How Many Ballistic Missiles Is Russia Producing?

Assessing 9M723 Iskander-M and Kh-47M2 Kinzhal output against employment data

Picture: Russian Ministry of Defense

Russian conventional ballistic missile production is arguably one of the most important metrics for the ongoing war in Ukraine and European defense more broadly. With fewer ballistic missile defense interceptors reaching Ukraine, and a shrinking share available on the global market as a result of the Iran War, the ability to manufacture and deploy ballistic missiles at scale remains a major source of coercive leverage for Russia.

This post examines claimed Russian ballistic missile production rates — focusing on the 9M723 Iskander-M and Kh-47M2 Kinzhal — and compares them with use rates to assess the current state of Russian ballistic missile production capacity.

Ukrainian assessments and Russian ballistic missile employment rates

Throughout the war, Ukrainian intelligence has relatively openly shared its assessments of Russian ballistic missile production, specifically regarding the 9M723 short-range ballistic missile used in the Iskander-M system and the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile.

Ukrainian intelligence is, of course, not a neutral source, and it is arguably in Ukraine’s interest to exaggerate production numbers to create urgency and expedite interceptor deliveries, even if actual figures are somewhat lower. That said, in the absence of alternatives, it remains one of the more authoritative sources on the subject.

In July 2024, HUR data, as reported by the Kyiv Independent, indicated that Russia was producing 720 to 840 9M723 ballistic missiles and 120 to 180 Kh-47M2 Kinzhal ballistic missiles annually. It is unclear whether these figures represented a notional production ceiling or Ukrainian intelligence’s estimate of actual output. In either case, they appear to have been exaggerated.

Procurement documents that have emerged since suggest that Russia ordered 598 and 643 9M723 missiles for production in 2024 and 2025, respectively. Order intake for the Kh-47M2 remains undisclosed. These figures are likely closer to the real production ceiling than those reported by Ukrainian intelligence, though actual output in both years was probably lower.

The CSIS Russian Firepower Strike Tracker aggregates data on Russian missile and long-range drone use based on Ukrainian Air Force reporting and provides analysis of the frequency and intensity of Russian strike activity. These aggregate figures should be treated with caution, as some strikes go unreported or are recorded inaccurately. They are also poorly suited to precise assessments of individual missile types, since Ukrainian source data often fails to neatly differentiate among missile types and instead aggregates them (for example, reporting 9M723 and KN-23 ballistic missile numbers together). As a rough estimate of magnitude, however, they can be useful.

Accounting for these shortcomings, it is reasonable to estimate that Russia launched no more than 200 to 250 9M723 ballistic missiles and 50 to 70 Kh-47M2 ballistic missiles against Ukraine in 2024. For 2025, the figures indicate a significant increase, suggesting a production surge, but likely still amounted to no more than 350 to 400 9M723 ballistic missiles and 75 to 100 Kh-47M2 ballistic missiles.

There is, of course, the possibility that a substantial share of missiles produced in 2024 and 2025 went into longer-term storage. However, before Russia stopped reporting serial numbers on missile components some time in 2023, recovered missile wrecks indicated a very short lag between production and use, suggesting that Russia tends to launch what it builds fairly quickly. This is unlikely to have changed in the years after. While Russia is reported to maintain a reserve stockpile for broader contingencies, it is unlikely to be large enough to account for the gap between ordered and launched quantities.

Russian ballistic missile production in 2024 and 2025 was therefore likely below ordered quantities and well below the production capacity estimated by Ukrainian intelligence.

Russian ballistic missile employment rates and production capacity in 2026

How has the picture since developed? Ukrainian Air Force data suggest that from 2025 through early 2026, the intensity of Russian ballistic missile employment increased, indicating higher production capacity. Analysts at Militarnyi plotted this in the graph below.

Figure: Dmytro Shumlyanskyi, Militarnyi

Since May 2025, reported ballistic missile strikes have exceeded 40 per month, with two exceptions: September and December 2025, when reported figures fell below 30 and 40, respectively, before rebounding substantially in subsequent months, suggesting that the lower employment rate in those months may reflect deliberate stockpiling.

Again, these trends should not be overinterpreted given the unreliability of the underlying data. In general, however, employment rates appear to have fluctuated more significantly in recent months, reaching higher peaks while also more clearly dipping below the trendline at other times.

Analysts at Militarnyi went a step further, fitting a cubic regression trend line to smoothed time-series data, which to them indicates that Russian ballistic missile employment in March and April 2026 dipped below the trend. They attribute this to recent strikes against the Russian ballistic missile production supply chain.

Figure: Dmytro Shumlyanskyi, Militarnyi

These claims are theoretically plausible but warrant caution for statistical reasons. The cubic trend is fitted to approximately 15 smoothed observations, which themselves constitute partially constructed data, leaving little room to distinguish a real pattern from random noise. The standard error of 5.72 missiles means the observed dip falls comfortably within the model’s normal prediction interval, rendering it statistically inconclusive.

Data from May 2026 suggests that Russian ballistic missile employment has recovered to previous levels, with roughly 60 to 80 9M723 and Kh-47M2 missiles launched against Ukraine, depending on how many ballistic projectiles constituted repurposed S-300/400 surface-to-air missiles, a distinction the source data does not clearly draw. This suggests that the dip in the preceding two months may be partly explained by stockpiling ahead of May, and that any supply chain disruptions suffered in recent months have at least partially been overcome (even if they could have prevented an increase in production capacity over that timeframe).

Where does this leave Russian ballistic missile production capacity by mid-2026? Recently, Ukrainian intelligence provided an updated estimate of Russian missile production capacity, stating that Russia produces around 60 9M723 ballistic missiles per month. Numbers for the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal remained unspecified.

Based on recent employment trends, this figure is not entirely implausible (at least compared to when this number was first mentioned in 2024), though it should be treated as an upper-bound estimate. More realistically, Russia’s combined 9M723 and Kh-47M2 production capacity in mid-2026 may be between 600 and 800 units annually, with monthly production potentially fluctuating significantly depending on the availability of internationally sourced components. This would allow Russia to sustain an average employment rate of roughly 50 to 70 monthly ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine, with greater peaks possible if part of the production is stockpiled in a given month.

Conclusion

This analysis presents a challenging picture for Ukraine and, more broadly, Europe. Employment rates of this magnitude appear more than sufficient to saturate and likely overwhelm Ukraine’s already depleted ballistic missile defenses.

To maintain a sustainable denial posture, Ukraine would likely need access to at least 140 PAC-3 MSE-type interceptors per month, valued at roughly USD 1 billion on the international market, according to relatively recent budget requests. Even if such volumes could be imported, which is nowhere near realistic, Ukraine lacks sufficient ballistic missile defense launchers to cover its entire territory.

Promises to deploy a European Patriot alternative as early as next year, such as those made by FirePoint, are not realistic, even if such an effort must be pursued. Ukraine’s best course of action in the short-term is to continue targeting the Russian ballistic missile production supply chain through its increasingly capable long-range arsenal. Electronic warfare efforts aimed at degrading the accuracy of Russian ballistic missiles could reduce their impact, even if they cannot stop them outright.

Western states must reinforce sanctions and tighten third-party measures to ensure that advanced Western components do not reach Russian ballistic missiles, or, where this cannot be fully prevented, that doing so carries the highest possible cost and effort for Russia.