This whole German missile strategy is rather shocking. It still follows the old US/ NATO paradigm of investing in highly complex, expensive systems that take ages to develop and produce. That's not a lesson learned from the Ukraine-Russia war. The proposed numbers are also a bit on the low side. It projects the message towards Russia "our weapons act as a deterrent, we don't have the intention to actually use them". Look at the warp speed of Ukrainian invention. They have to cope with the changing AI-warfare, or they face the prospect of annihilation. Apparently, Germany feels entitled to act differently. In a wider perspective, we should get used in Europe to actually deploy our armies in wartime. And especially in Germany, with its idea of Kollektivschuld. That will take probably more than a generation to change. A luxury the people of Ukraine don't have.
The planned acquisitions meet the high accuracy, high performance criteria of traditional NATO doctrine. As long as parallel investments in lower cost Anduril-type systems are in the works as well and a relevant war fighting strategy is guiding the force structure, this might be the best we can hope for.
That's Russky propaganda, my friend. Any patriotic supporter of US weapons manufacturers... er, I mean, any patriotic supporter of the EU, knows that 3 x 4 x 4 = 144
So, a huge increase in long-range missile capacity. Assuming russia is the significant risk, where would Germany acquire the intelligence to designate targets at such ranges?
Germans are really ready to lick any US boot soles for 20 years. I thought they were all about European sovereignty… Germany should apply to become the 51st US state, because at this rate they will soon make UK jealous.
Fabian, thanks for your analysis. My current interest has been what Germany is doing to develop a drone shield with lower cost means of shooting them down, and other means of defense against them, let alone a plan for handling drones other than that the police force is allowed to shoot down drones. Are they getting training in this?
I read about a drone delaying air traffic in Berlin on Friday evening. While I do not live in Berlin, I have a child who studies there, and I have been noticing Berlin's airport being tampered with on more than one occasion by presumably Russian interference. Of course Berlin is a target, it is the capital.
I would like to see Germany develop a bigger defense capability towards drones, and we know that is not these high priced long range weapons, unless they will be used defensively to hit military and weapons production targets in enemy territory. Still, that is not enough of a strategy for defense. Germany is known to be slow to adopt new things, and it seems in terms of the military it is as well.
Excellent assessment. The central issue, in my view, is that becoming a missile power is not primarily a procurement problem. It is an architecture problem.
Germany can buy Tomahawk, Taurus Neo, JASSM-ER, JSM, and future European long-range systems, but missiles do not become strategic power simply by entering the inventory.
The harder task is building the system around them: targeting, ISR, command authority, escalation doctrine, stockpile depth, production capacity, survivable launch options, mission planning, legal-political decision cycles, and integration with NATO operational concepts.
That is why the timeline matters. A missile arsenal that becomes robust only in the early 2030s may still be strategically late if the doctrine, industrial base, and employment logic mature even more slowly.
Germany’s real challenge is not whether it can become Europe’s missile superpower on paper. It is whether it can become a credible long-range strike system in practice.
US defense contractors making incredible money, selling a demonstrative token capability which is probably not even enough to intimidate the French, nevermind serious opponents. All while Germany loses a generation of tech development opportunities for what used to be a world-class industry.
This whole German missile strategy is rather shocking. It still follows the old US/ NATO paradigm of investing in highly complex, expensive systems that take ages to develop and produce. That's not a lesson learned from the Ukraine-Russia war. The proposed numbers are also a bit on the low side. It projects the message towards Russia "our weapons act as a deterrent, we don't have the intention to actually use them". Look at the warp speed of Ukrainian invention. They have to cope with the changing AI-warfare, or they face the prospect of annihilation. Apparently, Germany feels entitled to act differently. In a wider perspective, we should get used in Europe to actually deploy our armies in wartime. And especially in Germany, with its idea of Kollektivschuld. That will take probably more than a generation to change. A luxury the people of Ukraine don't have.
The planned acquisitions meet the high accuracy, high performance criteria of traditional NATO doctrine. As long as parallel investments in lower cost Anduril-type systems are in the works as well and a relevant war fighting strategy is guiding the force structure, this might be the best we can hope for.
At those levels of procurement it is very possible that most of the weapons will be destroyed by the enemy or launched in the first week of a war.
3 Typhon batteries x 4 launchers x 4 missiles = 48, not 144…
That's Russky propaganda, my friend. Any patriotic supporter of US weapons manufacturers... er, I mean, any patriotic supporter of the EU, knows that 3 x 4 x 4 = 144
Sorry but I don’t get it. Maybe your humor is too subtle for me.
So, a huge increase in long-range missile capacity. Assuming russia is the significant risk, where would Germany acquire the intelligence to designate targets at such ranges?
Probably from the same source where Germany wants to acquire most of the missiles... US provides the whole pack
Germans are really ready to lick any US boot soles for 20 years. I thought they were all about European sovereignty… Germany should apply to become the 51st US state, because at this rate they will soon make UK jealous.
Two questions that immediately arise:
1. Does Germany have the money to implement these plans?
2/ Will the Germans approve thereof?
Fabian, thanks for your analysis. My current interest has been what Germany is doing to develop a drone shield with lower cost means of shooting them down, and other means of defense against them, let alone a plan for handling drones other than that the police force is allowed to shoot down drones. Are they getting training in this?
I read about a drone delaying air traffic in Berlin on Friday evening. While I do not live in Berlin, I have a child who studies there, and I have been noticing Berlin's airport being tampered with on more than one occasion by presumably Russian interference. Of course Berlin is a target, it is the capital.
I would like to see Germany develop a bigger defense capability towards drones, and we know that is not these high priced long range weapons, unless they will be used defensively to hit military and weapons production targets in enemy territory. Still, that is not enough of a strategy for defense. Germany is known to be slow to adopt new things, and it seems in terms of the military it is as well.
Do you see this differently?
@Fabian Hoffmann: Good post. Timely, insightful and informative. Thank you.
Excellent assessment. The central issue, in my view, is that becoming a missile power is not primarily a procurement problem. It is an architecture problem.
Germany can buy Tomahawk, Taurus Neo, JASSM-ER, JSM, and future European long-range systems, but missiles do not become strategic power simply by entering the inventory.
The harder task is building the system around them: targeting, ISR, command authority, escalation doctrine, stockpile depth, production capacity, survivable launch options, mission planning, legal-political decision cycles, and integration with NATO operational concepts.
That is why the timeline matters. A missile arsenal that becomes robust only in the early 2030s may still be strategically late if the doctrine, industrial base, and employment logic mature even more slowly.
Germany’s real challenge is not whether it can become Europe’s missile superpower on paper. It is whether it can become a credible long-range strike system in practice.
No
US defense contractors making incredible money, selling a demonstrative token capability which is probably not even enough to intimidate the French, nevermind serious opponents. All while Germany loses a generation of tech development opportunities for what used to be a world-class industry.
Great analysis, thank You