Drones, Missiles, and Leverage: Why Ukraine’s Strike Capabilities Matter More Than Ever

Massed precision, Ukraine's 1,000 km Neptune cruise missile, and talks about a ceasefire in the sky

Picture: VoidWanderer via Creative Commons/Wikimedia

On 18 March, following a phone call between U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, the latter gave the impression that Russia would temporarily halt attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure for a period of 30 days. Just hours later, Russia launched a large-scale drone attack on critical infrastructure in Slovyansk, including hospitals, resulting in widespread blackouts, while also accusing Ukraine of having breached the ceasefire agreement first.

Despite this, reports indicate that Ukrainian and Russian delegations are preparing to meet with U.S. negotiators in Riyadh to discuss a limited ceasefire agreement focused on protecting critical infrastructure. While the situation remains unclear at the time of writing, this episode offers a timely reason to reassess the long-range strike campaigns of both Ukraine and Russia—their changing character, new developments, and which side stands to gain more from a potential “ceasefire in the sky”, should it come about.

Mass is king

Similar to tactical-level warfighting efforts—now dominated by an almost absurd proliferation of FPV drones—both Ukraine and Russia’s long-range strike campaigns are increasingly shaped by the logic of “massed precision.”

Given the presence of relatively effective air and missile defenses across the theater and the sheer number of relevant targets at operational and strategic depth, having capable long-range strike weapons alone is insufficient. What is required is not just precision and range, but volume. Both Ukraine and Russia appear to have recognized this, and are investing accordingly.

Russia is still estimated to produce over 1,200 cruise missiles annually, alongside several hundred short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. In 2024, it reportedly manufactured close to 6,000 Shahed-136 drones domestically and now plans to add an annual output of 10,000 Gerbera decoy drones, designed to mimic the radar signature of Shahed, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of existing long-range drone capabilities.

Ukraine, in parallel, is increasingly pursuing mass production, having—at least until recently—deprioritized “heavier” and more complex missile projects, as far as can be discerned from open sources. At the close of 2024, President Zelensky pledged that Ukraine would produce 30,000 long-range drones and 3,000 cruise missiles in 2025, supported by the introduction of several new “light” cruise missile and drone designs to meet that target (you can read about them here). While these figures remain highly ambitious, Ukraine has unquestionably scaled up its long-range strike production efforts by a significant degree.

New Ukrainian developments

In recent days, Ukraine announced the successful test-firing of a 1,000 km-range variant of the Neptune cruise missile, likely optimized for land-attack purposes. Originally, the R-360 Neptune was developed and deployed as a >300 km anti-ship missile and lacked land-attack capability due to the absence of suitable guidance systems.

Ukraine already possesses multiple long-range drone designs capable of exceeding 1,000 km in range. Thus, range itself is not the key variable in this development. The significance lies in the payload. If Ukraine has managed to extend the Neptune’s range to 1,000 km while retaining its original 150 kg warhead, it would gain access to a broader set of targets at strategic depth that are currently unreachable due to the limited payload capacity of existing drone systems.

Long-range drones typically carry very light warheads, often under 50 kg, and their slow speed limits their warhead penetrability. In many cases, a basic concrete structure is therfore sufficient to prevent serious damage.

By contrast, a cruise missile impacting its target at high subsonic velocity (~ Mach 0.9) and equipped with a 150 kg warhead—depending on the exact warhead configuration—should be able to penetrate one to three meters of reinforced concrete. This would allow Ukraine to engage not only soft targets but also semi-hardened infrastructure at strategic depth, significantly expanding its strike options.

The key challenge for Ukraine will be to combine this new capability with mass by scaling production of the Neptune variant. Its effectiveness will also depend on successful integration into broader Ukrainian strike packages that combine various drone and missile systems.

One potential issue is that, compared to existing systems, the Neptune variant may be relatively easy to discriminate on radar—if not by radar signature, then by flight profile, particularly its velocity. This could allow Russian missile defenses to identify it as a high-value target and prioritize interceptors accordingly.

That said, Russia continues to face constraints in covering all potential attack vectors due to limited missile defense assets. With proper mission planning and strike coordination, there remains a strong likelihood that the missile could penetrate defenses and inflict significant damage, even in more limited numbers.

Coercive leverage

Considering these developments, should Ukraine be open to a ceasefire in the sky? Answering this question requires a broader assessment of Ukraine’s current position in the war—militarily and politically.

In my view, Ukraine currently—at least until very recently—possesses three major sources of coercive leverage over Russia that shape both the conduct of the war and the dynamics surrounding any potential negotiations or their preparation.

These include:

1. Western support: Russia understands that, over the long term, and as long as Ukraine’s allies remain committed, Ukraine will enjoy greater economic and industrial capacity to sustain its war effort. This creates pressure on Russia to settle the conflict sooner rather than later, and helps explain its efforts to isolate Ukraine diplomatically and economically.

2. Ukrainian troops on Russian soil: The presence of larger Ukrainian combat formations operating inside Russian territory prevents any straightforward freezing of the conflict along existing frontlines. As long as Ukrainian forces remain active on Russian soil, neither Russia nor the United States can unilaterally impose a static end to hostilities.

3. Ukraine’s independent long-range strike capability: Ukraine’s ability to strike Russian targets at operational and strategic depth gives it the capacity to impose significant costs on Russia for as long as the war continues. This capability operates outside the constraints of frontline dynamics and largely independently of its allies.

As we know, U.S. support either appears to be gone or, at best, highly uncertain for the coming years. Europe is attempting to step up, but cannot do so quickly enough—especially while also scrambling to rebuild its own defense posture. Meanwhile, Ukraine seems to have largely lost its positions in the Kursk region, even as it tries to hold ground there and push into other areas.

This suggests that Ukraine’s only remaining source of significant coercive leverage—one it maintains regardless of shifts among its allies or developments on the ground—is its ability to impose sustained costs on Russia for as long as the war continues.

For that reason, a ceasefire in the sky could be deeply problematic for Ukraine. It would effectively neutralize its most independent source of leverage and could significantly weaken its negotiating position for the duration of the ceasefire.

Of course, such an agreement would also carry potential benefits—notably the preservation of lives and the protection of Ukrainian infrastructure. Whether these benefits outweigh the potential costs cannot be determined without access to classified information, including Ukraine’s energy situation, missile and drone stockpiles on both sides, and current threat perceptions in both Kyiv and Moscow.

What this does underscore, however, is that, if the Trump Administration attempts to pressure Ukraine into accepting a ceasefire—even one limited to the missile domain—Europe must be prepared to stand behind Ukraine should it decide to reject such terms, understanding the coercive leverage Ukraine would give up by accepting to it.