Taurus Redux: The Return of the Zombie Debate

Why the case for Taurus deliveries has never been stronger

Picture: MBDA Germany

The Taurus debate is back (yes, I hate it as much as anyone else, maybe more so). In a recent television appearance, prospective German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated that he — in consultation with European allies — would be open to delivering Taurus to Ukraine. In response, several voices from his likely coalition partner, the SPD, reiterated their skepticism and opposition, arguing that such a delivery would make Germany a direct party to the conflict and carry significant escalation risks.

This is, of course, a zombie debate, one that has resurfaced repeatedly, with the same arguments on both sides, ever since the United Kingdom delivered Storm Shadow cruise missiles in May 2023 (though one side — the opponents — have been consistently wrong).

Now, two years later, the situation on the ground in Ukraine has changed fundamentally. This post considers whether a Taurus delivery in 2025 still makes strategic sense, or whether the window of opportunity has already closed. In short: It does, and probably more so than ever.

Bogus arguments

Opponents of delivery typically advance three main arguments: First, that Taurus would not make a meaningful military difference in Ukraine. Second, that Ukraine could not operate Taurus independently, meaning Germany would become too involved in the conflict and risk direct confrontation with Russia. Third, that Taurus is too valuable for the Bundeswehr and available in such limited numbers that the Air Force cannot afford to part with any. Taken together, they argue, the risks outweigh the potential benefits.

In reality, none of these arguments withstand serious scrutiny.

First, whether Taurus alone will change the situation on the ground depends on how Ukraine is permitted to use the weapon, how it actually employs it, and the extent of the resulting damage.

For instance, will Ukraine be allowed to target the Kerch Bridge? If so, will it choose to prioritize that target, or will it focus on others? And if the bridge is struck, will this noticeably affect Russian logistics, or has Russia already priced in its loss and rerouted supply lines in advance? (There are several indications this may be the case.)

Before any delivery occurs, definitive claims about the impact are premature and necessarily speculative. Still, regardless of whether the effects are decisive, supplying Taurus to Ukraine will compel Russia to adapt — for example, by redeploying air defense assets or relocating logistics nodes and storage sites. Taurus will have an effect on the theater, though the scale remains to be seen.

Second, just like South Korea and Spain, which have acquired Taurus through export contracts, Ukraine would be able to operate the system independently and without direct German oversight, provided Ukrainian personnel receive the necessary training and are entrusted to conduct strikes autonomously. No one disputes that the targeting process could initially be faster and more streamlined with direct support from German industry or military personnel. But with proper training, there is no reason — yes, truly none — why Ukrainians could not manage the system themselves.

There is likewise no reason to assume that German geographic and navigational data would be strictly necessary for Taurus to function. Ukraine has been collecting relevant guidance data for years via private satellite providers. In some cases, this data may even be superior to Germany’s, particularly in terms of recency. The only technical question is whether Taurus targeting software can process Ukrainian data formats — but if this represents an issue, it should be solvable through a software update.

Critics are correct that, without access to auxiliary data on the positions of Russian missile defense and electronic warfare assets, Taurus’ survivability and hence effectiveness could be reduced. However, most of this data originates from the United States, followed by the United Kingdom. Germany plays only a marginal role in this regard, meaning critics can sleep soundly on this point too.

Third, I fully agree with opponents that even the loss of a limited number of Taurus cruise missiles would be a significant blow to the Bundeswehr’s overall capabilities. That said, this argument often lacks coherence. If Taurus is indeed so critical to German national defense, why are the same voices not outraged by the fact that only 600 units exist in the arsenal? Why is there no political pressure to resume and expand production?

As far as publicly known, Germany has allocated a certain — though unspecified — number of Taurus missiles to NATO operational planning. This does limit what can realistically be provided to Ukraine. However, based on leaks, the German Air Force appears comfortable with transferring 50 to 100 missiles without compromising its own operational readiness. That judgment should carry weight.

All of this reinforces, in my view, that the standard arguments against Taurus deliveries remain unconvincing. They didn’t hold in 2023 or 2024 — and they certainly don’t in 2025. In fact, the case for delivery is now stronger than ever.

Why deliver in 2025

When Ukraine first began receiving Storm Shadow missiles in May 2023, its long-range strike capability was essentially non-existent. In that sense, Storm Shadow — and later SCALP-EG from France and Italy — was a major step forward, enabling a critical capability in modern warfare: the ability to strike and hold at risk targets at operational and strategic depth.

At the same time, the situation was problematic. Ukraine was entirely dependent on these expensive Western systems to deliver effects in the enemy’s rear. Given the limited quantities and high cost, this immediately raised concerns about the efficiency and, more importantly, the sustainability of Ukrainian long-range strike operations. This was, in fact, one of the central arguments for why Taurus was so urgently needed earlier in the war: it was always clear that Ukraine would eventually exhaust its supply of Storm Shadow and SCALP-EG — as now appears to be the case.

By 2025, the situation has changed fundamentally. Ukraine now fields hundreds and even thousands of indigenous long-range strike capabilities. These systems are less sophisticated and less lethal that Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG and Taurus — particularly against hardened targets — but they are far cheaper. This changes the calculus. If Taurus is delivered, Ukraine would be able to reserve it for those targets where pinpoint precision and lethality truly matter, while saturating less complex targets with existing domestic systems.

As noted above, the precise impact of Taurus remains difficult to predict. Still, there is a strong case that the cumulative effects of delivering Taurus in 2025 could be greater than if deliveries had taken place in earlier years.

The second argument is political: the Taurus debate has come to symbolize German risk aversion and pain intolerance. This has damaged Germany’s credibility — both among NATO allies and in Moscow.

If Germany appears willing to retreat at the slightest hint of escalation over Ukraine, the thinking in Moscow may be: why should Germany suddenly prove steadfast in a broader NATO contingency, where Eastern European allies are directly at risk and the likelihood of NATO-Russia nuclear escalation is far higher? The issue is not that Scholz or Germany would necessarily back down in such a scenario — This is a speculative counterfactual, so strong predictions aren’t feasible. But the danger lies in the signal: so long as we appear susceptible to blackmail, Russia may miscalculate — increasing the risk that it could entrap NATO in a direct conflict under the assumption that its decisionmakers wrongly believe they hold the upper hand.

The likely incoming Chancellor, Friedrich Merz, must right this wrong. Delivering Taurus would break the dangerous cycle of hesitation and shift the perceived balance of resolve back in Europe’s favor. To be clear, this is not to say that there are no risks associated with delivering Taurus — there are, as with other weapon systems provided to Ukraine. But compared to the risks of inaction and the signal sent by yielding to Russian coercive nuclear threats, those risks are minimal.

Overall, the conclusion remains unchanged: Taurus should be delivered to Ukraine as quickly as possible. The case for delivery is arguably even stronger now than it was in 2023 — both militarily and politically. Moreover, if the delivery serves as the final trigger to restart cruise missile production in Germany to replenish transferred stocks, it would bring additional long-term benefits for European defense.