How we know what we know about European missile production

A closer look at missile analysis methodologies

Picture: MBDA

In recent weeks, I’ve frequently commented on European missile production capacities and have a more comprehensive piece forthcoming—part of a broader analysis of key sectors within the European technological and defense industrial base—which I hope will be published in the coming weeks.

In a post from 2 March, I estimated MBDA France’s annual production capacity for SCALP-EG at 50–100 missiles, and MBDA Germany’s capacity for Taurus at 40–60 missiles. These figures have since been cited in several outlets, including some major newspapers.

While I’m glad that this work has drawn interest from journalists and analysts working on this topic, I believe it’s important to critically examine my own estimates. These figures are based on limited and partially inferential data. With that in mind, I thought it would be useful to briefly outline how I arrived at these numbers—both to clarify the methodology and to open it up for critique.

Europe as a special case

Compared to missile producers in other parts of the world, European manufacturers remain something of a black box when it comes to production capacity, largely due to the scarcity of published official data.

In contrast, U.S. missile producers are very transparent. For example, we have detailed insight into Lockheed Martin’s efforts to scale up JASSM-ER production over the past several years, and their successive ramp-ups in production capacity. (In general, the U.S. government shares an incredible amount of detailed data of missile stocks, prices, and production capacities).

Russian manufacturers do not publish such data, but in recent years, Ukrainian intelligence has repeatedly released estimates of Russian missile production capacity. Given that these assessments are likely based on multiple high-quality sources and triangulated through various intelligence channels, they can be treated with a reasonable degree of confidence. The same applies to China, where the U.S. Department of Defense regularly includes missile production figures in its Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC reports.

For European missile manufacturers, however, there are typically neither official figures nor publicly available intelligence assessments. This makes it more difficult to develop a clear picture of production output.

That said, useful insights can still be drawn from publicly available data—particularly on past order intake and delivery timelines. Below, I illustrate how this can be applied to SCALP-EG and Taurus.

SCALP-EG production capacity

For SCALP-EG, we have several data points on order intake and delivery timelines, which, while fragmented, allow for reasonable inferences. These are summarized neatly in this source, but are corroborated across multiple open sources (though uncertainty remains):

• In 1997, France ordered 500 SCALP-EG missiles. The system became operational in 2004.

• Also in 1997, the UAE ordered 600 Black Shaheen missiles (a range-restricted variant of the SCALP-EG).

• In 1999, Italy ordered 200 SCALP-EG/Storm Shadow missiles, which became operational around 2006.

Keep in mind that reaching initial operational capability does not necessarily imply that the full order had been delivered by that point. More likely, it indicates that an initial batch was received that is sufficient for test firings and qualification trials. That appears to be the case here.

Nevertheless, to meet the delivery timelines outlined above, as well as an additional order of Greece of unknown quantity in 2000, it is reasonable to assume that peak SCALP-EG production capacity in the early to mid-2000s exceeded 100 missiles per year—likely in the range of 100–150, and possibly higher during periods of maximum efficiency across the production line and supply chain.

However, since then, order intake has slowed considerably. Following a rather long break, France received follow-on orders from Qatar (2014), India (2015), and Egypt (2015), but the combined volume of these orders likely does not exceed 500 missiles. This makes it highly unlikely that maintaining peak production levels between the early 2000s and 2022 would have been economically viable.

It is therefore probable that MBDA France maintained a minimally viable production line during this period, with an estimated output of 50–100 missiles per year, though the true figure was likely located at the lower end of that range.

Since 2022, France has placed new orders for SCALP-EG and MBDA France has announced an intention to expand production capacity, which likely also includes SCALP-EG. However, the most plausible interpretation is that capacity is being restored toward the 100-missile-per-year mark. Given that no new production facilities have been publicly reported, this ramp-up appears to be occurring within the limits of the preexisting infrastructure.

Taurus KEPD 350 production capacity

We can apply the same method to estimate production capacity for the Taurus cruise missile, based on available data points regarding order intake and delivery timelines for MBDA Germany and Saab. The following open-source data provides a useful basis:

• Germany ordered 600 Taurus missiles in August 2002. The first deliveries began in 2005, with final deliveries completed by November 2010.

• Spain ordered 43 missiles in June 2005. These were delivered by December 2010.

• South Korea ordered 177 Taurus missiles in November 2013, with deliveries occurring between 2016 and 2017.

• South Korea placed a second order in February 2018, with deliveries likely completed between late 2018 and mid-2020.

These figures suggest that when the Taurus production line was active, MBDA Germany and Saab were producing between 50 and 100 missiles annually. It's notable that it took more than two years to restart production after it ceased in December 2010, following the completion of the Spanish order, with deliveries to South Korea not beginning until 2013.

An additional insight is that although Spain ordered only 43 missiles, fulfilling that order took over five years, indicating that by the time Spain joined the program, the production line was already operating near or at maximum capacity.

As with MBDA France, there is no public evidence that MBDA Germany or Saab have built new production facilities since 2022. This implies that any restart of production would rely on legacy infrastructure. Moreover, because the Taurus production line has remained dormant—unlike SCALP-EG, which has seen some continuity—a restart would take several years, with initial output closer to 50 than 100 missiles annually.

Conclusion

I hope this provides some clarity on how I arrived at my estimates. If anyone has additional data that could refine the picture, or if you take issue with any of the analytical choices, feel free to share your thoughts in the comments.

From a military-industrial perspective, it’s hard not to find these numbers deeply frustrating. Europe urgently needs to scale up missile production, and doing so will be a multi-year effort. The longer we delay, the more precarious the situation will become.