More Missile Drama: What to Make of the Latest German-Ukrainian Long-Range Strike Deal?

Germany may not deliver Taurus, but will invest in Ukraine's long-range strike industry

Picture: Bundesregierung/Jesco Denzel

On 28 May, during President Zelensky’s visit to Berlin, German Chancellor Merz announced that Germany would finance the production of “long-range weapons” manufactured inside Ukraine.

Later that day, the German and Ukrainian Defense Ministers signed a memorandum of understanding to formalize the agreement. A press release from the German Ministry of Defense states:

The defense ministers of Germany and Ukraine have signed a declaration providing for the financing of long-range weapons production in Ukraine. This marks a step toward Germany’s plan to increase direct investment in Ukrainian defense manufacturing. A significant number of these weapons are expected to be produced within this year. The first systems can be deployed by the Ukrainian armed forces within weeks. As they are already in use, no additional training will be required.

This episode is the latest in what seems to be a never ending dispute over the delivery of German long-range strike weapons to Ukraine. This post explores the potential implications of the deal and the possible next steps.

What will be financed?

Ukraine currently produces a wide range of long-range strike systems, including various types of long-range drones and cruise missiles. It is also developing short- and potentially medium-range ballistic missiles, though these are not yet known to have entered serial production.

According to a well-informed source I spoke to, German financing will focus on shorter-range long-range strike systems, covering ranges from 40 to 200 km, as well as systems with extended reach. Exclusive reporting by the German outlet Die Welt indicates that Ukraine has requested funding for the BARS and AN-196 Liutyi systems. Support for these systems will reportedly amount to 400 million Euros.

According to Ukrainian sources, the BARS has a range of 700 to 800 km and shares key specifications with the Pekklo mini cruise missile (which I have discussed previously). The AN-196 Liutyi — sometimes called the Ukrainian Shahed — is a long-range drone now reportedly equipped with a 75 kg warhead, enabling it to strike targets at up to 1,000-2,000 km. It is credited with multiple successful strikes on Russian oil refining infrastructure.

German funding will likely support both the expansion of production capacity within Ukrainian factories and the procurement of drone and missile components from abroad. An example for the latter could be the Czech-made AI-PBS-350 turbojet engine used in the Palianytsia long-range drone. Increased funding for components ultimately means more complete systems can be delivered.

It is also possible that the funding will be used to scale up production of some of Ukraine’s “heavier” missile projects that have struggled to gain momentum, including the Neptune cruise missile, originally developed for anti-ship purposes and later adapted for land-attack missions, notably credited with the sinking of the Moskva cruiser. Ukraine is also officially developing at least one ballistic missile, the Hrim-2 short-range ballistic missile system, which could benefit from German financial support.

Financial assistance could, in theory, include technology transfers from German missile manufacturers, though this seems unlikely.

First, Ukrainian technologies, whether domestically developed or sourced externally, are already tailored to Ukraine’s operational requirements, whereas German systems may not be. There is also the issue of whether German firms would be willing to part with intellectual property, even with government compensation.

Second, Ukraine’s most pressing need is likely in the area of missile propulsion, an area where German firms have limited expertise to offer. For instance, the Taurus KEPD 350 cruise missile’s turbofan engine is sourced from the United States, and German manufacturers do not build solid-fuel missile engines for use in ballistic missiles. The fact that German missile producers themselves depend on foreign suppliers for key components also means that Germany could not simply share the Taurus blueprints with Kyiv and have Ukrainian engineers build the missile in Ukraine.

Does this mean Taurus will not be delivered?

The future of Taurus deliveries remains uncertain. In 2025 the need for Taurus is arguably reduced compared to the earlier years of the war, though good reasons to supply the missile remain.

In principle, Ukraine should now be able to service around 80 to 90 percent of relevant Russian targets with its own long-range strike weapons. This means that in contrast to the beginning of the war, Ukraine is no longer dependent on Western assistance to deploy a credible long-range strike capability.

In addition, while the Taurus offers a range advantage over the Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG (700–800 km vs. 560 km), it does not exceed the reach of several Ukrainian missile and drone systems (including the BARS missile/drone which is reported to be included in the financing package). In fact, some of Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities significantly outrange the Taurus. With or without a Taurus delivery, Ukraine retains the ability to hold at risk most high-value Russian targets at both operational and strategic depth.

However, there are targets Ukrainian systems struggle to strike effectively, mainly due to payload limitations. Most Ukrainian long-range weapons carry relatively small warheads — typically between 20 and 100 kg — whereas the Taurus carries a 450 kg multi-effect warhead, combining a primary shaped charge with a follow-on penetrator. This makes it capable of targeting heavily hardened and deeply buried sites that Ukraine’s domestically-built systems cannot effectively engage.

In addition, the damage inflicted on soft targets, such as oil refineries, by a single Taurus missile would be significantly more severe and harder to repair than that caused by a lighter Ukrainian cruise missile or drone.

Moreover, the Taurus is uniquely suited to strike bridge targets thanks to its advanced fuse, which can detect and count distinct layers and void spaces penetrated by the penetrator. This allows the warhead to detonate at the optimal point to maximize damage — typically after penetrating the bridge deck (first layer) and exploding within a supporting pillar (second layer). If the objective is to destroy the Kerch Bridge with minimal missile expenditure, Taurus is the most capable system in Western arsenals for that task.

Lastly, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of the Taurus missile. Like Storm Shadow and SCALP-EG, it is a relatively old system (albeit slightly more modern than its British and French counterparts). Russian air and missile defenses, which have recently demonstrated improved effectiveness against Storm Shadow and SCALP-EG, may achieve a reasonable intercept rate against Taurus as well. Moreover, it remains unclear how the German-Swedish missile performs against Russia’s advanced electronic warfare capabilities.

Combined with the relatively limited number of Taurus missiles Germany could provide without constraining its own operational planning too much — likely in the range of 50 and 100 — the overall impact could be fairly limited.

Overall, there remains a clear military rationale for delivering Taurus in 2025, but it is no longer as compelling as it was in 2022 or 2023. It is understandable that Zelensky still seeks access to the missile and that the Ukrainian Armed Forces would certainly accept it if offered, though it likely no longer ranks as a top priority.

Also, keep in mind that due to inaction by the previous government, the Taurus cruise missile would first need to be integrated onto Ukrainian aircraft, and personnel would require training. This process would likely take at least three months, possibly up to twelve, with six months being a realistic estimate. Given that Merz has recently stated no further details will be shared on the scope or timing of future weapons deliveries, any Taurus transfer would likely become public only once the missiles arrive in Ukraine (unless leaked beforehand). In any case, this remains several months away.

Does this mean we can lay the Taurus issue to rest?

While it would be great to finally close the chapter on the Taurus debate, we are unfortunately not there yet. Although the military rationale for delivery has diminished in significance, the political rationale remains as strong as ever. In fact, Germany may now stand to gain more from delivering the missile than Ukraine. This is for two reasons:

First, Taurus has arguably become the clearest symbol of German risk aversion and and escalation angst. The previous government’s refusal to deliver the system, while explicitly linking this decision to Russian nuclear threats, has undermined perceptions of German resolve and highlighted the vulnerability of German society to nuclear coercion.

The current government must urgently address this perception. Failing to do so risks further eroding Germany’s and Europe’s deterrence posture vis-à-vis Russia, potentially increasing the risk of a Russian attack. Reversing the previous decision and delivering Taurus would be a necessary first step.

Second, the credibility of the new government, particularly that of Chancellor Friedrich Merz himself, is directly linked to the delivery of Taurus. Before taking office, Merz consistently called for providing the cruise missile to Ukraine. Now that he holds power, failing to act on that position would undermine his credibility domestically, in Europe, and internationally. This is all the more pressing following his poorly handled ceasefire ultimatum from two weeks ago, which expired without any apparent consequences for Russia.

If Taurus is ultimately not delivered, Germany would need to offer something of comparable political weight. One option could be to provide substantial financial and technical support — where feasible — for Ukraine’s ballistic missile program, with the aim of accelerating development and rapidly scaling production of this critical capability. Such a move would send a clear signal that Germany will no longer allow Russian nuclear threats to dictate the terms of its support for a country defending itself from an unjustifable war of aggression.

As noted above, this type of support may be part of the current plan, but there is no public indication that it is — at least not yet.