Decoding the Credibility of Russian Nuclear Threats

Russia revises its nuclear doctrine, expanding the scenarios for potential nuclear use. How credible is the threat?

Picture: Kremlin

On September 25, the Kremlin fueled nuclear fears by announcing plans to revise its nuclear doctrine. The changes would adapt the doctrine to the situation in Ukraine and generally broaden the conditions that could trigger nuclear retaliation. Some observers believe this adjustment poses a credible nuclear threat that must be taken seriously. But how credible are Russian nuclear threats?

Categorizing Russian nuclear threats

The credibility of Russian nuclear threats has been a key concern for decision-makers since the war began, and much suggests that Western politicians have tended to overestimate their credibility. To understand the credibility of Russian nuclear threats, it’s useful to differentiate between four types of nuclear threats, each varying in intensity. Generally, the more intense the threat, the higher its credibility.

1. Cheap talk

The first category of nuclear threats can be described as cheap talk. Most of Russia’s nuclear threats fall into this category.

A good example is the discussions regularly held by eccentric guests on Russian talk shows, who fantasize together with the moderator about launching nuclear weapons against cities like London, Paris, Berlin, Washington D.C, or any other Western city that comes to their mind.

These threats are not state-sanctioned, occur in a vacuum, and completely ignore the tremendous costs nuclear use would impose on Russia. Thus, these threats are inherently non-credible and should be ignored.

2. State-sanctioned rhetoric

The second category of nuclear threats stays on the rhetorical level but are more intense. This is largely because the discourse is elevated from non-official to official channels.

In this case, the nuclear threat is made directly by Russian decisionmakers, including Putin himself. A good example of a nuclear threat in this category occurred in September 2022, when Putin declared that Russia would use any means necessary to defend annexed territory, insisting, “It’s not a bluff.” (As it turns out, it absolutely was.)

Putin’s latest and very direct nuclear threat related to lifting targeting restrictions for Western long-range strike weapons also falls under this category. So does the announced nuclear doctrine change, as a nuclear doctrine essentially is a formal policy document reflecting state-level discourse on nuclear weapons.

While it's important not to ignore these nuclear threats entirely, it's equally important to recognize their limited credibility and avoid overreacting, as Western decision-makers have done in the past.

3. Preparations for limited nuclear use

Moving from the second to the third category, a major qualitative shift takes place. Now the threat is no longer purely rhetorical and restricted to a discursive level, but also includes an active physcial component related to preparations for nuclear use.

If Putin wanted to launch a tactical or non-strategic nuclear warhead against Ukraine or NATO, he would first need to order preparations. Unlike Russia's strategic nuclear warheads, which are kept at a high level of readiness, Russia's tactical nuclear warheads are normally stored separately from their delivery vehicles.

To initiate this process, Putin would need to activate the military unit responsible for managing Russian nuclear warheads (12 GUMO). This unit would then retrieve the warheads from storage sites and transport them to workshops, where they would be “mated” with their delivery vehicles.

These movements would likely be highly visible through signal and human intelligence, even if Russia attempted to conceal them. This being said, Russia would likely want to telegraph these movements to maximize their coercive impact and achieve objectives without having to cross the nuclear threshold, which would be incredibly risky.

There are two reasons why this kind of threat is much more credible than the previous two. First, it involves actual preparations and sets the stage for potential nuclear use. Second, it dramatically shortens the timespan between a decision taken and eventual nuclear use.

If Russia were to escalate its nuclear threats to this level, there would still be no need to panic. However, concrete steps would need to be devised to deter Russia from crossing the nuclear threshold, including political, diplomatic, and potentially military measures.

4. Preparations for largescale nuclear use

Finally, to further enhance the credibility of his nuclear threats, Russia could pair limited preparations for nuclear use, as outlined in category three, with preparations for large-scale nuclear use.

This would primarily involve preparing Russia's strategic nuclear arsenals, including those on strategic bombers, nuclear-armed submarines, and mobile and silo-based ICBMs. The rationale would be to signal to the West that Russia is ready to bear the costs of counter-escalation and is potentially willing to escalate a NATO-Russia confrontation to a strategic nuclear exchange.

This type of threat would, for example, involve “flushing out” Russian mobile transporter-erector launchers (TELs) from their garages and sending them on patrol, putting strategic bombers equipped with nuclear-armed cruise missiles on airfield alert, maximizing the number of SLBMs at sea (even if this disrupts scheduled maintenance), and heating up missile silos.

This type of threat would be very intense and credible, and would constitute a major reason for concern. Potentially, this would be the time to contemplate military action to preempt a deterrence failure and major Russian nuclear first strike.

Explaining the absence of credible threats

Russia's nuclear threats so far have exclusively fallen into the first and second categories. Their effectiveness has varied over time and from country to country—consider the different impacts on Germany and the United States versus Poland and Estonia, for example.

In general, and especially up until the debate on long-range strike weapons, Russia has likely been dissatisfied with the impact of its nuclear threats. But if Russia can theoretically send more credible nuclear threats, why hasn't it done so?

The reason is that not only nuclear use, but also more credible preparations for it, could provoke a major backlash. China and India, as well as key players in the Global South, have repeatedly made clear that they do not condone Russian nuclear threats, and their desire to avoid nuclear escalation. Just recently, this was confirmed in a Brazilian-Chinese Communiqué.

If Russia began moving tactical nuclear warheads or parading nuclear-armed missiles, its partners might turn their backs, especially as Western states would quickly bolster their diplomatic efforts to isolate Russia. Thus, from a Russian perspective, credible nuclear threats are risky business.

Conclusion: The likelihood of nuclear use

The fact that Russia has not used nuclear weapons so far does not mean it will never do so. Additionally, I do not subscribe to the theory that Russia's nuclear arsenal is no longer functional—this also cannot be a reasonable basis for our planning.

However, employing nuclear weapons would be extremely risky from a Russian perspective, and so far Russia’s nuclear threats have lacked credibility. This should reassure us. There is a high likelihood that Putin will never resort to nuclear use, as the risks are too great and the potential rewards too low. There is equally a strong chance that Russia's nuclear threats will remain on the rhetorical level and not turn into action.

But if Putin were to seriously consider using nuclear weapons, he would likely first ramp up the credibility of Russian nuclear threats to intimidate the West and create more severe coercive conundrums before turning to nuclear use. This would produce more intense nuclear crisis episodes than we've seen so far, but it would also provide an opportunity for the West to adapt its posture and dissuade Russia from crossing the nuclear threshold.