Why Cheap Drones Destroy Expensive Things - And How to Deal with Them.

Lessons from the Gulf for defending critical infrastructure against large-scale drone threats

Picture: U.S. Central Command

Over the last few days, credible reports indicate that Iran managed to hit several American radar systems in the Gulf region.

The most prominent, and so far the only confirmed hit, struck the AN/TPY-2 radar at the Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, which serves as the primary sensor for the THAAD missile defense system. Iran is also reported to have damaged the AN/FPS-132 early-warning radar at the U.S. base in Al-Udeid, Qatar, and may have targeted additional sensor sites across the region.

While the exact circumstances remain unconfirmed, early reports suggest these attacks were carried out primarily with Shahed-type long-range drones. This raises the question of why the United States and its allies were so unprepared for this type of threat and how relatively simple systems can inflict hundreds of millions of dollars in damage across separate strikes.

This post discusses why these strikes were able to succeed and how states can posture in the future to prepare effectively for large-scale, long-range drone threats.

The long-range drone challenge in the Middle East

In principle, Iranian long-range drones, including the Shahed series, should be relatively easy to defeat. They are slow, follow relatively predictable routes, and lack advanced stealth features. Yet several structural factors make long-range defense in the Gulf more difficult than it might first appear.

Before the war, regional missile defense was highly optimized for ballistic missile defense. The Gulf states invested billions in sophisticated early-warning, tracking, and engagement solutions to address what was seen as Iran’s primary threat, namely ballistic missiles.

Existing infrastructure is, of course, not useless, but it is also not well-suited to the long-range drone threat. Shahed-type systems can approach their targets at relatively low altitudes, sometimes only tens of meters above the ground. Detecting these types of targets can be difficult for non-optimized radars because low-altitude flight places them within the radar horizon and against heavy ground clutter.

Many of the region’s existing radars were instead optimized for long-range air surveillance, pointing up into the sky rather than for persistent low-altitude coverage. What results is not an absence of capable sensors, but coverage gaps and suboptimal detection geometry against slow and low-flying drones. Alternative sensor solutions, such as the acoustics-based early-warning network deployed by Ukraine, do not exist in the region.

Pre-war hubris?

Part of the explanation for why Iranian long-range drones have been effective, paradoxically, probably also lies in Israel’s success in intercepting Shahed-type drones during the 2024 and 2025 conflict episodes. Here, Israel was able to intercept hundreds of drones repeatedly, without a single drone reaching its target, let alone causing serious damage.

That success, however, was heavily shaped by geography. The long distance between Iran and Israel led to travel times of up to 10 hours, while Israel’s small size created highly predictable attack vectors, simplifying interception. In fact, Israel and allied aircraft intercepted most incoming long-range drones long before they arrived in Israeli airspace, notably inside Jordan.

With the conflict now extending to Iran’s immediate neighbors, these geographic advantages no longer apply. Shahed travel times are much shorter, while the Gulf’s large geographic expanse creates many more potential attack vectors that must be defended simultaneously. As a result, while most long-range drones are still intercepted, some inevitably slip past defensive systems.

Existing long-range drone defenses

At present, the United States and the Gulf states appear to rely primarily on manned aircraft to intercept incoming long-range drones. This approach makes sense given the region's geographic realities, as only large numbers of patrolling or scrambled aircraft can provide sufficient levels of area defense.

This initial layer appears capable of intercepting the vast majority of incoming drones, sometimes at relatively low cost. For example, intercepting incoming Shaheds with rotary-wing aircraft, such as the AH-64 Apache, costs roughly 5,000 to 10,000 USD per flight hour, plus a few thousand dollars for gun ammunition.

Even using an F-15E fighter jet, which costs up to 30,000 USD per flight hour, together with an AIM-9X Sidewinder priced at roughly 400,000 to 500,000 USD, is arguably acceptable given the economic advantage of the United States and its regional partners, as well as the potential cost of repairing or replacing whatever infrastructure might otherwise be struck.

That said, most fighter jets currently appear to use APKWS missiles to combat long-range drones, which cost only about $30,000 each. This greatly improves the cost-effectiveness of these missions and renders cost concerns largely moot.

While manned aircraft have proved effective, some long-range drones slip through this initial layer. If that happens, surface-to-air missile systems provide a second layer. As noted by many commentators, interception attempts at this layer can be very expensive, given that the Gulf states do not deploy suitable point-defense systems for low- or lower-cost engagements, while the United States has only a limited number of suitable assets in the region, such as C-RAM.

Whether employing these more expensive systems is cost-inefficient is not always clear-cut. The United States would likely have been willing to allocate dozens of Patriot interceptors to prevent hits on its AN/TPY-2 and AN/FPS-132 radars. That said, regardless of whether the defended target justifies the cost, the engagement attempt will be expensive, and the expended munitions, given long production lead times, will be difficult to replace.

Pre-war reporting suggests that the Gulf states, together with the United States, were interested in acquiring dedicated counter-UAS systems that could have effectively complemented the upper missile defense layers to defend against long-range drones. However, procurement processes proved too lengthy, creating the now obvious capability gap at the start of the war.

It is also worth remembering that both Jordan and Qatar gave up their fleets of 60 and 15 Gepard systems in 2023, when Germany and the United States purchased them for transfer to Ukraine. Both countries could have made good use of these systems in the ongoing war.

How to defend long-range drone threats

Despite these challenges, the ongoing Iran War, as well as the war in Ukraine, increasingly clarify what a future missile defense posture designed to address a large-scale long-range drone threat must look like, including in Europe.

First, states must be able to establish an effective first layer of airborne area defense. Manned aircraft are broadly suitable, though large fleets of unmanned aircraft, with lower maintenance and per-flight-hour costs, combined with lower-cost air-to-air missile capabilities, would be preferable. Several low-cost ground-to-air interceptors currently under development in Europe and beyond could, in principle, be adapted for this role.

Second, states need to deploy affordable point-defense systems with a low cost per interception to deal with long-range drones that slip through the initial layer. These systems will necessarily be point-defense in nature, as costs tend to increase with engagement range. In other words, the objective is not to create a second area defense layer, which is not feasible, but rather to establish a redundancy layer for critical targets. How many targets can be defended in this way depends on the level of investment a state is willing to make.

Third, since it may not be feasible for a state to provide dedicated ground-based missile defense for every potential high-value target, the public sector may need support from the private sector. Just as discussions are underway about whether airports should be able to counter small quadcopter-type drones that threaten civilian air traffic, a broader debate may be required about whether large industrial actors and companies — under specific circumstances — should be authorized, or even required, to acquire defensive capabilities designed to counter larger and more potent drone threats.

The objective is not to privatize defense, but to recognize that as drone threats proliferate and civilian infrastructure becomes an increasingly common target for drone strikes in war, the military alone may not be able to provide the level of protection required across all sectors. This may be particularly relevant for countries such as Norway, which are geographically large and host significant numbers of dispersed critical infrastructure sites. Needless to say, this would require major policy reforms.

Ultimately, it must also be acknowledged that a perfect drone defense solution capable of intercepting every incoming system at all times and in all places does not exist.

Ukraine’s experience with drone defense shows that even with extensive operational experience, gaps can still emerge. Even on days when “only” 90 Russian long-range drones arrive, operator error, chance, technical problems, or other factors allow individual drones to get through. That is the nature of air defense. For this reason, defensive components must always be complemented by other capabilities, ideally to make clear to an adversary that an attack is not worthwhile and to retain the ability to generate effects within enemy territory should deterrence fail.