The Oreshnik Problem for Europe

Technical constraints, opportunity costs, and Europe’s unresolved deterrence deficits

Picture: Via X

On the night of January 8 to 9, 2026, Russia launched the second confirmed Oreshnik missile strike against Ukraine. While the launch confirms the operational limitations of the missile system, the strike also highlights the dilemma the missile poses for European defense.

Capability profile

The Oreshnik appears to be an intermediate-range ballistic missile with an estimated maximum range of roughly 3,000 to 5,500 kilometers. It is reportedly equipped with up to six MIRVed payloads that independently reenter the atmosphere to strike separate aimpoints. Each payload is said to carry up to six submunitions released during the terminal phase of flight, producing area effects around the intended target.

Operational use suggests that the missile carries an inert payload, meaning it is not equipped with high explosives. Instead, lethality derives from the mass and velocity of the submunitions upon impact. Given the high terminal velocity of the payload (estimated at Mach 10-11 by some Russian and Ukrainian sources, though this likely represents an upper bound), even relatively light submunitions can impart substantial kinetic energy, sufficient to cause serious damage to above-ground concrete structures.

The missile’s genealogy can be traced to the RS-26 Rubezh, which was developed between 2008 and 2018 but was mothballed before reaching full operational capability. The RS-26 was conceived, tested, and publicly presented as a nuclear delivery system. As a result, the Oreshnik is very likely dual-capable, meaning it can carry both non-nuclear and nuclear payloads. It remains unclear whether Russia has already certified the Oreshnik for nuclear delivery, although doing so should be technically straightforward and would likely require only limited adaptations, such as rebalancing the missile to account for changes in weight distribution.

Operational limitations

The employment of the missile, both in November 2024 when it was first used and in the recent strike, suggests limited projectile accuracy. This is likely because reentry vehicles are not individually guided; instead, they follow a gravity-driven descent after separation from the post-boost vehicle.

As a result, Oreshnik has very limited utility against most point targets, including individual buildings, air defense sites, or enemy launcher assets. That said, the missile may have some effectiveness against certain area targets, including residential areas that appear to have been struck in the attack a few days ago, as well as larger industrial sites.

Some analysts have further suggested that grouped Oreshnik strikes involving several missiles and hundreds of submunitions could seriously threaten large NATO air bases such as Ramstein. This assessment is not incorrect. However, given the high cost of each Oreshnik missile, which, while unknown, likely exceeds the price of more common shorter-range ballistic missiles in Russia’s arsenal by a substantial margin, this type of attack would be expensive. Unless it causes damage that cannot be repaired quickly, it may not be very cost-effective.

At present, given a CEP of several hundred meters per submunition as well as the absence of explosives combined with pre-fragmented warhead casings that could create overlapping fragmentation clouds, there appear to be relatively few conventional use cases for the missile beyond striking large and soft area targets, as well as serving as a tool for escalation management by signaling Russia’s perceived ability to escalate in the missile domain.

Opportunity costs

A second limitation of the missile is the opportunity cost it entails. Russia’s missile sector has expanded dramatically in recent years, but is likely now operating at or near maximum capacity. Any further expansion would require additional industrial facilities and a larger workforce, both of which are constrained in Russia’s overemployed and fiscally constrained economy.

There are also material constraints. Like many other countries, Russia likely faces shortages of precursor energetic materials, such as nitrocellulose and ammonium perchlorate, which are required for the production of solid propellants and high explosives. This implies that resources allocated to Oreshnik production are unavailable for other programs, including additional 9M723 and Kh-47M2 Kinzhal ballistic missiles, as well as for maintaining the solid-propelled nuclear ICBM force.

As a result, unless Russia perceives significant benefits from deploying Oreshnik missiles at scale that are not apparent here, the system is likely to remain a niche capability produced and deployed in limited numbers. Russia may well build a few dozen Oreshnik missiles per year, but this would still fall well below the several hundred other conventional missiles it manufactures annually, which arguably offer a more reliable return, both in the context of the war in Ukraine and beyond.

The Oreshnik dilemma

Oreshnik nevertheless presents a dilemma for European decision-makers. This dilemma stems less from the missile’s technical characteristics than from the political challenges it poses.

First, from a military perspective, given the limited utility of conventionally armed Oreshnik missiles against most relevant targets, combined with the small numbers of missiles likely available, both in absolute terms and relative to higher-priority missiles in Russia’s arsenal, the most prudent response is not to overreact to the Oreshnik threat. There is even an argument for largely ignoring the system altogether, committing instead to repairing the moderate damage it might inflict on area targets while accepting the marginal risk that a submunition could, by chance, destroy or seriously damage a higher-priority civilian or military asset.

From a political perspective, however, this argument may be a difficult sell. For example, would the German public accept this explanation if Germany were targeted by Oreshnik, and would it agree that scarce Arrow 3 interceptors should be reserved for higher-priority targets (e.g., the extended-range 9M723 variant reportedly entering service)? The answer is not obvious, but it is plausible that political guidance may diverge from military reasoning in such a scenario.

Second, the dual-capable nature of Oreshnik means that decision-makers would have to assume that, at least in principle, any incoming projectile could be nuclear-armed. In practice, contextual clues about the state of the conflict will indicate whether a payload is likely nuclear or non-nuclear. Still, there is no certainty until impact. As a result, there may again be a political imperative to attempt to intercept every incoming Oreshnik warhead, thereby rapidly depleting limited interceptor stockpiles.

Resolving the dilemma

Resolving this dilemma is conceptually straightforward but difficult for European states to implement at present, particularly without assistance from the United States.

Non-nuclear Oreshnik strikes are best deterred by presenting Russia with a credible non-nuclear counterstrike capability. Nuclear Oreshnik strikes are best deterred by NATO’s own nuclear forces, which should ideally provide a nuclear tit-for-tat and, ultimately, a countervalue capability to deter both limited and large-scale Russian nuclear use. European missile defense systems, including Arrow in Germany and Aegis Ashore in Poland, are ultimately insufficient to deal with Russian non-strategic or strategic nuclear attacks, regardless of the missile system employed.

Unfortunately, European states currently face a substantial capability gap in deep-strike weapons, including medium- to intermediate-range ballistic missile systems comparable to the Oreshnik. While these capabilities are gradually being developed and deployed, Europe is likely still several years away from fielding the types and quantities of missile systems required.

In addition, without the United States, Europe’s nuclear capabilities are limited in both quality and quantity and are insufficient to credibly address Russia’s large and diverse nuclear arsenal, including its pronounced advantage in non-strategic nuclear weapons. In a conflict with NATO, particularly one in which the United States was not involved, Russia would therefore retain significant coercive leverage in the nuclear domain.

Overall, Oreshnik poses a distinct challenge to European security. This challenge stems less from the missile’s technical characteristics, which remain overstated, than from the way it exposes and amplifies existing European capability gaps that require urgent attention.