Missile Systems in Homeopathic Doses

Germany's request for the Typhon missile system reveals continued shortcomings in Europe's missile procurement

Picture: U.S. Army

In mid-July 2025, Germany submitted an official Letter of Request for the Typhon missile system, also known as the “Strategic Mid-Range Fires System.”

While the Letter of Request does not imply that a procurement decision has been finalized — the German parliament would still need to allocate funding in any case — it signals a strong interest on Germany’s part.

This post examines the request and offers insights into how quickly a Typhon purchase could help close Germany’s capability gap in the deep strike segment.

German missile ambitions

For about a year now, Germany has publicly emphasized its intention to acquire a deep precision-strike capability, capable of engaging targets far behind the frontline.

Germany has been a founding member of the European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA) program, announced in July 2024, which seeks to develop a European ground-launched conventional missile system with a range between 1,000 km and 2,000 km.

Additionally, in October 2024, Germany and the United Kingdom signed the Trinity House Agreement, under which Germany committed to developing a new long-range strike capability with a range exceeding 2,000 km in partnership with the United Kingdom. This commitment was recently reaffirmed.

Beyond aspirational programs and conceptual work, Germany’s actual missile procurement has remained limited, however, despite the demonstrated importance of missile systems in Ukraine and repeated affirmations by German officials of the value of systems like the Taurus KEPD 350.

In 2023, Germany likely ordered 75 AGM-158B JASSM-ER cruise missiles (1,000 km range), the maximum number it was authorized to buy, alongside its 35 F-35A Lightning II aircraft. In June 2025, Germany placed an order for an unspecified number of Joint Strike Missiles (500+ km range), valued at approximately $645 million. Assuming a per-unit cost of $3–3.5 million, this corresponds to roughly 180 to 215 missiles.

At best, these acquisitions can be described as “homeopathic” in scale. Moreover, the deep strike segment — if defined as a range significantly exceeding 1,000 kilometers — has remained unaddressed.

Typhon for Germany?

Typhon is a transporter-erector launcher system for SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles. Each launcher contains four strike-length cells from the Mark 41 Vertical Launching System mounted in the footprint of a 40-foot (~12-meter) ISO container.

SM-6 is a multi-use missile system capable of serving in an anti-air and anti-missile role, as well as an anti-ship missile in sea-based environments, as well as as a surface-to-ground missile against land-based targets. In the latter role, it reportedly has a range of around 500 kilometers.

For Germany, more interesting is likely the ability to launch Tomahawk cruise missiles. Tomahawk has been around since the 1980s and is currently being produced in the Block IV and Block V configurations.

The baseline Block IV and Block V variants are largely similar, with a range of over 1,600 kilometers and equipped with a 450-kilogram warhead. The most important difference is an upgraded datalink that is included in the Block V variant, which allows the operator to communicate with the missile in-flight and retarget it, if necessary.

Recent foreign sales of the Tomahawk cruise missile to Australia, Japan, and the Netherlands included a mix of Block IV and Block V variants, which may similarly be the case for Germany.

Tomahawk would be a useful tool for the German armed forces, provided it can be acquired fast and in substantial numbers. And here, once again, issues arise.

Tomahawk production and building slots

U.S. Navy Weapons Procurement Justification Books indicate that sustaining the Tomahawk production line requires a minimum output of 90 units per year. Otherwise, Raytheon risks disruptions in the supply chain.

This threshold has barely been met in recent years, though only by combining purchases of the U.S. Navy — nominally the main customer for Tomahawk cruise missiles — with orders from the U.S Marine Corps and Army, as well as foreign military sales.

As a result, observers have consistently criticized the relatively low order rate, especially when measured against the missile’s high expenditure rate in recent missile operations in the Middle East, and the extremely high expected demand for Tomahawk cruise missiles in a China contingency. For example, the U.S. Navy ordered only 70 Tomahawk cruise missiles in FY2022, 55 in FY2023, and none in FY2024, instead allocating funds to upgrade 50 existing missiles from Block IV to Block V standard.

As a result, the current order volume is insufficient to sustain a robust supply chain, which directly affects Raytheon’s ability to service export customers promptly, including a potential customer in Germany.

While the exact annual delivery capacity for Tomahawk is unclear, it likely hovers around the minimum sustainment rate of 90 missiles per year. Unsurprisingly, U.S. Navy Justification Books list a total lead time of 2.5 to 3 years for newly ordered Tomahawks.

Germany would also face competition for building slots with U.S.-based and foreign customers and would initially be placed at the back of the queue (unless others voluntarily give up their slots). Even another modest, more homeopathic order in the low three-digit range could take three to five years to fulfill — or even more. And it’s worth remembering that Germany’s actual requirement likely lies in the high three digits, if not into the thousands, for deep strike missiles over the coming years.

Tomahawk is not unique in frustrating export customers with long lead times. JASSM-ER customers face similar delays, despite the missile having a much more robust and better-funded production line. For example, Japan’s 2023 order of 150 missiles is scheduled for delivery between FY2028 and FY2030, at a rate of 50 per year.

This underscores that ordering from the United States is not necessarily a fast or even a significantly faster alternative to rebuilding a European missile industrial base. While the U.S. does have an existing missile industry, access to building slots is heavily constrained, meaning that a Typhon and Tomahawk order is not necessarily a quick fix to Germany’s deep precision-strike gap.

A sustained missile industrial effort

In fact, German and European decision-makers must finally recognize that there are no quick fixes. Only a sustained, long-term missile industrial effort can get Europe back on track in the missile domain. This requires acknowledging that modern war demands thousands of conventional long- and deep-strike capabilities, backed by a robust and continuous order intake.

The core problem, of course, is that even a major effort launched now — of which an order for the Typhon system may or may not be a part — will not deliver quick results. If German decision-makers still believe in the 2029 timeline for having to be ready to deter Russia, there is no time to lose. And under a pessimistic reading of the situation, the window may already have closed. Still, a delayed start is better than continued inaction.