So much depends on the quality of the IMU and GNSS subsystem that it is really hard to tell what we should expect from Ukrainian jamming attempts. Russian missiles are clearly not flying with the highest quality of either. Still, where Ukrainian jamming starts to be effective would be a key attribute. It’s hard to imagine they can jam earlier in the flight path, and if the missile obtains a GNSS correction as late as 100 miles from target it could still achieve a 10m CEP without further GNSS correction.
In addition, Iskander and Khinzal are supposed to have some form of terminal guidance, perhaps DSMAC-like. So jamming of their mid course should not result in an inability to find their target. Again, we don’t know of the actual quality of the terminal guidance system.
Not just jamming, but spoofing of the GNSS signal would really be required to (at least in theory) send these missiles so far off course that they were effectively “downed”, right?
There are persistent reports of terminal guidance on the two missiles, but no evidence from Ukraine has emerged indicating they employ it.
Yes, they are probably too far away to jam during the launch phase, and midcourse is the only viable window. There were reports of Russian BMs falling as far as 1,000 m off target. If that's EW related, it might indeed be spoofing rather than jamming. But, as you say, very difficult to make firm predictions.
I've read where Ukraine has some sort of interference or jammer that would apply to the "glide bombs" Russia likes to shoot off from its fighter-bomber aircraft. I assume your information concerning jamming missiles could also apply to these dumb bomb kits. Did the Soviets (way back when) copy the US JDAM kits after they saw how dumb bombs could be made smart? I'd like to know if the satellites in orbit themselves, on either side, could be jammed or spoofed directly from the ground. Or would it be possible that a rogue satellite could approach another satellite (both in orbit) and then jam any signal emanating from a certain satellite? Maybe that's too science fiction.
Great questions, and sadly, my understanding of space assets is not sufficient to provide a complete answer, I'm afraid. That said, what you describe as rogue satellites is definitely a threat scenario under discussion. I also know there are soft-kill methods for satellites, though they are often laser-based or conducted from nearby orbiting satellites. Not sure if ground-based jammers can jam the satellite signal directly at the source.
As for the guidance kits, I would assume that if the jammer can jam ballistic missiles, it can also jam glide bombs. They are slower in midcourse, fly closer to the EW system, and likely incorporate less robust GNSS receivers. The bigger challenge here is operational. Glide bomb attacks are more distributed across the Ukrainian territory, making it difficult to preposition EW systems where the attack might arrive. Easy to expect an attack on Kyiv, but it is much harder to estimate where the next glide bomb will drop.
The Boeing X-37, the mini space shuttle sans pilots, could very well fill the niche of satellite killer if that need ever arose for the US. No doubt the world space powers keep track of that vehicle as it orbits the earth. I believe it even has a grappling arm similar to the one the original space shuttles had. Most of the details about that vehicle are classified. So who knows just exactly what it's doing up there when it's in orbit.
The sanctions-enforcement footnote at the end is doing more work than it looks. The Russian guidance stack has depended on Western components for two decades. Sanctions never closed that pipeline cleanly — they raised the friction. The interesting structural shift since 2022 is that the friction now compounds across components rather than degrading any one of them sharply. IMU drift, GNSS receiver hardening, antenna fabrication tolerances. Each one slightly worse than the import equivalent, none catastrophically so. The jammer's job gets easier in aggregate, even if no single component fails. That is what makes it hard to attribute the 58-of-59 number to any specific cause.
So much depends on the quality of the IMU and GNSS subsystem that it is really hard to tell what we should expect from Ukrainian jamming attempts. Russian missiles are clearly not flying with the highest quality of either. Still, where Ukrainian jamming starts to be effective would be a key attribute. It’s hard to imagine they can jam earlier in the flight path, and if the missile obtains a GNSS correction as late as 100 miles from target it could still achieve a 10m CEP without further GNSS correction.
In addition, Iskander and Khinzal are supposed to have some form of terminal guidance, perhaps DSMAC-like. So jamming of their mid course should not result in an inability to find their target. Again, we don’t know of the actual quality of the terminal guidance system.
Not just jamming, but spoofing of the GNSS signal would really be required to (at least in theory) send these missiles so far off course that they were effectively “downed”, right?
There are persistent reports of terminal guidance on the two missiles, but no evidence from Ukraine has emerged indicating they employ it.
Yes, they are probably too far away to jam during the launch phase, and midcourse is the only viable window. There were reports of Russian BMs falling as far as 1,000 m off target. If that's EW related, it might indeed be spoofing rather than jamming. But, as you say, very difficult to make firm predictions.
Excellent explaination and presentation of a key technical matter
Thank you!
Many thanks!! A clear and concise explanation of a subject I knew very little about!
Outstanding analysis!
I've read where Ukraine has some sort of interference or jammer that would apply to the "glide bombs" Russia likes to shoot off from its fighter-bomber aircraft. I assume your information concerning jamming missiles could also apply to these dumb bomb kits. Did the Soviets (way back when) copy the US JDAM kits after they saw how dumb bombs could be made smart? I'd like to know if the satellites in orbit themselves, on either side, could be jammed or spoofed directly from the ground. Or would it be possible that a rogue satellite could approach another satellite (both in orbit) and then jam any signal emanating from a certain satellite? Maybe that's too science fiction.
Great questions, and sadly, my understanding of space assets is not sufficient to provide a complete answer, I'm afraid. That said, what you describe as rogue satellites is definitely a threat scenario under discussion. I also know there are soft-kill methods for satellites, though they are often laser-based or conducted from nearby orbiting satellites. Not sure if ground-based jammers can jam the satellite signal directly at the source.
As for the guidance kits, I would assume that if the jammer can jam ballistic missiles, it can also jam glide bombs. They are slower in midcourse, fly closer to the EW system, and likely incorporate less robust GNSS receivers. The bigger challenge here is operational. Glide bomb attacks are more distributed across the Ukrainian territory, making it difficult to preposition EW systems where the attack might arrive. Easy to expect an attack on Kyiv, but it is much harder to estimate where the next glide bomb will drop.
The Boeing X-37, the mini space shuttle sans pilots, could very well fill the niche of satellite killer if that need ever arose for the US. No doubt the world space powers keep track of that vehicle as it orbits the earth. I believe it even has a grappling arm similar to the one the original space shuttles had. Most of the details about that vehicle are classified. So who knows just exactly what it's doing up there when it's in orbit.
The sanctions-enforcement footnote at the end is doing more work than it looks. The Russian guidance stack has depended on Western components for two decades. Sanctions never closed that pipeline cleanly — they raised the friction. The interesting structural shift since 2022 is that the friction now compounds across components rather than degrading any one of them sharply. IMU drift, GNSS receiver hardening, antenna fabrication tolerances. Each one slightly worse than the import equivalent, none catastrophically so. The jammer's job gets easier in aggregate, even if no single component fails. That is what makes it hard to attribute the 58-of-59 number to any specific cause.
Dear manlet,
Great prompting skills.
A fan
Very much appreciated Fabian. Excellent detail work, thank you 👍