Beggars Can't be Choosers: Three Pathways for Europe to Acquire Deep Strike Quickly

Picture: U.S. Navy

The announcement that the United States will not deploy a Long-Range Fires Battalion has sent shockwaves through European capitals — more so than it should have — once again highlighting the dramatic capability gap Europe faces in the deep-precision-strike segment.

European long-range and deep-strike arsenals are insufficient. Efforts to refill them have been slow, with credible rearmament timelines stretching into the 2030s. This need not be a foregone conclusion, however. European states retain three credible pathways toward rapid rearmament in the deep-strike domain:

1. Acquisition of Ukrainian systems

2. Acquisition of market-available non-Ukrainian solutions

3. Accelerating development programs into crash efforts

This post reviews each alternative.

Pathway 1: Acquisition of Ukrainian Systems

Ukraine has, over the past four years, developed a large and diverse long-range and deep-strike arsenal comprising long-range drones, mini cruise missiles, and heavy cruise missiles. Ballistic missiles are under development.

If European states prioritize strike range and wish to quickly field a capability with a range broadly comparable to the Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile (1,600 kilometers), Ukrainian long-range drone manufacturers might be the only viable near-term alternative. The latter have previously indicated that they have excess capacity to fill European orders, which would also help generate additional capacity to supply the Ukrainian armed forces. A significant European order would put that proposition to the test.

Likely candidates include FirePoint’s FP-1 and Antonov’s An-196 Liutyi, which, depending on the variant, have demonstrated ranges exceeding 1,500 kilometers and payload capacities of up to 120 kilograms. That payload is substantially smaller than what a Tomahawk or comparable system offers (454 kilograms), and European states would have to accept compromises on survivability, lethality, and velocity. If the ability to strike Moscow and beyond is the primary requirement, however, these are battle-tested systems that could likely be exported on short notice and at relatively low unit cost, possibly in the medium to high five figures depending on contract size.

Other Ukrainian systems warrant consideration. Mini cruise missiles such as the Bars, Peklo, and Palianytsia are viable options that, while somewhat more expensive than long-range drone alternatives, offer higher velocity and survivability, though at the expense of range — indicated at 500 to 800 kilometers for these systems.

In principle, European states could also seek to join existing heavy missile programs such as FirePoint’s Flamingo heavy land-attack cruise missile, or the planned FP-7 and FP-9 ballistic missile capabilities. Unlike the lighter systems described above, however, these are not mature programs. Procurement would therefore carry greater risk and likely involve extended delivery timelines.

Pathway 2: Acquisition of Off-the-Shelf Systems

If European states prefer not to procure from Ukraine, other options are available. Some are American. Several European states have already procured the Tomahawk and AGM-158B JASSM-ER. Even with America’s comparatively large production capacity, however, lead times have lengthened considerably. Finland, the Netherlands, and Poland, for example, will wait until 2032 for JASSM-ER orders placed by 2024 to be fulfilled, and delays caused by the Iran War could stretch those timelines further. Ordering from the United States is also an increasingly unattractive option politically and may be rejected on those grounds.

South Korea and Israel may also be options, though capacity limitations similarly constrain their ability to deliver quickly. South Korean manufacturers, in particular, have recently signed a number of export contracts for the Chunmoo MLRS system, thereby reducing excess capacity. The 500-kilometer-plus missile for Chunmoo is also still under development and will likely not be available before the 2030s.

The alternative is European industry. While the heavy cruise missiles that European states have traditionally procured carry long lead times, there is potential for European manufacturers to supply meaningful quantities of lighter cruise missiles and long-range drones more quickly.

Destinus, a European missile manufacturer headquartered in the Netherlands, could supply the Ruta mini cruise missile. The Ruta Block 1, extensively battle-tested in Ukraine, is equipped with a turbojet engine, has a range exceeding 300 kilometers, and carries a 150-kilogram payload. The recently announced Ruta Block 2, which has recently undergone flight testing, extends the range to over 800 kilometers and could be a logical choice for European procurement.

Destinus already produces around 2,000 Ruta mini cruise missiles annually, with production scalable significantly upon order. This is in part enabled by the establishment of additional production sites across Europe, including through a joint venture with Rheinmetall in Germany. Lead time for new orders is indicated as 6 months.

European missile prime MBDA also offers several systems. Beyond the SCALP-EG, currently produced at an estimated 100 missiles per year, MBDA has received a development and low-rate production contract for the One-Way Effector, a 500-kilometer long-range drone, with initial deliveries planned for mid-2027. With sufficient urgency and additional funding, it may be possible to accelerate the timeline and reach full-scale production of 1,000 units per month rather quickly. MBDA also states that its Crossbow mini cruise missile is ready for serial production pending an order.

None of these systems is comparable to American missile systems that would have arrived as part of the Long-Range Fires Battalion. However, if European states are willing to relax range and payload requirements, accept larger quantities of less capable systems, and tolerate some risk associated with betting on new suppliers and supply chains, European solutions for rapid acquisition exist.

Pathway 3: Acquisition through crash programs

If European states do not wish to rely on Ukrainian suppliers while also insisting on a heavy missile capability comparable to American systems that are no longer arriving, the only feasible near-term solution is to convert existing longer-term development projects into crash programs for rapid procurement.

The Land Cruise Missile program — the envisioned ground-launched version of the Missile de Croisière Navale and the most direct European analog to the Tomahawk — may be the most feasible candidate.

Under a crash program, states participating in the European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA) could quickly agree on core design parameters, commit to a fixed procurement quantity, and provide the funding necessary to accelerate the timeline. Success would likely depend on the willingness of procuring states to set aside disagreements over where development and production are localized and to direct funding to whichever national players can deliver results most quickly, in this case, French industry. Even then, delivery of the Land Cruise Missile to European militaries appears unlikely before 2028.

Another potential candidate for a crash program is the deep-strike capability envisioned under the British-German bilateral project, which could aim at pushing the deployment timeline from the 2030s to the late 2020s. That said, feasibility constraints are likely to impose tighter limits on rapid delivery here than for the Land Cruise Missile.

Beggars can’t be choosers

In the end, European states face a limited set of options, but are by no means out of them. What is clear, however, is that — given European hesitation to invest in deep strike over the past several years — no optimal solution remains, and European states will have to accept trade-offs in weapon characteristics and procurement risk if they want to field at least an adequate long-range strike capability by the end of the decade.

If European states pursue none of the three options outlined above, a credible European long-range and especially a deep-strike capability is unlikely to materialize before the mid-2030s. This would be a dangerous gamble, given the critical role these weapon systems play in modern warfare and the fact that European officials themselves have repeatedly identified the late 2020s as the period of greatest danger.

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