Can Germany Become Europe's Missile Superpower

As Germany ramps up its conventional long-range strike investments, questions about its missile strategy arise.

Picture: MBDA Germany

Earlier this year, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz announced his ambition to make the Bundeswehr the strongest conventional military in Europe, pledging “all the financial resources it needs.” With the debt brake reformed and the floodgates of military spending opened, this ambition now appears within reach.

One area long neglected in German defense spending is conventional long-range strike weapons. That, however, finally seems to be changing. This post reviews Germany’s announced and ongoing procurement projects in the conventional long-range strike domain.

Tomahawks for the Bundeswehr?

According to a list obtained by Politico, Germany plans to procure 400 Tomahawk Block Vb cruise missiles for roughly €1.15 billion. These Tomahawks would be divided between land- and sea-based components.

For the German Navy, Tomahawk would serve as an interim capability to meet its deep-strike requirement in the near to medium term, until the 3SM “Tyrfing”, a land-attack cruise missile currently in joint development with Norway, enters service in the mid-2030s. Tomahawk missiles would presumably be deployed aboard F123 and F124 class frigates, which are equipped with 16 and 32 MK41 vertical launch system (VLS) cells, respectively.

In total, the German Navy operates four F123 and three F124 class frigates, providing up to 160 VLS cells at sea if all vessels are deployed simultaneously. Assuming a Tomahawk loadout share of 20 to 30 percent, which is typical for U.S. Navy ships, the German Navy might have between 30 and 50 missiles at sea at any given time. That said, it is unlikely that the entire fleet would be deployed for strike missions simultaneously.

The Politico article also indicates that Germany is interested in acquiring three ground-based Typhon launchers for €220 million. Given the price tag, it is likely that the list refers to three Typhon batteries, each consisting of four launchers, one Battery Operations Center, and associated support vehicles. With each launcher capable of carrying up to four Tomahawks, this would theoretically allow for up to 144 ground-based launches at a time, though salvos of this size would be unlikely in practice.

The Block Vb Tomahawk, which the Bundeswehr appears to be interested in, is one of three Block V variants and comes equipped with the Joint Multiple Effects Warhead System (JMEWS), which combines a primary shaped charge with a secondary penetrator warhead, providing the missile with hard-target kill capability.

This is a somewhat peculiar choice, as the Bundeswehr’s hard-target kill requirement is arguably already met by the Taurus KEPD 350 and its presumed successor, the Taurus Neo, both of which are equipped with the highly optimized MEPHISTO penetrator warhead system. Moreover, the Block Vb is a more complex and likely more expensive design than the baseline Block V variant, which has been selected by other recent export customers, notably Australia and Japan.

Unless the Bundeswehr has a specific hard target set located at a range of over 1,000 kilometers in mind — one that cannot be effectively engaged with baseline Tomahawk variants — it arguably makes little sense to pursue the Block Vb variant. I may offer some speculation on what this hard target set might entail in a future post.

Other missile project: Taurus Neo, Joint Strike Missile, and JASSM-ER

In addition to the planned Tomahawk procurement, previously leaked documents have revealed that the Bundeswehr intends to acquire 600 Taurus Neo cruise missiles for approximately €2.4 billion.

Taurus Neo is the successor to the Taurus KEPD 350, of which the German Air Force currently fields around 600 units. It remains unclear what portion of this stockpile is currently serviceable, as part of it is undergoing maintenance and lifecycle upgrades.

There are some open questions regarding the Taurus Neo’s engine. According to reports, work is underway to replace the American-origin turbofan engine used in the original system with an alternative of comparable performance. In this context, Taurus Systems GmbH (a joint venture between MBDA Germany and Saab) has been in discussions with Kawasaki to supply a replacement engine. Well-informed sources also indicate that the manufacturer is in talks with additional potential suppliers, including from Europe. However, sourcing a mini-jet engine with similar thrust specifications and efficiency levels outside the United States remains a significant challenge.

While both the Tomahawk and Taurus Neo procurements are not yet officially confirmed (though they now appear highly likely), Germany has already placed orders for two cruise missiles that will arm its future F-35A Lightning II fleet.

The first is the AGM-158B/B2 JASSM-ER, of which Germany was authorized to purchase up to 75 units. It is likely that the full amount was ordered. The JASSM-ER features advanced low-observability characteristics, is equipped with a penetrator warhead providing hard-target kill capability (though it lacks a primary shaped charge), and has an unclassified range of 1,000 kilometers.

The second is the Joint Strike Missile (JSM), for which Germany placed an order for an unspecified quantity in June 2025. Based on a per-unit cost estimate of $2.5 to $3.5 million, this would correspond to approximately 185 to 260 missiles.

The JSM is a modern land-attack cruise missile designed to fit within the internal weapons bay of the F-35A. This allows the missile to be deployed without compromising the F-35’s radar cross section, theoretically enabling the aircraft to penetrate adversary weapons engagement zones before releasing the missile. The JSM has a range exceeding 500 kilometers when flown in a high-high-low altitude trajectory.

Challenges and capability gaps

What these developments indicate is that, at the very least, funding is now clearly moving in the direction of conventional long-range strike. While the balance between offensive strike capabilities and missile defense remains heavily skewed in favor of the latter (a rough estimate would be a ratio of around 4:1) the gap has begun to narrow. Still, several challenges remain.

First, most of the newly ordered missile systems, along with those under consideration, will not be delivered quickly. While there is a good chance that Lockheed Martin and Kongsberg will be able to fulfill the JASSM-ER and JSM orders — at least in part — with the arrival of the first F-35s in 2026 to 2027, the first Taurus Neo is not expected to leave the production line before 2029. Moreover, the Tomahawk Block Vb variant has not yet reached initial operational capability, which means that production and delivery cannot begin immediately. The U.S. Navy currently expects fleet release by 2028 to 2029.

Taken together, these factors suggest that even with orders placed in 2025, Germany’s missile arsenal is unlikely to reach a level of robustness before the early 2030s.

In addition, Germany, like many other European countries, has yet to address its capability gap for a high-velocity missile system capable of striking time-sensitive targets, in particular at operational depth.

ATACMS, which may soon be license-produced by Rheinmetall in Europe, is one potential option. However, it is an aging system that has shown vulnerability in Ukraine. The Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) might offer a more modern alternative, but it remains unclear whether the United States would be willing to export it to Germany, given that it has already denied a similar request from Norway.

Germany and the United Kingdom have recently announced plans to jointly develop a “deep precision weapon” with a range of 2,000 kilometers, which may partially address this gap. Still, this system is more likely to evolve into an expensive capability (according to rumors, a hypersonic boost-glide vehicle) aimed at high-value strategic-level targets, rather than one suited for engaging the wide range of targets located closer to the frontline and rear area. In any case, the project appears to remain in the conceptual phase for now, with production and delivery still years away.

Within the European Long-Range Strike Approach, Germany also appears to be interested in a ground-launched cruise missile with a range of 2,000 kilometers, which would offer a European alternative to Tomahawk. As with the British-German development effort, however, the missile remains in the conceptual phase.

Germany has so far also not made any public efforts to acquire an affordable long-range strike capability like a mini-cruise missile or long-range drone, which are needed to saturate enemy air defenses, and to efficiently engage lower-cost targets that do not warrant an expensive cruise or ballistic missile.

That being said, Rheinmetall’s potential cooperation with Anduril for the local production of Barracuda mini-cruise missiles may indicate a certain level of interest in this type of capability on the part of the German customer. A fully European alternative could be offered by the Dutch manufacturer Destinus, which supplies both mini-cruise missiles and long-range drones to Ukraine and has recently sought to expand its customer base across Europe.

All this indicates that the Bundeswehr still has work to do before it can credibly position itself as a serious missile power. Given the critical role conventional long-range strike weapons now play in modern warfare, German decision-makers would be well advised to act swiftly and build on the progress already made.

Importantly, just as crucial as the capabilities themselves is the doctrine guiding their use. It is therefore essential that German decision-makers complement their acquisition efforts with a coherent missile strategy and already now devise clear guidelines for employment that takes into account both opportunities and risks.