The FP-5 Flamingo Has Arrived: What Ukraine's 3,000-Kilometer Cruise Missile Means for the War and the Future of Europe

Specifications, lethality, survivability, and strategic implications.

Image: Fire Point

On 17 August, imagery of a new Ukrainian cruise missile appeared, known as the FP-5 “Flamingo”. Since then, Fire Point, the Kyiv-based defense manufacturer, has launched a marketing offensive to showcase the missile internationally and pledged a substantial increase in production until the end of the year.

This post looks at what to make of the Flamingo. I first discuss the known technical characteristics of its capability profile to assess its expected performance before looking at the missile’s implications for the ongoing war in Ukraine, but also the broader deterrence architecture in a post-war Europe.

FP-5 Flamingo technical specifications

The FP-5 Flamingo is a large missile. According to the manufacturer, it has a wingspan of about six meters, a launch weight of around 6,000 kilograms, and a payload capacity of 1,150 kilograms.

This makes the Flamingo the first indigenously produced “heavy” missile system in Ukraine’s arsenal. Previous Ukrainian systems, including mini-cruise missiles and long-range drones, were much lighter in both overall weight and payload capacity.

The key visual feature of the FP-5, aside from its overall size, is the top-mounted engine, which, as observers quickly noted, gives it a resemblance to the Fieseler Fi 103, commonly known as the V-1, the world’s first cruise missile used by Nazi Germany in the final years of the Second World War.

But the similarities end there. Unlike the V-1, which used a simple and inefficient pulse jet engine by today’s standards, the Flamingo appears to employ a far more efficient turbofan engine, specifically the AI-25TL produced by Ukrainian manufacturer Motor Sich, as identified by missile expert Fabian Hinz on X, which is typically used in Aero L-39 jet trainers.

The use of this engine is notable for two reasons.

First, the combination of an efficient turbofan engine and the missile’s large size, which allows for ample fuel storage, explains the 3,000-kilometer range the Flamingo offers to Ukrainian operators.

Second, the engine is typically designed for manned aircraft and lacks the miniaturization found in Western and Russian cruise missile engine designs. The Flamingo is therefore likely a case of a cruise missile built around an engine rather than an engine developed specifically for a cruise missile.

Fire Point has stated that the missile travels at a velocity of approximately 950 kilometers per hour. This likely refers to the FP-5’s terminal velocity near the end of its flight, with the cruise speed somewhat lower. Even so, the missile provides a substantial speed advantage over most existing long-range strike weapons in Ukraine’s arsenal.

For guidance, the Flamingo appears to rely solely on GPS-assisted inertial navigation. It does not feature more advanced midcourse guidance systems such as TERCOM, or terminal guidance systems like an electro-optical or imaging infrared seeker, likely to keep costs low and production relatively simple.

Lastly, as missile analyst John Ridge has pointed out on X, the warhead’s body, as seen in imagery of the missile, resembles the FAB M62. Since no FAB-1000 exists, the payload could consist of two stacked FAB-500 unguided bombs, though the resemblance could also be coincidental.

In any case, a payload of over 1,000 kilograms should translate into roughly 450 to 550 kilograms of TNT-equivalent high explosives packed into the missile, which is substantially more than the long-range drones and mini-cruise missiles Ukraine currently employs.

FP-5 Flamingo production

Fire Point says it is currently producing one missile per day or around 30 per month. By the end of the year, the company says it can increase production sevenfold, which would result in an annual output of over 2,500 missiles.

The key bottleneck in scaling FP-5 Flamingo production is almost certainly the turbofan engine. All other components should be comparatively easy to manufacture and scale. This places the burden mainly on Motor Sich to increase production and meet demand, or on Fire Point to secure additional suppliers of turbofan technology.

Producing over 200 units per month by the end of the year is undoubtedly an optimistic projection, though Ukrainian manufacturers have shown over the past year that they can rapidly scale conventional long-range strike production if provided with sufficient funding.

This being said, even achieving a steady monthly output of 30 to 50 missiles would give Ukraine a substantial supply of heavy cruise missiles that would likely have tangible effects on the war.

Lethality and destructive potential of the Flamingo missile

In terms of missile lethality, the FP-5 Flamingo offers two advantages over existing Ukrainian conventional long-range strike weapons.

First, the missile’s relatively high terminal velocity, combined with its heavy weight, allows the warhead to penetrate structures more deeply before detonation, potentially resulting in far more destructive effects.

Second, the FP-5’s large payload capacity produces a much larger lethal radius than existing Ukrainian missiles and drones. For a 20-psi target, such as most reinforced above-ground concrete structures, the lethal radius of the 1,000+ kilogram payload is around 21 meters. For a softer target, such as distillation columns of Russian refineries, for example, the lethal radius is considerably larger, upwards of 38 meters.

This means that even with the Flamingo’s reduced accuracy, due to the absence of advanced guidance systems and a reported CEP of 14 meters, the missile would still be virtually guaranteed to destroy its target with a single strike, unless it is intercepted.

The implications are clear: if the Flamingo reaches its target, and especially if the target lacks heavy armor, destruction rather than disruption can be expected.

Survivability against Russian air defenses

A critical question is how vulnerable the Flamingo will be to Russian air and missile defenses.

In principle, the missile is likely more survivable than Ukrainian long-range drones, which are more exposed due to their low speed and relatively large radar cross-section. At the same time, the FP-5 may prove somewhat more vulnerable than comparable cruise missiles like Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG because of its lack of stealth features and its large top-mounted engine, which will be highly visible to enemy radars.

That said, the main challenge for Russia will be covering all possible attack vectors. Since the FP-5 can essentially reach most relevant targets west of the Urals, Russian defenses will need to be further dispersed. After 3.5 years of war and heavy attrition of its air defense assets, including S-300 and S-400 fire units, as well as AWACS aircraft, this is an increasingly difficult task for Russia.

Much will also depend on Ukrainian intelligence and reconnaissance, particularly Ukraine’s ability to identify and track Russian missile defense units and guide Flamingo missiles around them. Alternatively, saturation attacks that combine heavy Flamingo missiles with lighter long-range strike capabilities in large numbers could also prove effective.

In any case, the question is not whether the Flamingo gets through, but how many. This depends on Fire Point’s production capacity and Russia’s ability to counter the threat, both of which remain uncertain for now.

Implications for the future of Ukrainian deterrence

While much attention is on the missile’s immediate implications for the war, the full value of the Flamingo can only be understood by considering its role as a post-war Ukrainian deterrent.

A mass-produced deep strike weapon like the Flamingo is arguably Ukraine’s strongest security guarantee in a post-war European order, regardless of the war’s outcome and independent of European or American allies.

If Ukraine were to possess a large arsenal of heavy missiles, perhaps 2,000 to 4,000 cruise and ballistic missiles, which could be launched within 24 to 48 hours of a Russian reinvasion to comprehensively disrupt and destroy Russia’s economic potential from the outset, it may independently convince Moscow that any future aggression is not worth the cost.

Of course, fielding a robust conventional countervalue deterrent is no easy task. Acquiring and maintaining a missile arsenal of that size costs money. Ukraine would also have to be able to safely store these missiles in peacetime while arranging for procedures to launch them on short notice. That’s operationally and logistically challenging. Still, Ukraine appears to have made the first step toward such a capability.

Russia is, of course, well aware of this and understands that a robust Ukrainian deep strike capability could create major problems for both ongoing and future plans. It can therefore be expected that Russian officials will soon insist that any peace agreement include Ukrainian disarmament and range restrictions in the missile domain.

Ukraine, however, would be ill-advised to accept such terms and should continue on its path toward becoming the most capable missile power in Europe.