Shifting Priorities in the Missile Domain

The emergence of low-cost "mini" cruise missiles.

Picture: MBDA Germany

One of the more notable developments in the missile domain over the last year has been the emergence of a new class of “mini cruise missiles.” These systems aim to improve cost-efficiency over existing cruise missile designs while retaining key advantages associated with cruise missiles.

Specifically, mini cruise missiles are beginning to fill a capability gap between inexpensive long-range drones and more expensive “heavy” cruise missiles. This post reviews the advantages of these missile systems, while shedding light on ongoing programs in Ukraine, North America, and Europe.

Low cost, strong punch?

Cruise missiles are highly effective weapon systems for a range of missions. The problem: they are also very expensive. Even Lockheed Martin’s AGM-158B JASSM-ER—the only Western cruise missile currently produced at scale, which helps lower per-unit costs—still comes in at around $1.2 to $1.3 million per missile, excluding lifetime costs such as operator training and maintenance. In addition, mass production of these types of cruise missiles, while not impossible, is difficult due to the complexity of the supply chain that needs to be scaled.

Long-range one-way attack drones, like the infamous Shahed, deal with the cost problem, given that they are often up to ten times cheaper or more than traditional cruise missiles, while still providing the ability to strike targets at standoff range. They are also fairly easy to mass produce.

The main problem of these long-range drones relates to their lack of lethality. These drones typically operate at low subsonic speeds due to simple propulsion systems and carry small payloads, often under 20 kilograms. This may suffice for destroying soft targets in open terrain, but it means that a simple concrete wall can completely negate the damage due to the payload’s inability to penetrate the structure (given that penetrability is primarily a function of warhead shape, warhead weight, and impact velocity). Low speed and a comparatively poor stealth profile also reduce survivability vis-à-vis enemy countermeasures.

The new category of mini cruise missiles on the market could offer a good compromise. First, by reducing complexity and size, mini cruise missiles are naturally cheaper and also easier to mass produce than their “heavier” counterparts. At the same time, they retain the overall capability profile of a cruise missile, allowing them to engage a larger set of targets effectively.

For example, a mini cruise missile carrying a 50 kilogram warhead impacting at medium to high subsonic velocity, should be able to penetrate at least one to one-and-a-half meters of reinforced concrete. As such, semi-hardened targets, like above-ground concrete structures, are within the engagement envelope.

Mini cruise missile developments

Ukraine is known to be fielding and developing two mini cruise missile systems: the Pekklo and the Ruta. The Pekklo reportedly has a range of 700 km and uses an air-breathing engine to reach a top speed of 700 km/h (Mach 0.57). The Ruta, still under development as of late 2024, is expected to have a shorter range of 300 km but a slightly higher top speed of 800 km/h.

Available information suggests that Ukraine has successfully established mass production lines for these systems. Mass producibility was likely a key reason for prioritizing these missiles over more complex legacy projects, such as a land-attack version of the Neptun anti-ship missile or the Khorshun land-attack cruise missile. Another likely factor is that, unlike larger missile systems, mini cruise missile production facilities can be more easily relocated underground, improving survivability against Russian strikes.

Similar developments are underway in the United States. Several companies are currently offering low-cost cruise missile solutions to the U.S. Air Force and Navy, though none have yet reached mass production. Notable efforts include Lockheed Martin’s Common Multi-Mission Truck—a compact cruise missile system designed to fit inside the F-35’s weapons bay with a reported range of several hundred kilometers, and an advertised cost of $150,000 per unit.

Startups like Anduril and Zone 5 Technologies have also entered the field, offering smaller, cost-effective cruise missiles as part of the U.S. Air Force’s “Enterprise Test Vehicle” program. These companies emphasize modularity of their missile designs—allowing components to be quickly swapped or adapted for specific missions—and scalability, particularly by simplifying manufacturing processes. Anduril, for instance, claims its system can be assembled using only ten tools.

Outside Ukraine, European mini cruise missile development remains limited. The most notable exception is MBDA Germany’s RCM2, a cruise missile designed with a range exceeding 500 km and adaptable for launch from land, air, and sea platforms. Compared to the larger German-Swedish Taurus missile, the RCM2 is more compact and features enhanced stealth characteristics. While pricing has not been disclosed, the system’s comparatively complex system architecture suggests it will sit at the higher end of the mini cruise missile category.

Opening up the cruise missile market

Compact mini cruise missiles offer clear advantages for militaries already fielding diverse missile arsenals. They provide a cost-effective complement in scenarios where heavy cruise missiles would be excessive and long-range drones insufficient. Moreover, their lower cost facilitates swarm employment, which has become a key tactic in overcoming air and missile defenses, especially given the vulnerability of subsonic projectiles in contested environments, as demonstrated in Ukraine and Russia.

However, mini cruise missiles could open up the missile market to other, particularly smaller states that have not previously considered procuring cruise missiles, having been effectively priced out by the high costs of legacy systems. For example, if mini cruise missiles find their way to Europe in sufficient numbers, they could offer states like Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania the opportunity to build credible long-range strike arsenals at acceptable price points.