Taurus News and the Future of the European Missile Industry

Sweden's (almost) confirmed Taurus order and its implications

Picture: Saab

The German-Swedish Taurus KEPD 350 land-attack cruise missile is back in the spotlight. For once, the renewed attention on the Taurus is not directly linked to Ukraine-related developments. Instead, it appears that Sweden is set to become the missile’s fourth confirmed operator, joining Germany, Spain, and South Korea.

An (almost) confirmed order

Over the past weeks, unconfirmed reports have suggested that Sweden has ordered the Taurus cruise missile for its Gripen fleet. Then, on February 24, a major Swedish newspaper reported that Sweden’s military procurement agency, the Försvarets materielverk (FMV), had been tasked with procuring the missile. This reporting is based on the annual report of the Swedish Armed Forces, published three days earlier, which confirmed the intended purchase.

At this stage, neither Taurus Systems GmbH—a subsidiary of MBDA Germany and Saab Dynamics that markets the Taurus KEPD 350—nor the Swedish government or armed forces have officially confirmed the deal. However, given that the FMV has been formally tasked with the order, negotiations are likely in an advanced stage, and an official announcement is likely a matter of time.

Details of the procurement project

Sweden has for some time now identified the need for a long-range strike capability, most recently in its Defence Resolution 2025–2030, which outlines procurement priorities for the coming years. Choosing the Taurus system is somewhat unsurprising given that Swedish manufacturer Saab Dynamics is a key supplier in the missile program.

If the order is confirmed, Sweden will become the fourth country to acquire the Taurus KEPD 350. Contrary to persistent misinformation, the Taurus has not been produced in multiple variants—the KEPD 350 is the only available version, and this is what Sweden will receive. Most likely, Swedish Taurus will incorporate the general overhaul updates that are currently being implemented in Germany’s Taurus fleet.

The number of missiles the Swedish armed forces will acquire remains unknown, and given past procurement practices by Sweden—such as with the RBS-15 Mk3/Mk4—, the exact figures may not be disclosed. However, an estimated purchase of 100–300 missiles seems plausible.

The only other confirmed detail so far is that initial operational capability (IOC) for the JAS-39C Gripen is expected in 2028, with integration for the JAS-39E Gripen planned at a later stage. The Gripen C is likely prioritized because previous testing has already advanced integration efforts, whereas work on the Gripen E has yet to begin.

Implications for Europe’s missile industry

Most importantly, Sweden’s order will reopen another production line for dedicated long-range strike weapons in Europe.

Currently, SCALP-EG is the only land-attack cruise missile in production in Europe, though its annual output remains unclear. Production figures are likely below 100 units per year, possibly closer to 50.

Other European missile production is primarily focused on anti-ship cruise missiles. While these missile systems are equipped with a certain level of land-attack capabilitiy, due to the availability of advanced seekers, they lack the range to strike deep into enemy territory, in particular at strategic depth.

A revived Taurus production line would provide a much-needed boost to European missile manufacturing. However, a key question remains regarding production capacity.

MBDA Germany and Saab are not known to have expanded their production facilities since the last Taurus came of the production line 2020, meaning current capacity is likely similar to previous levels. Based on past Taurus orders and delivery timeframes, annual production capacity can be estimated at 40–60 missiles.

Given the scale of the existential threat Europe faces, this production capacity is far below what is necessary. For comparison, the Lockheed Martin currently produces around 700 JASSM-ER cruise missiles annually, with plans to expand output to over 1,000 per year. Meanwhile, Russia missile manufacturers are producing approximately 1,200 cruise missiles and 600 short- and medium-range ballistic missiles annually.

For Europe’s missile industry to scale up, one of two things must happen:

1. Large multi-year contracts providing long-term financial certainty, allowing private capital to fund expansion.

2. Public investment in production facilities, as frequently done in the U.S. but rarely in Europe, reducing the financial risk for private manufacturers.

Without one of these steps, European missile production capacity, including that of Taurus, will remain far below what is required to meet today’s challenges.

Who’s next?

The Swedish order will restart Taurus production, potentially opening the door for additional users.

However, Germany’s failure to restart production before 2025 has already led several European states to seek alternatives, particularly the AGM-158B/B-2 JASSM-ER from the United States. This includes the Netherlands, Poland, Finland, and even Germany itself.

Germany alone has an estimated need for at least 1,000 long-range strike missiles, if not substantially more. It would be shocking—and a massive failure—if the incoming German government did not place a large Taurus order soon. It is also possible that some level of coordination between Berlin and Stockholm on restarting production and ordering Taurus missiles has taken place, though no official information has surfaced yet.

Other potential future operators include:

• Ukraine could receive an initial delivery of 50–100 Taurus cruise missiles once the new government takes office. Follow-up deliveries would likely depend on the Bundeswehr’s ability to replenish its stock through new industry production.

• Italy, which already operates SCALP-EG and may prefer to stick with it.

• Norway, which requires a true deep-strike capability, including one with hard-target kill capability like the Taurus. However, this would require integration with the F-35. Given the extensive cooperation between Germany and Norway, the Norwegian armed forces may go for Taurus rather than JASSM-ER. However, this would require cooperation by Lockheed Martin, which may not be willing to integrate a competitor’s weapon system on its platform.

Conclusion

The likely Swedish acquisition of the Taurus KEPD 350 represents an important step for European security, potentially opening the door for additional Taurus orders by other states. It is unfortunate that Taurus production had to wait until 2025 to hopefully be restarted, but better late than never.

This being said, Europe still faces a major gap in production capacity, and unless large-scale procurement contracts or public investments materialize soon, European missile output will continue to lag behind operational requirements.