is accelerated in the engine core, which makes it more efficient at supersonic speeds. In contrast, in a turbofan engine, only part of the drawn-in air is directed through the core while the rest bypasses it via a fan at the front of the engine, generating additional thrust with greater fuel efficiency at subsonic speeds.

Because of this, subsonic cruise missiles powered by turbofan engines generally achieve greater range than subsonic cruise missiles of similar size powered by turbojet engines. Most existing subsonic cruise missiles, however, use turbojets, as turbofans are more difficult to produce and require more advanced materials and manufacturing to handle the fan stage, bypass ducting, and airflow management.

Military-grade and dual-use mini jet engines

Broadly speaking, three types of miniature jet engines are used in cruise missiles today.

First, there are high-end, relatively large turbojet and turbofan engines capable of generating significant thrust, typically in the range of 3 to 6 kilonewtons. This level of thrust is necessary to sustain high speed in ground-skimming trajectories where atmospheric density and terrain-following maneuvers create drag and slow the missile down.

These engines are expensive, military-grade products with long shelf lives and high reliability, likely costing between $200,000 and $500,000 per unit in 2025. Before the war in Ukraine, which highlighted the need for larger numbers of lower-cost missiles, these types of engines were used almost exclusively in modern cruise missile designs.

Second, there are lower-cost military-grade engines that maintain high performance but are smaller and less powerful, generating between 1 and 2 kilonewtons of thrust while still offering relatively high fuel efficiency. They remain capable yet lower-end military-grade products, reflected in their lower price point, often at or below $100,000.

These engines are used in the emerging category of mini-cruise missiles, whose utility has been demonstrated in Ukraine and which are increasingly being considered elsewhere, including in Europe, Asia, and the United States.

Third, there are non-military-grade engines with relatively limited performance that are used to power mini-cruise missiles, particularly by Ukraine.

While these engines can provide some utility, they deliver low thrust-to-weight ratios, constraining payload capacity and range, and are relatively fuel-inefficient. They also tend to be less reliable under sustained high-stress conditions such as long-duration or low-altitude flight, and their tolerance to high temperatures, vibration, and dust ingestion are generally inferior. This being said, they are extremely affordable, typically priced below $10,000.

The table below lists turbojet and turbofan engines used in contemporary European cruise missile designs, outlining their performance parameters and indicating which category they fall into.

The European mini jet engine market

European cruise missile programs, including Ukrainian and Turkish designs, currently rely on four main engine manufacturers for propulsion: Safran, Motor Sich, Kale Arge, and Williams International.

French manufacturer Safran has traditionally supplied most of the mini jet engines used in Europe’s cruise missile programs. Its engines power a range of systems, including anti-ship cruise missiles (Exocet MM40 Block 3/3C, RBS-15 Mk3, Naval Strike Missile) and land-attack cruise missiles (Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG, Missile de Croisière Naval).

Ukrainian and Turkish manufacturers Motor Sich and Kale Arge have so far supported primarily national cruise missile programs, including the R-360 Neptune, SOM, and Çakır. That said, Turkey has emerged as a major player in recent years and continues to invest in indigenous mini jet engine technology.

Destinus, a Dutch-based firm, is the newest entrant in the European cruise missile market, producing the T150 turbojet engine used in Ukraine’s RUTA mini-cruise missile.

Czech manufacturer PBS, while not currently supplying engines to European or international cruise missile programs, produces engines used in some target drones for training. However, its portfolio includes several jet engines, particularly in the lower-end military-grade segment, that could be of interest for European mini-cruise missile designs. Given the critical importance of these systems for Europe’s missile rearmament, PBS’s pivot toward the U.S. market is a troubling sign.

U.S. mini jet engine manufacturers have so far played a relatively small but crucial role in the European cruise missile market as the sole suppliers of turbofan technology. Williams International provides the turbofan engines for Norway’s Joint Strike Missile and the German-Swedish Taurus KEPD 350.

Europe’s turbofan blindspot

The fact that the United States is the only supplier of turbofan technology to Europe is far from ideal. Turbofan engines are essential for producing heavy cruise missiles that can carry large payloads over long distances while maintaining a stealthy flight profile. While turbojet engines can, in principle, power longer-range land-attack cruise missiles, their performance is inferior.

It is therefore unsurprising that the Taurus KEPD 350 program relies on Williams International to supply the P8300-15 turbofan engine, and that Kongsberg selected Williams International’s F415 for the Joint Strike Missile rather than using Safran’s TR40, as in the Naval Strike Missile. Both systems depend on ground-skimming trajectories for survivability and mission success, and both emphasize extended range to execute complex, non-linear flight paths to their targets.

From a strategic autonomy perspective, continued reliance on U.S. technology in 2025 is obviously not great, especially in such a critical sector, but Europe lacks alternatives. While developing a European mini turbofan engine would theoretically be possible, it’s not a short-term solution.

For instance, if German engine manufacturer MTU were contracted to develop a turbofan engine for use in the Taurus today, it would likely take several years before a suitable design became available that could be integrated into the missile. This means the successor to the Taurus KEPD 350, expected to be ordered in substantial numbers toward the end of this year or early next year, will almost certainly continue to rely on Williams International’s engine.

It is also somewhat puzzling that French manufacturer Safran, Europe’s leading engine producer, has yet to develop a turbofan engine suitable for cruise missiles. A turbofan would have been particularly valuable for the MdCN, which, although significantly longer than the Tomahawk and carrying a payload 33 percent smaller, has inferior range. This is likely due in large part to its less fuel-efficient TR50 turbojet compared to the Tomahawk’s F107-WR-402 turbofan.

Why Europe must scale mini jet engine production

If Europe wants to rival Russia in the conventional missile domain, it must take the scaling of European mini jet engine production seriously.

While the benefits may not appear as obvious to decision-makers as building new artillery shell factories, expanding mini jet engine output is just as critical and should be supported accordingly, including with national and European funds.

In December 2024, for example, Williams International received over $250 million to expand mini jet engine production capacity in support of the JASSM-ER, LRASM, and Tomahawk production lines. U.S. decision-makers understand that scaling missile production is impossible without a robust industrial engine base. European decision-makers should too.

Similarly, while in the short term it is unlikely that Europe can move away from U.S. turbofan technology, developing a European alternative should be a medium- to longer-term priority. European manufacturers, if entrusted with a dedicated development project, could likely deliver a high-thrust, fuel-efficient mini turbofan engine within several years.

Quick note: As I plan to submit my PhD by the end of the year and need to prioritize my dissertation, my output on Missile Matters may decrease in the coming months, likely to one post every two weeks. I am extremely thankful for the support I have received on here, and I look forward to being back at full strength next year.

Fabian

Picture: National Police of Ukraine

Despite large investments in missile defense, current European efforts remain ill-suited to countering cheap, long-range drones that Russia has employed extensively against Ukraine, as highlighted by the incursion of Russian Gerbera long-range drones into Polish airspace a few days ago.

This post provides some pointers on how European states can best respond to the long-range drone threat from Russia.

Western insufficiencies

While the incursion of Russian long-range drones into Poland may have served as a wake-up call for European decisionmakers — prompting quick inquiries in Ukraine about acquiring long-range drone interception technology from Ukraine — the episode should not have come as a surprise.

As Russian long-range drones, initially imported Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 models and later domestically produced variants like the Geran-2, have pummeled Ukrainian cities and infrastructure from the sky, it was always clear that Western and Central European states would face even greater challenges against Russian long-range drones than Ukraine does.

Although European states have made significant investments in missile defense — Germany alone has spent or announced air and missile defense procurements exceeding 10 billion euros — these efforts have not sufficiently addressed the long-range drone threat Russia poses to both Ukraine and Europe. Moreover, the debate on long-range drone defense has largely failed to account for the technological realities of modern air defense solutions.

Shahed-type drones vs European defenses

Three types of technologies are usually considered most suitable for intercepting long-range drones cost-effectively: mobile anti-aircraft guns, interceptor drones, and low-cost interceptor missiles. All come with challenges.

First, a challenge common to all systems — and often omitted in public debate — is the need for detection and tracking capabilities that provide early warning and guide the intercepting projectiles to their targets, whether they are bullets, drones, or missiles.

For example, while long-range drones are relatively cheap, typically costing $1,000 to $5,000 depending on type, they must be paired with radar systems that deliver timely warning and precise tracking. This is especially critical for the types of interceptor drones we are seeing in Ukraine, which only provide for limited endurance and low speed, leaving only a narrow interception window. As a result, even a slight error in interception timing is likely to cause failure.

Another problem with the interceptor drone concept is that it still relies on skilled pilots. While autonomous interceptor drones are under development, they are not yet mature, and their more complex system architecture will make them significantly more expensive.

Second, there is a direct trade-off between range and cost. Low-cost interceptors, whether drones or missiles, generally have restricted ranges of only a few kilometers. As interceptors grow in size and complexity, costs rise accordingly. This makes low-cost interceptors effective for point defense but unsuitable for area defense in ground-launched configurations. Achieving cost-effective area defense requires combining interceptors with highly mobile platforms such as helicopters or jets, though the high cost per flight hour (especially for jets) can undermine overall cost-effectiveness.

Third, calculating interception costs is not always straightforward. For instance, the Skyranger 30 air defense system is often cited as cost-effective for countering long-range drones, yet it comes with significant upfront costs: depending on configuration and numbers ordered, $10–15 million per unit in recent contracts.

By comparison, assuming a cost of $20,000–30,000 per unit, up to 1,000–1,500 low-cost interceptor missiles could be procured for the price of one Skyranger, potentially offering much greater utility and versatility. Ammunition costs also add up. A single AHEAD round for the Skyranger likely costs more than $1,000; assuming six rounds are required to reliably destroy a larger drone, each interception exceeds $6,000. This can make it less cost-effective than interceptor drones and significantly narrows the price gap between bullet- and missile-based interception.

This does not make the Skyranger irrelevant. It is also important to note that it includes an effective radar for early warning and fire control, eliminating the need for external and potentially costly systems. However, when combined with its relatively low production capacity, this suggests the system is not the magical solution to the long-range drone threat it is sometimes portrayed to be.

Fourth, one aspect that has so far been largely ignored in the debate is civil airspace: Europe is at peace, and the skies are crowded with civilian aircraft. A large-scale long-range drone defense system that fires missiles, drones, or projectiles at everything that appears like an enemy aircraft would pose a serious risk of collateral damage or endangering civilian flights.

Of course, this overview is not comprehensive and should not be taken as the basis for a full comparison between different solutions. What it does show, however, is that the options typically discussed as preferred solutions for long-range drone defense each come with unique challenges, advantages, and potential drawbacks. In other words, there are no silver bullets.

The way forward

The positive aspect of the long-range drone threat is that it can be addressed in the short to medium term if the right decisions are made in time. Doing so, however, requires European governments to pursue a procurement approach that likely differs from their usual preferences.

First, no fully matured, cost-effective anti-long-range drone technology currently exists on the market that can also be produced at scale. Governments must therefore accept a degree of risk by investing in promising technological solutions and supporting manufacturers to accelerate development, whether through financial backing or regulatory frameworks that enable rapid testing.

Second, when it comes to the technologies discussed above, governments and militaries must abandon the notion that cheap area defense against long-range drones is possible. While affordable point defense systems exist or will soon mature, extending the range of missile and drone interceptors inevitably raises costs. Governments must therefore decide whether point defense for critical targets is sufficient or whether defending larger areas is necessary. If the latter is the case, they must be prepared to fund it.

The exception may be electronic warfare, which can cover larger areas relatively cost-effectively but comes with its own set of drawbacks. It is vulnerable to countermeasures, risks collateral disruption of civilian systems, may be less effective against hardened or fully autonomous drones (which will increasingly be deployed in the future), and often requires constant adaptation as adversaries shift frequencies or tactics.

Ultimately, decisionmakers already understand that firing $1.4 million AIM-120C-7 AMRAAMs from F-35s at long-range decoy drones costing less than $30,000 is unsustainable. But witnessing it in real time may finally instill the urgency needed to act. If so, Europe may at last be on its way to taking the long-range drone challenge seriously.

Picture: Fire Point and Hartpunkt

Yesterday evening, high-resolution imagery of the first reported strike by Ukraine’s FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile was released. This post provides an initial battle damage assessment and considers whether the Flamingo lived up to its hype.

Battle Damage Assessment

According to official information, three Flamingo cruise missiles were used in the attack. This aligns with earlier video footage showing three launches unmistakably identified as Flamingo cruise missiles by their characteristic S-curved launch pattern, use of a large solid-fuel booster, and visible top-mounted engine.

The target of the missile strike was an FSB outpost in Armyansk, Northern Crimea, about 100 kilometers southeast of Kherson.

High-resolution satellite imagery shared on social media shows two impacts inside and near the outpost. One missile struck the main building complex, causing significant damage to at least one structure.

The second impact occurred about 200 meters west of the main building complex along the shoreline. The warhead appears to have detonated in the water, cratering the shoreline and burning the surrounding area. No visible damage to nearby infrastructure is evident. However, given the substantial blast radius of a 1,150-kilogram payload, it is not implausible that the strike inflicted light to medium damage on hovercraft and small vessels that were located 80 to 100 meters away at the time of the attack.

In both cases, the warhead detonations created craters with a diameter of 13 to 15 meters, demonstrating the significant punch delivered by the Flamingo.

The fate of the third missile remains unknown. It may have been intercepted midair, either kinetically by Russian missile defenses or non-kinetically through GPS jamming that caused it to veer off course. Another possibility is a systemic failure within the missile itself, preventing it from reaching the target area without outside interference.

It is also unclear why the outpost was chosen as the target, though its location suggests that Ukraine’s armed forces may have been primarily interested in testing the missile’s capabilities. Because the missiles did not need to penetrate deep into Russian-controlled territory, Ukrainian staff were likely able to observe performance parameters under relatively favorable conditions.

In this sense, the strike may have served as a proof of concept for the system, allowing an initial assessment of the missile’s capabilities and suitability.

Observed accuracy and performance of the Flamingo cruise missile

The strike also provides some insight into the missile system’s accuracy. This being said, estimating accuracy from a single engagement is extremely difficult, particularly since only three missiles were used in the attack. In addition, the intended aimpoints are unknown, leaving only informed guesses about how far the shots strayed.

If we assume the nominal aimpoint for the strike that fell within the main building complex was its center, the missile missed by roughly 40 meters. If, however, the struck building itself was the intended target, the missile hit within 15 meters or less.

For the missile that detonated on the shoreline, assuming the aimpoint was also the center of the main complex, the miss distance was about 180 to 190 meters. If the intended aim point was instead the area storing hovercraft and boats northeast of the crater, the miss distance narrows to about 80 to 100 meters.

How does this compare to Flamingo’s stated performance? The manufacturer, FirePoint, previously stated that the FP-5 Flamingo’s CEP is 14 meters.

This means that the manufacturer expects that if 100 Flamingo missiles are launched at an aimpoint, 50 are statistically expected to fall within 14 meters of their aimpoint, 93 are expected to fall within 28 meters of their aimpoint, while the remaining seven would fall outside that 28-meter radius.

For the impact inside the building, if the intended aimpoint was the building itself, the missile performed within stated expectations. If instead the aimpoint was the center of the complex, the deviation suggests lower levels of accuracy.

For the second impact, the missile likely missed its target by a rather significant margin and did not meet expected performance, but even this assessment is uncertain since occasional large misses are statistically expected.

In the end, it is clear that the missile did not demonstrate pinpoint accuracy, though that was never the expectation for the Flamingo. That said, it is likely the Ukrainian armed forces and the manufacturer had hoped for better performance than what was demonstrated, especially given the relatively benign conditions of the strike.

This being said, if the missile was intended primarily as a proof of concept, it likely met minimum expectations, and the collected data should hopefully help the manufacturer advance the program and implement improvements.

Implications and future developments

The FP-5 Flamingo remains a promising weapon system to propel Ukraine’s missile program forward. If the manufacturer indeed manages to achieve a reliable CEP of 14 meters or less, while also being able to produce the missile in more substantial numbers, it could prove deadly to Russia’s critical infrastructure, notably its oil refining capabilities.

Still, it’s important to keep in mind that these are no longer $50,000 long-range drones being launched. The strike package used against the targeted site in Crimea likely cost up to $3 million, which makes it all the more important to ensure that future volleys count. Foreign financing for Ukrainian missile systems will also become increasingly important.

Fire Point, meanwhile, appears to be maintaining its marketing momentum and seems intent on positioning itself as Ukraine’s primary missile manufacturer. At the International Defence Industry Exhibition in Kielce, Poland, it unveiled two new ballistic missile designs, one with a range of 200 kilometers and another with a range of up to 855 kilometers, both advertised as retaining relatively high accuracy (14 and 20 meters CEP, respectively).

As such, Fire Point is now directly challenging legacy land-attack cruise missile designs such as the Long Neptune and Korshun, as well as legacy ballistic missile systems like the Hrim-2, with its disruptive new programs. Whether Fire Point can deliver on these ambitions remains to be seen.

Picture: Wikimedia Commons

Ukraine’s missile industry has moved through several distinct phases since 2014, from modest post-Soviet capabilities and problem-ridden pre-war programs to wartime improvisation, foreign reliance, and now ambitious attempts at independent production.

The trajectory has been neither linear nor smooth, shaped by Russian interference, Western supply limits, domestic political pressures, and shifting industrial capacity. By 2025, Ukraine fields a diverse but still imperfect long-range strike arsenal, with lighter drones and mini-cruise missiles forming the backbone and new efforts underway to add heavier missile systems.

This post attempts to provide an initial assessment of the evolution of Ukraine’s missile industry and programs, from pre-2022 to today.

2014–2022: Ukraine’s Pre-War Missile Industry

On the eve of 2022, Ukraine retained a real but uneven missile capacity built on Soviet-era design and production hubs at Yuzhnoye and Yuzhmash, complemented by Luch for longer-range missile systems.

Concrete outputs existed but were limited in scale: the Vilkha guided 300 mm rocket entered service in 2018 with serial production beginning in 2019, and the R-360 Neptune coastal anti-ship cruise missile was delivered to the Ukrainian Navy in March 2021, reportedly just achieving initial operational capability before the war. A short-range ballistic missile program, the Hrim-2 (with the export version known as Sapsan), remained mired in prolonged development with uncertain funding and timelines.

Structural constraints in Ukraine’s missile industry were significant. Deep historical dependence on Russian components and markets, sharply disrupted after 2014 and only partially substituted by 2022. Yet opportunities remained in a skilled workforce, legacy facilities, rising domestic demand after 2014, and early export interest, such as talks with Indonesia on the Neptune in 2021.

2022: Ukraine’s Missile Industry Under Fire

The challenges Ukraine’s missile industry experienced deepened once the war began. Russia likely made a concerted effort in the early months to disrupt and destroy Ukraine’s missile industry, though details remain murky.

One confirmed case was a missile strike on the Pivdenmash production plant in Dnipro in November 2022, which produced rocket motors and liquid fuel, among other components. There are also reports that infrastructure linked to the Hrim-2 program was targeted early on, in particular a solid-fuel production plant in Dnipro, causing a setback to the program.

Within the chaos of the war and intense competition among industry and services for scarce funds and resources, scaling Ukraine’s missile industry likely posed a major challenge. Ongoing programs such as the Hrim-2 were probably turned into crash efforts tasked with delivering an operational missile as quickly as possible.

Ukraine also appears to have begun scaling and modifying the Neptune anti-ship cruise missile almost immediately, both to increase production and to adapt the design for land-attack missions. The sinking of the Moskva, which reportedly resulted from two Neptune missiles striking the ship, provided proof of concept for its maritime effectiveness, but this did not automatically translate to land environments.

Information on the initial R-360 Neptune’s guidance package is ambiguous. It is unclear whether it was equipped with a satellite receiver or relied entirely on an inertial measurement unit for midcourse guidance before the active radar seeker took over during terminal approach (if you have detailed information on this, let me know in the comments). If it lacked satellite navigation, integrating a jamming-resistant GPS receiver was likely one of the first priorities, possibly alongside the addition of a terminal guidance seeker optimized for land-attack roles.

In any case, confirmed use of land-attack–optimized Neptunes was only reported in August 2023, suggesting that these modification efforts took time to complete. That said, one theory for how Ukraine managed to strike Saki air base in August 2022 is that Neptune and/or Hrim-2 missiles were used in the attack, though this remains unconfirmed and speculative.

2023–2024: Building Independent Strike Capabilities

Ukraine’s missile industry did not appear to make major strides between February 2022 and May 2023. Whether this was mainly the result of Russian strikes on the industry, a lack of funding and resources, structural issues, or a combination of all these factors is difficult to determine from currently available information.

Ukraine only began to acquire a serious conventional long-range strike capability in May 2023, when it received Storm Shadow land-attack cruise missiles from the UK, followed by French deliveries of SCALP-EG in July. The UK likely supplied around 200 to 300 missiles in several batches, while France initially delivered about 50. Italy reportedly provided a similar number from its stocks, though this was only confirmed much later.

Nevertheless, toward the end of the year, Ukraine appeared to relaunch efforts to scale its own missile and long-range drone industry, this time with greater determination and likely more funding. This decision was probably driven — though not solely determined — by a confluence of at least four factors:

1. Demonstrated military and political success from Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG strikes. In addition, around mid-2023, Ukraine’s first serial-produced long-range drone, the UJ-26 Bober, also showed promising initial success.

2. Recognition that European long-range strike support would not be indefinite due to the depletion of available arsenals in Western Europe, paired with the decision not to restart large-scale missile production in France and the UK.

3. Growing realization that, despite promising early signals, Germany would not deliver Taurus KEPD 350 missiles to sustain Ukraine’s long-range strike capability beyond what France, Italy, and the UK could provide.

4. Understanding that Western-supplied missiles would likely always come with targeting restrictions and heavy oversight, highlighted by the Biden Administration’s approach to ATACMS deliveries at the time.

As a result, Ukraine embarked on an ambitious long- and deep-strike armament program, focusing largely on domestic suppliers of missile and long-range drone technology. Where Ukraine turned to foreign manufacturers, it relied on startups and scaleups rather than European or North American missile primes. One example is the Dutch firm Destinus, known to have provided LORD long-range drones and Ruta mini-cruise missiles.

2024–2025: Scaling Light Missiles and Long-Range Drones

By the end of 2024, this program appeared to bear fruit, with Ukraine able to produce or acquire substantial numbers of mini-cruise missiles and long-range drones of various types, and with clear ambitions to further scale these programs throughout 2025.

As of August 2025, Ukraine is fielding a range of long-range drones, including the AN-196 Liutyi (sometimes credited as the most successful long-range drone), the FP-1, the UJ-26 Bober, and the AQ 400 Scythe, among others. This is complemented by mini-cruise missiles, like the above-mentioned Ruta or the Ukrainian Pekklo.

What unites these capabilities is that they are comparatively light in nature. Although they provide a significant range, often matching or even exceeding that of Western-supplied systems, they do not combine this with either a substantial payload capacity or high velocity.

For example, most of the systems mentioned above carry payloads under 100 kilograms — sometimes as little as 10 to 20 kilograms — and travel at or below 600 km/h (with mini-cruise missiles significantly faster than long-range drones). By contrast, Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG can deliver a 450-kilogram payload to a distance of 560 kilometers while maintaining high subsonic speed throughout the flight (around 800 to 900 km/h).

This directly affects the lethality of Ukrainian missile and drone strikes. Low terminal velocity limits warhead penetrability, reducing the warhead’s ability to travel deep into a structure before detonation and thereby lowering the destructive effect. Limited payload capacity decreases the lethal radius and makes post-strike repair easier.

As a result, Ukrainian long-range strikes could disrupt Russian military positions and repeatedly damage critical infrastructure, particularly gas and oil facilities, but they rarely produced wholesale destruction.

That said, in recent weeks, as Ukraine has resumed large-scale attacks on Russian oil refineries, even lighter missile and drone systems at times appeared to have inflicted significant damage, particularly when used in saturation attacks or when initial explosions triggered fires that spread across entire sites. Still, the absence of a mass-produced heavy missile system combining long range with high payload capacity and speed has remained notable and suboptimal from a Ukrainian perspective.

2025–?: Entering the Heavy Missile Era

Ukraine’s exclusive reliance on light missile and long-range drone systems, following arsenal depletion of heavier Western missiles, is the context within which last week’s news about the FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile was received, explaining the hype surrounding the missile system.

If the Flamingo meets the manufacturer’s specifications (3,000-kilometer range, 1,150-kilogram payload), and the missile can be manufactured at scale, it would constitute the first indigenously developed and mass-produced heavy missile system in Ukraine’s arsenal.

Since the missile was unveiled last week, several reports about the manufacturer Fire Point have suggested it is best to be cautious regarding the maturity and scalability of the program. Notably, a report released on Friday indicated that Fire Point is under investigation for corruption. The aggressive marketing campaign it launched may therefore have been partly or entirely motivated as a distraction, though this is difficult to judge from the outside.

In any case, the Flamingo is indicative of a broader trend that was underway before its unveiling and will inevitably continue, whether or not the missile becomes Ukraine’s system of choice.

Work on Ukraine’s first short- to medium-range ballistic missile, the Hrim-2 (or a derivative), continues. The missile reportedly entered mass production in June 2025, though little has been heard since, aside from Russian claims in August 2025 that several Hrim-2–related production sites had been destroyed. On 25 August, Ukraine unveiled the “Long Neptune,” a 1,000-kilometer-range missile system derived from the original R-360 Neptune. Work is also reportedly ongoing on the Korshun land-attack cruise missile, based on legacy Soviet-era Kh-55 (and Kh-555) technology. While its exact specifications remain unknown, it will likely be able to deliver a 480-kilogram warhead to a distance of at least 700 to 1,000 kilometers, if not significantly more.

In other words, Ukraine has options. Whether the Flamingo is merely a marketing ploy or a real missile, it illustrates the broader dynamics in Ukraine’s missile industry in 2025, which is seeking to complement its light missile and long-range drone systems with a heavy-hitter.

When such a missile enters service, the intensity and destructiveness of Ukraine’s missile war, particularly against strategic-level targets, can be expected to rise. At the same time, as Ukraine’s missile industry continues to scale and output expands, the share of the budget devoted to long- and deep-strike capabilities will only grow. There are already indications that costs have reached a level that is no longer sustainable for Ukraine’s internal budget. This makes direct financial assistance from European partners to Ukraine’s long-range drone and missile programs increasingly important.

Image: Fire Point

On 17 August, imagery of a new Ukrainian cruise missile appeared, known as the FP-5 “Flamingo”. Since then, Fire Point, the Kyiv-based defense manufacturer, has launched a marketing offensive to showcase the missile internationally and pledged a substantial increase in production until the end of the year.

This post looks at what to make of the Flamingo. I first discuss the known technical characteristics of its capability profile to assess its expected performance before looking at the missile’s implications for the ongoing war in Ukraine, but also the broader deterrence architecture in a post-war Europe.

FP-5 Flamingo technical specifications

The FP-5 Flamingo is a large missile. According to the manufacturer, it has a wingspan of about six meters, a launch weight of around 6,000 kilograms, and a payload capacity of 1,150 kilograms.

This makes the Flamingo the first indigenously produced “heavy” missile system in Ukraine’s arsenal. Previous Ukrainian systems, including mini-cruise missiles and long-range drones, were much lighter in both overall weight and payload capacity.

The key visual feature of the FP-5, aside from its overall size, is the top-mounted engine, which, as observers quickly noted, gives it a resemblance to the Fieseler Fi 103, commonly known as the V-1, the world’s first cruise missile used by Nazi Germany in the final years of the Second World War.

But the similarities end there. Unlike the V-1, which used a simple and inefficient pulse jet engine by today’s standards, the Flamingo appears to employ a far more efficient turbofan engine, specifically the AI-25TL produced by Ukrainian manufacturer Motor Sich, as identified by missile expert Fabian Hinz on X, which is typically used in Aero L-39 jet trainers.

The use of this engine is notable for two reasons.

First, the combination of an efficient turbofan engine and the missile’s large size, which allows for ample fuel storage, explains the 3,000-kilometer range the Flamingo offers to Ukrainian operators.

Second, the engine is typically designed for manned aircraft and lacks the miniaturization found in Western and Russian cruise missile engine designs. The Flamingo is therefore likely a case of a cruise missile built around an engine rather than an engine developed specifically for a cruise missile.

Fire Point has stated that the missile travels at a velocity of approximately 950 kilometers per hour. This likely refers to the FP-5’s terminal velocity near the end of its flight, with the cruise speed somewhat lower. Even so, the missile provides a substantial speed advantage over most existing long-range strike weapons in Ukraine’s arsenal.

For guidance, the Flamingo appears to rely solely on GPS-assisted inertial navigation. It does not feature more advanced midcourse guidance systems such as TERCOM, or terminal guidance systems like an electro-optical or imaging infrared seeker, likely to keep costs low and production relatively simple.

Lastly, as missile analyst John Ridge has pointed out on X, the warhead’s body, as seen in imagery of the missile, resembles the FAB M62. Since no FAB-1000 exists, the payload could consist of two stacked FAB-500 unguided bombs, though the resemblance could also be coincidental.

In any case, a payload of over 1,000 kilograms should translate into roughly 450 to 550 kilograms of TNT-equivalent high explosives packed into the missile, which is substantially more than the long-range drones and mini-cruise missiles Ukraine currently employs.

FP-5 Flamingo production

Fire Point says it is currently producing one missile per day or around 30 per month. By the end of the year, the company says it can increase production sevenfold, which would result in an annual output of over 2,500 missiles.

The key bottleneck in scaling FP-5 Flamingo production is almost certainly the turbofan engine. All other components should be comparatively easy to manufacture and scale. This places the burden mainly on Motor Sich to increase production and meet demand, or on Fire Point to secure additional suppliers of turbofan technology.

Producing over 200 units per month by the end of the year is undoubtedly an optimistic projection, though Ukrainian manufacturers have shown over the past year that they can rapidly scale conventional long-range strike production if provided with sufficient funding.

This being said, even achieving a steady monthly output of 30 to 50 missiles would give Ukraine a substantial supply of heavy cruise missiles that would likely have tangible effects on the war.

Lethality and destructive potential of the Flamingo missile

In terms of missile lethality, the FP-5 Flamingo offers two advantages over existing Ukrainian conventional long-range strike weapons.

First, the missile’s relatively high terminal velocity, combined with its heavy weight, allows the warhead to penetrate structures more deeply before detonation, potentially resulting in far more destructive effects.

Second, the FP-5’s large payload capacity produces a much larger lethal radius than existing Ukrainian missiles and drones. For a 20-psi target, such as most reinforced above-ground concrete structures, the lethal radius of the 1,000+ kilogram payload is around 21 meters. For a softer target, such as distillation columns of Russian refineries, for example, the lethal radius is considerably larger, upwards of 38 meters.

This means that even with the Flamingo’s reduced accuracy, due to the absence of advanced guidance systems and a reported CEP of 14 meters, the missile would still be virtually guaranteed to destroy its target with a single strike, unless it is intercepted.

The implications are clear: if the Flamingo reaches its target, and especially if the target lacks heavy armor, destruction rather than disruption can be expected.

Survivability against Russian air defenses

A critical question is how vulnerable the Flamingo will be to Russian air and missile defenses.

In principle, the missile is likely more survivable than Ukrainian long-range drones, which are more exposed due to their low speed and relatively large radar cross-section. At the same time, the FP-5 may prove somewhat more vulnerable than comparable cruise missiles like Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG because of its lack of stealth features and its large top-mounted engine, which will be highly visible to enemy radars.

That said, the main challenge for Russia will be covering all possible attack vectors. Since the FP-5 can essentially reach most relevant targets west of the Urals, Russian defenses will need to be further dispersed. After 3.5 years of war and heavy attrition of its air defense assets, including S-300 and S-400 fire units, as well as AWACS aircraft, this is an increasingly difficult task for Russia.

Much will also depend on Ukrainian intelligence and reconnaissance, particularly Ukraine’s ability to identify and track Russian missile defense units and guide Flamingo missiles around them. Alternatively, saturation attacks that combine heavy Flamingo missiles with lighter long-range strike capabilities in large numbers could also prove effective.

In any case, the question is not whether the Flamingo gets through, but how many. This depends on Fire Point’s production capacity and Russia’s ability to counter the threat, both of which remain uncertain for now.

Implications for the future of Ukrainian deterrence

While much attention is on the missile’s immediate implications for the war, the full value of the Flamingo can only be understood by considering its role as a post-war Ukrainian deterrent.

A mass-produced deep strike weapon like the Flamingo is arguably Ukraine’s strongest security guarantee in a post-war European order, regardless of the war’s outcome and independent of European or American allies.

If Ukraine were to possess a large arsenal of heavy missiles, perhaps 2,000 to 4,000 cruise and ballistic missiles, which could be launched within 24 to 48 hours of a Russian reinvasion to comprehensively disrupt and destroy Russia’s economic potential from the outset, it may independently convince Moscow that any future aggression is not worth the cost.

Of course, fielding a robust conventional countervalue deterrent is no easy task. Acquiring and maintaining a missile arsenal of that size costs money. Ukraine would also have to be able to safely store these missiles in peacetime while arranging for procedures to launch them on short notice. That’s operationally and logistically challenging. Still, Ukraine appears to have made the first step toward such a capability.

Russia is, of course, well aware of this and understands that a robust Ukrainian deep strike capability could create major problems for both ongoing and future plans. It can therefore be expected that Russian officials will soon insist that any peace agreement include Ukrainian disarmament and range restrictions in the missile domain.

Ukraine, however, would be ill-advised to accept such terms and should continue on its path toward becoming the most capable missile power in Europe.

Picture: The White House

On 15 August, U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin met in Alaska for a high-profile Trump-Putin summit to discuss the ongoing war in Ukraine, prospects for a lasting peace agreement, and the future of European security.

The Trump-Putin meeting left behind an uneasy mix of relief and apprehension. Relief, because the encounter could have produced a much deeper alignment between Washington and Moscow at the expense of Ukraine and Europe. Apprehension, because Trump’s remarks still left open the possibility of a settlement framework shaped on Russian terms, with Europe and Ukraine reduced to secondary roles.

This post examines both the implications of the Trump-Putin meeting and discusses the conditions required to pursue a realistic path toward a just and durable peace.

What the Trump-Putin Summit Means for Ukraine

Bad, but it could have been worse. That is how I would summarize the Trump-Putin summit episode.

On the positive side, Trump does not appear to have been fully swayed by Putin’s ‘great power concert’ diplomacy, which seeks to sideline Ukraine and Europe and settle the war and Europe’s future directly between the United States and Russia.

Listening to Trump afterward, he seems to envision some role for Ukraine and its European partners, though it remains unclear what exactly that might be. In the worst case, Trump could simply expect Ukraine to accept whatever understanding he and Putin reached (the word “deal” that was printed in international media afterwards appears to be a translation error) and for European states to follow along. Much will depend on the expected meeting between Zelensky and Trump in the coming days.

Perhaps the most troubling element was Trump’s explicit acceptance of Russia’s demand that the war be settled as part of a broader agreement on European security, involving European states and NATO’s role, rather than being confined to Russia and Ukraine.

This is, of course, entirely inappropriate, as Russia’s future role in Europe can only be discussed once it returns to the community of law-abiding states, makes amends, and demonstrates readiness to act as a constructive rather than destructive player on the international stage.

The saving grace may lie in Trump’s well-known tendency to echo the last person he spoke to — in this case, Putin. In a best-case scenario, he might revert to his “ceasefire first” line, which remains the correct and appropriate policy, once he has spoken with European leaders. But there is no guarantee.

Another negative outcome is that the narrative of an imminent U.S. sanctions package against Russia, which could have posed serious problems for an already strained Russian economy, has been replaced by the narrative of peace talks, effectively resetting the pressure. It remains uncertain how quickly, if at all, European states can persuade Trump to return to the previous course.

Despite this gloomy picture, the outcome was at least somewhat tolerable because it could have been worse. There was a notable distance between Trump and Putin, despite the diplomatic show they staged. The meetings lasted shorter than expected and the atmosphere was reportedly quite tense. The absence of a written communiqué outlining areas of agreement also leaves European leaders with scope to shape developments if they make the correct moves.

In sum, the outcome was not good, but it could have been much worse given past experience with Trump. If the Trump-Zelensky summit in March marked the low point so far, this meeting was some distance away from that.

Russia’s Economy and Pressure Points

Independent of the meeting, the basic prerequisites for how to facilitate serious negotiations geared towards a just peace haven’t changed: pressure on Russia and offer credible security guarantees.

Most importantly, there is no reason for Russia to move away from its maximalist ambitions if it believes it can still achieve them on the battlefield and that it is better off continuing the fight rather than sit down at the negotiation table.

This means that as long as Russia retains the capacity to continue and its force generation is not sufficiently suppressed, negotiations remain unlikely. Russia’s warfighting capacity will decline as the war drags on, but so will Ukraine’s. The key task for European states, ideally alongside the United States, is to accelerate this decline on the Russian side while slowing it on the Ukrainian side.

The number one pressure point that has not yet been sufficiently exploited is Russia’s heavily strained economy.

Russia now operates a war economy with cooling momentum. Output growth has slowed, inflation is high by local standards, the federal deficit is widening under heavy defense outlays, the current-account surplus is smaller, and the authorities have relied on tight monetary policy and episodic capital controls to manage pressures.

Russia’s economic decline could speed up, but only if several factors align. Some can be shaped by Europe and the United States, while others are harder to influence. These include:

1. lower oil revenues from stricter price caps or weaker prices,

2. reduced fiscal space that forces costly domestic borrowing, and

3. a near-zero external balance that weakens the ruble or requires tighter monetary controls.

Given current data, the risk window for such a squeeze opens in late 2025 through mid-2026, earlier if the EU’s new measures are enforced effectively and if U.S. enforcement further raises the cost of Russia’s oil trade.

Even then, degrading Russia’s warfighting capacity will be a gradual process. A collapse by 2027 is not the baseline expectation; a slow grind with periodic stress is more likely. As the Russian economy continues to weaken, however, the likelihood of serious negotiations will increase.

Security Guarantees for Ukraine

The second major point concerns security guarantees. In anti-Ukrainian channels, the prevailing narrative is that the main obstacle to peace is Ukraine’s categorical refusal to cede territory as part of an agreement.

Ultimately, only Ukrainians can decide what they are willing to give up for what kind of deal, and where they draw their red lines. My impression is that Ukraine might be prepared to part with some territory under certain conditions, particularly areas controlled by Russia since 2014.

However, any acceptance of such a deal would require firm security guarantees from the West. Ukrainians are rightly insistent that any peace agreement must be underwritten by the military power of Europe and, ideally, the United States to prevent it from becoming a temporary ceasefire that simply allows Russia to rebuild its forces.

When Trump previously pushed for a negotiated settlement earlier this year, the issue of security guarantees — and Europe’s inability to provide them independently — was a major point of contention. This time, it scarcely featured in the public debate, if at all. That is unfortunate, as it is arguably a far more important and pressing issue than the exact position of the frontline on any given day.

The Future of Europe’s Security Order

In the end, the future of Ukraine is also the future of Europe. European states must be adamant in preventing any peace deal that undermines Europe’s core interests.

One possible response to Russia’s preposterous insistence on a broader European agreement is to turn the demand back on Moscow and present a list of expected concessions. After all, as the sole European power that has invaded its neighbors three times in the past 17 years, what steps is Russia prepared to make to reassure European NATO states of its non-hostile intentions?

Picture: Wikimedia Commons

On Monday, 4 August 2025, Russia announced it would no longer adhere to its “self-imposed” moratorium on deploying INF-range missiles (ground-launched missile systems with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers) previously banned under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which has been defunct since 2019 following U.S. withdrawal.

To show that Russia was never in a position to issue such a moratorium credibly, this post presents a technical analysis of the 9M729 cruise missile’s range. The findings strongly indicate that the 9M729 exceeds the INF range limits by a significant margin.

History of non-compliance

The key issue surrounding the INF Treaty centers on the 9M729 (NATO designation SSC-8) ground-launched land-attack cruise missile. Russia claims the 9M729 has a range of less than 500 kilometers and was therefore INF-compliant. The United States and its NATO allies have rejected this assertion.

The United States first publicly raised concerns about the missile in 2013. In total, it engaged Russian counterparts on the 9M729 more than 30 times before deciding to withdraw from the treaty, with Russia unable and unwilling to address its concerns.

U.S. assessments of Russian noncompliance rest on two main points. First, the United States claims to have tracked test launches of the 9M729 from both fixed and mobile launchers, demonstrating missile trajectories above and below 500 kilometers.

The specific collection methods and launch site locations have not been publicly disclosed, but U.S. statements indicate that satellite imagery, telemetry (interception and analysis of the missile’s in-flight data transmissions), and other intelligence sources were involved.

Second, U.S. assessments are probably also based on a technical assessment of the missile’s characteristics, notably its maximum range in standard trajectories.

Technical assessment of Russian non-compliance

From an outside perspective, relying only on unclassified data, it is impossible to verify U.S. claims of having collected testing data proving Russian noncompliance with the INF Treaty.

However, we do have reasonably good technical information on the missile and its components, which allows for an independent assessment of the technical side of the issue. It is unclear how much weight the United States placed on such technical evaluations in its engagements with Russia — likely less, given that it could share classified test launch data directly with Russian counterparts, which in any case would have carried greater weight.

From a technical perspective, the key factor is the overall length of the 9M729, as this ultimately determines the size of the internal fuel tanks, which in turn play a central role in defining the missile’s range.

Unfortunately, the overall length of the 9M729 is not known. However, we can estimate it with some accuracy. As other analysts have pointed out, the 9M728 (the lower-range “friendly” cousin of the 9M729) and the 9M729 appear to be based on the Kalibr family of missiles. Notably, the 9M728 appears to be largely similar to the 3M14E, which has a length of 6.2 meters without a booster.

According to Russian statements, the 9M729 is 53 centimeters longer than the 9M728 to accommodate a larger and modernized guidance system. This suggests that the 9M729 is at least 6.73 meters long, though it is likely somewhat longer in reality.

In 2019, Sputnik News published a graphic showing an outline of the 9M729 missile, matching Russia’s stated dimensions of a 51.3-centimeter diameter and a length of 6.73 meters. It is unclear whether Sputnik’s graphics team arrived at these measurements independently or whether the graphic was provided by official sources to support Moscow’s narrative. Ultimately, this is of little importance, as the graphic offers a useful basis for the following analysis, one grounded in Russia’s own statements. I have uploaded a dimensioned graphic on my profiles on X, Bluesky, and LinkedIn, which serve as the basis for the calculations below.

The funny thing is that even using Russia’s own figures at face value, the missile appears highly suspect.

Assuming a length of 6.73 meters and accounting for the foldable wings along the fuselage, which pass through part of the fuel tank section, while also assuming that roughly one quarter of the air inlet section provides additional space for fuel storage, and that ten percent of the total volume is required for structure, plumbing, baffles, and unusable residuals, the total fuel tank volume is about 0.433 cubic meters. In other words, the missile can likely carry around 433 liters of fuel.

High-performance fuel equivalent to JP-10, which the Russians should have access to, has a density of 0.94 grams per cubic centimeter. This means the fuel section could hold about 407 kilograms of JP-10 equivalent fuel.

The Kalibr family is equipped with TRDD-50 turbofan engines. According to open sources, these engines have a maximum thrust of 4.4 kilo Newton, equivalent to 448.67 kilogram-force (kgf), and a thrust-specific fuel consumption of 0.7 kg/(kgf·h). This means that at full thrust, the engine burns roughly 314 kg of fuel per hour.

If the missile cruises at an average speed of 800 km/h (Mach 0.65), which likely requires about 60 percent of maximum thrust, the fuel burn is approximately 188 kg/h. With 407 kilograms of fuel, this yields an endurance of about 2.16 hours. Multiplying by the average cruise speed gives a maximum range of roughly 1,728 kilometers — well above the 500-kilometer INF range threshold.

These findings are robust:

First, there are good reasons to believe the missile is well over 6.73 meters in length, similar to other missiles in the Kalibr family. A longer missile would theoretically allow for more fuel capacity and, consequently, a greater range.

Second, the results don’t fundamentally change, even if key parameters in the calculations are changed.

For example, even if we assume that 60 percent thrust yields only 680 km/h cruise speed, rather than the more optimistic 800 km/h, the range still comes out to roughly 1,470 kilometers.

Similarly, even if we further assume that 20 percent less fuel is available (e.g. because the warhead is 50 percent larger than originally assumed) and that the thrust-specific fuel consumption is 1.0 kg/(kgf·h), meaning the engine is significantly less fuel efficient than initially predicted, the maximum range would still be about 786 kilometers.

In fact, the thrust-specific fuel consumption would need to be around 1.55 kg/(kgf·h) to reduce the range to 500 km. This is much higher than is typical for a turbofan engine used in cruise missiles, and even exceeding that of less efficient turbojet engines, which are generally in the 1.1–1.3 kg/(kgf·h) range.

If realistic engine performance figures are used, the only way the missile’s range falls below 500 kilometers is if it carries a comically small fuel tank relative to its size. That is precisely what Russia attempted to present to observers at its 2019 press conference comparing the 9M728 and 9M729. It is, however, a hard claim to sustain, and without supporting evidence, which Russia has not managed to provide, it should not be accepted.

In other words, the analysis strongly suggests that the 9M729 has a range of well over 500 kilometers and thus constitutes an INF non-compliant missile.

Not a “he said, she said”

The point here is not to calculate the missile’s exact range with perfect accuracy. That would be difficult without access to the missile itself or classified data.

The point is that, using available information, open-source tools, and reasonable estimates and robustness tests, it is possible to show that the 9M729 very likely exceeds the INF range limits. In other words, even without access to testing records collected by the United States, which are not publicly available, there is a strong reason to believe Russia was in violation.

Therefore, the claim — unfortunately still made by some analysts — that we lack the tools to independently assess who was right or wrong regarding the 9M729 is simply incorrect, and reflects poor research practice and judgment.

The available evidence squarely places the burden of proof on Russia. It deployed a missile system whose technical characteristics strongly suggest it was prohibited under the INF. It was Russia’s responsibility to demonstrate why the missile was permissible. It has made no such effort, likely because it could not produce the required evidence.

Russia’s troubled INF history

The rest of the INF story is, of course, history. There are further reasons to believe that from at least the early to mid-2000s onward, Russia was no longer committed to the treaty and saw it not as a means to advance cooperative security, but as a tool to secure asymmetric military advantages.

The 9M723 short-range ballistic missile almost certainly has a range greater than 500 kilometers when fired on a minimum-energy trajectory and especially when equipped with a lighter nuclear payload.

Importantly, it was originally tested at a range below 500 kilometers, resulting in its classification as INF-compliant. Russia, therefore, avoided a material breach of its INF obligations, but the missile almost certainly violated the spirit of the treaty.

The 9M728 is also worth re-examining. As noted above, Russia itself acknowledges that the only difference is an added 53 centimeters in length. Even if that entire additional volume were devoted to fuel storage, it would still be possible that the 9M728’s maximum range is well over 500 kilometers.

Of course, the 9M728 was never subject to controversy, likely because Russia never tested it beyond 500 kilometers. However, based on the available data, there is reason to believe the missile was also noncompliant.

A moratorium that wasn’t

According to Russian sources, the 9M729 has been deployed since 2017 and remains in service today. Russia has never managed, or made a serious effort, to dispel allegations of noncompliance.

Russia therefore called for a moratorium on the deployment of INF-range missiles while simultaneously fielding such systems, including the very ones that led to the treaty’s collapse. At the same time, it claimed this moratorium could serve as the basis for a follow-on agreement. Yet given Russia’s record of noncompliance, how could any state actor in Europe or North America take such an offer seriously?

Russia was never in a position to credibly propose a moratorium. Its current statements announcing it will no longer abide by it should be recognized for what they are: propaganda and a flimsy attempt to shift blame for the INF’s demise onto the United States and Europe, when in reality, Russia is solely responsible.

Picture: U.S. Army

The Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), the United States’ newest conventional ballistic missile capability, recently reached key testing milestones.

On 2 July 2025, PrSM Increment 1 received Milestone C approval, which authorizes the program to enter the production and deployment phase. On 25 July 2025, Australia conducted its first PrSM live fire during Exercise Talisman Sabre. Together, these developments mark a significant step toward full-rate production and broader fielding.

This post examines the current status of the missile program, potential exports and deployment among U.S. allies, and its implications in the Indo-Pacific and Europe.

Precision Strike Missile

The missile is the successor to the MGM-140 ATACMS short-range ballistic missile, which can be launched from the M142A1 HIMARS or the M270 MLRS rocket artillery system. ATACMS has been used by Ukrainian forces against Russian targets with several successful strikes, though Russian air defenses have claimed – and in some cases shown – intercepts of ATACMS.

In addition, ATACMS appears to have limited resilience to Russian electronic warfare. This is not entirely surprising, as Russian electronic warfare is known to have disrupted several GPS-aided or guided Western munitions, including some that are more modern than ATACMS and equipped with more robust electronics.

However, this has also not always posed a problem, since many of the ATACMS supplied to Ukraine are of the M39/M39A1-type, which are equipped with cluster munition warheads that do not rely on accuracy beyond what the missile’s inertial navigation system can provide.

The Precision Strike Missile offers an extended range of 500 kilometers compared to ATACMS’ 165 to 300 kilometers (100 to 180 miles). In addition, the U.S. Army procurement specification for the missile have required electromagnetic-spectrum survivability, suggesting the incorporation of upgraded electronics, including a hardened GPS receiver to improve resistance to Russian electronic countermeasures. However, specific anti-jamming or spoofing features have not been publicly disclosed.

According to the manufacturer, the Precision Strike Missile will initially be equipped with a unitary blast‑fragmentation warhead optimized for area and point targets. However, restrictions on warhead weight will constrain the quantity of fragmentable casing and preformed fragments, thereby limiting the missile’s area effects, especially when compared to cluster munitions, which disperse submunitions over a significantly broader footprint.

The new missile is also significantly smaller than its predecessor, allowing operators to load two Precision Strike Missiles per launcher pod instead of just one, as with ATACMS. The missile therefore not only provide an advanced capability profile, but also effectively doubles the firepower available to operators in the field.

PrSM variants

The United States’ missile will be produced in several versions. PrSM Increment 1 is the baseline version (500-kilometer range, unitary warhead) and is expected to reach initial operational capability in the coming months. The U.S. Army plans to procure a total of 3,986 Increment 1 missiles.

PrSM Increment 2 (also known as the Land-Based Anti-Ship Missile), expected to enter service in late 2027, will feature an extended range of up to 1,000 kilometres and a new terminal guidance suite with a multimode seeker that combines a passive radio frequency seeker and an imaging infrared seeker. This combination will enable the Precision Strike Missile to engage mobile land and sea-based targets, most notably enemy ships. In total, the current U.S. Army procurement objective stands at 1,589 Increment 2 missiles.

PrSM Increment 3 is intended to expand the range of payloads the missile can carry while retaining most of the technologies developed in Increments 1 and 2. Planned payloads include warheads designed to destroy hardened targets, including submunition warheads. Increment 3 is scheduled to enter service last after Increments 1, 2, and 4.

Finally, PrSM Increment 4 is expected to extend the missile’s range beyond the 1,000-kilometre threshold set by Increment 2, without altering the missile’s external dimensions. Concept images imply this may be achieved by replacing the conventional solid rocket motor with a more efficient airbreathing propulsion system. While details remain undisclosed, a plausible configuration could involve a first-stage booster transitioning to a second-stage solid-fuel ramjet.

A fifth Increment is also planned, which can be launched from an autonomous vehicle.

PrSM production

PrSM entered Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) in December 2023, when Lockheed Martin delivered the first Increment 1 missiles to the U.S. Army following a production qualification flight test at White Sands Missile Range.

Since then, 42 PrSM Increment 1 missiles were scheduled to have been delivered to the U.S. Army by August 2025 for testing purposes, while several hundred have been procured in total since 2021.

In FY2024, the stated procurement number reached a three-digit figure for the first time, with 110 missiles procured. For FY2025, the number rose to 230, though this figure should be treated with caution and may not be fully reliable.

For FY2026, the U.S. Army initially targeted a procurement of 268 missiles. However, the President’s budget request included funding for only 45 PrSM missiles — 35 Increment 1 and, for the first time, 10 Increment 2. Following reconciliation, updated procurement funds now allow for a total of 152 missiles.

While Lockheed Martin has secured a 4.9 billion USD multi-year procurement contract and plans to ramp up production to 400 missiles per year, the current dip in procurement numbers is unlikely to support the development of a stable supply chain and production line. In any case, although reaching Milestone C will allow the PrSM program to transition from low-rate to full-rate production likely within the year, mass production remains some time off.

PrSM Increment 1 may also be built in Australia, currently the only U.S. ally slated to receive the missile (Norway requested it but was denied). Negotiations are expected to begin later this year.

Australia is already involved in several licensed missile production projects, including Kongsberg’s JSM, set to begin local manufacturing in 2027, and GMLRS, scheduled for production from 2029. Given these timelines, domestic production of PrSM in Australia should not be expected in the near term, even if a cooperation agreement is reached.

Another likely partner for licensed PrSM production would be Rheinmetall, which is significantly expanding its cooperation with Lockheed Martin in the missile sector.

So far, however, Rheinmetall appears focused on license production of ATACMS, which the manufacturer claims could begin in Germany from 2028. Given PrSM’s significantly more advanced capability profile compared to ATACMS, production in Germany would be desirable from both a German and broader European perspective, though it currently appears unlikely to materialize.

Strategic implications

The Precision Strike Missile will provide critical firepower to the United States and its allies, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region where the United States is preparing for a potential confrontation with China.

Given the vast distances in the region and China’s sophisticated anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) network, which poses a significant threat to U.S. freedom of operation in wartime, stand-off strike capabilities are urgently needed.

An advanced conventional ballistic missile capability may prove particularly valuable in this context due to its relatively short time to target. While a Tomahawk cruise missile takes nearly an hour to cover 1,000 kilometres, the PrSM Increment 2 will be able to traverse the same distance in approximately 5 to 10 minutes.

The new missile is therefore particularly well-suited to threaten mobile and semi-mobile targets, including Chinese Navy ships and relocatable land-based assets such as mobile missile launchers, mobile air defence radars and launchers, and forward-based command posts.

Nevertheless, challenges with the Precision Strike Missile program remain.

While PrSM Increment 1 offers a range improvement over ATACMS, its reach remains limited, particularly in the context of the vastness of the Indo-Pacific. To be relevant in a Taiwan scenario, the missile would likely need to be prepositioned on the island prior to the outbreak of war. However, current U.S. plans do not include deploying the missile – together with American operators – to Taiwan, nor does the United States appear intend on selling the missile to Taipei.

PrSM Increment 2 will provide the range upgrade needed to credibly threaten Chinese targets in the region, but it is not expected to enter service for several years. Even then, the United States will rely on allies such as Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines to provide basing options for the missile, which cannot be taken for granted, although some future deployments are likely.

In Europe, the PrSM Increment 1 variant would arguably be more useful than in the Indo-Pacific, given the shorter distances and the predominantly land-based environment of a potential confrontation with Russia. However, aside from planned deliveries to U.S. Army forces in Europe, no European armed forces are currently slated to receive the system.

Norway requested to purchase PrSM Increment 1 (along with GMLRS-ER) but was ultimately denied for unknown reasons. It remains to be seen whether other European countries will be permitted to acquire the missile.

Picture: Ukrainian Air Force

According to Oleksii Makeiev, Ukraine’s ambassador to Germany, the German IRIS-T SLM system has reportedly succeeded in intercepting ballistic missiles, as revealed in an interview with European Pravda on July 28.

Citing Ukrainian military reports, Makeiev stated that IRIS-T SLM — though according to the manufacturer not originally designed for this purpose — had in some cases managed shot down ballistic missiles. He offered no details regarding the missile types or engagement conditions.

Diehl Defence has also declined to comment on specific incidents. A spokesperson only noted that “the customer has repeatedly expressed a satisfaction rate of 100 percent”, a figure likely reflecting the system’s performance against long-range drones and cruise missiles rather than ballistic threats.

Interception of ballistic missiles

The ability of IRIS-T SLM to counter ballistic missile threats is not a total surprise but likely highly dependent on the type of incoming ballistic missile and the conditions of the engagement.

The German Bundeswehr, for example, explicitly lists short-range ballistic missiles as part of the system’s engagement envelope. As stated on the official Bundeswehr website: “The IRIS-T SLM system from Diehl Defence is considered the most advanced, combat-proven, and modular air defense missile system for countering airborne attacks. It provides 360-degree protection from close range up to medium distances (effective range 40 kilometers) and engages enemy aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles, and guided weapons, including short-range ballistic missiles”.

Without additional information, it is impossible to determine which specific ballistic missiles were intercepted in the cases cited by the ambassador.

According to well-informed sources, one key factor behind the air defense system’s high success rate is its use of Hensoldt’s TRML-4D high-precision radar. This radar allows the system to guide an IRIS-T missile with great accuracy toward its target before the interceptor’s terminal guidance seeker takes over, increasing the likelihood of a successful intercept.

The radar is integrated with long-range sensors, which provide early warning and target data to the IRIS-T SLM. This enables the system to detect and track a broad spectrum of ballistic threats. If paired with a sufficiently detailed threat database, the system could — in theory — generate effective fire control solutions against ballistic missile threats and guide interceptors accordingly, at least within the system’s optimal engagement envelope.

IRIS-T SLM-like systems intercepting ballistic missiles would also not be unprecedented. Missile defense systems have been able to intercept missile threats they are not nominally optimized for. The performance of Israeli air defense systems during the so-called 12-Day War with Iran illustrates this point.

Imagery from the conflict confirms that David’s Sling interceptors (Stunner missiles) successfully engaged medium-range ballistic missiles with ranges exceeding 1,000 kilometers. This is significant because Stunner is nominally designed for intercepting ballistic missile threats with ranges of up to 300 kilometers, meaning the system performed beyond its stated specifications.

Even more striking are video recordings showing Tamir interceptors — used in the Iron Dome system at the lowest tier of Israel’s missile defense architecture — successfully engaging what appeared to be a medium-range ballistic missile warhead at an estimated altitude of five to seven kilometers.

Tamir interceptors are not designed to counter such threats, let alone to do so effectively. Their success highlights both the capabilities of the Israeli defense industry and the proficiency of Iron Dome operators, while also suggesting that some engagements occurred under conditions of considerable urgency.

Similar outcomes could, in theory, be achieved with IRIS-T SLM. However, this would require the early and accurate detection and classification of the ballistic threat to allow timely interceptor deployment. Such a system would still not be a full replacement for air defense systems specifically designed to counter ballistic missiles, but it could ease their burden or complement them.

Range limitations

A central issue with using IRIS-T SLM against ballistic missiles is likely its limited engagement envelope. The IRIS-T SL interceptor is optimized for relatively low-flying targets. According to the manufacturer, its maximum range and altitude ceiling are approximately 40 and 20 kilometers, respectively.

This means it can only intercept ballistic missiles in their terminal phase — and even then only at very low altitudes compared to the rest of the ballistic missile’s trajectory. Additionally, intercepting ballistic missiles at altitudes near the interceptor's ceiling shortens the horizontal distance over which engagements are possible. Consequently, IRIS-T SLM has a smaller defensive footprint against steep, terminal-phase ballistic targets compared to engagements of low-altitude threats such as cruise missiles or long-range drones.

As a result, the system’s effectiveness against ballistic threats likely remains highly constrained. In this role, IRIS-T SLM is better suited for point defense and would likely be inadequate for defending larger areas.

Diehl Defence is currently developing the IRIS-T SLX, a longer-range interceptor specifically optimized for ballistic missile defense. According to the manufacturer, the SLX will offer a range of up to 80 kilometers and altitude coverage of up to 30 kilometers, significantly expanding its engagement envelope against ballistic missile targets.

Data gathered from Ukrainian operational experience with IRIS-T SLM — particularly on both successful and unsuccessful intercepts, as well as the development of a comprehensive ballistic threat database — could meaningfully support this development effort.

IRIS-T SLM in Ukraine

According to the Ukrainian ambassador, a single IRIS-T air defense fire unit in Ukraine comprises three IRIS-T SLM launchers and two IRIS-T SLS launchers.

Ukrainian fire units als reportedly include a Hensoldt TRML-4D radar with a detection range of up to 250 kilometers, as well as a command post vehicle. In a combat-ready configuration, the system would therefore have up to 24 IRIS-T SLM interceptors capable of engaging threats up to 40 kilometers away, and eight IRIS-T SLS interceptors for threats up to 12 kilometers away.

In total, Ukraine has received seven of the 18 IRIS-T fire units it has ordered, according to Makeiev.

This post is co-authored with Waldemar Geiger, publisher of the German defense news site hartpunkt, and first appeared in German on hartpunkt.