I think that there are more parallels between Ukraine and Iran. In both cases the countries were attacked and have a determined population that can sustain significant hardship.
The goal of their drone/missile campaigns wasn’t to “win” the war, but to make a continuation of the adversary (Russia/USA) economically unattractive. Iran succeeded within weeks thanks to the Straight.
Ukraine first eliminated radars and then attacked Russia’s economic base (oil), aiming to create a negative flywheel. Brilliant tactic, not in the least as it avoids senseless killing of civilians.
I hope Ukraine will continue to divert significant resources to attacking Russian radars and defense systems in order to maintain/ increase the yield of their strikes. This will likely depend on the ferocity of Russian attacks this spring.
The Ukrainian military deserves all accolades for this campaign: amazing planning and execution.
"In that sense, the strategic air campaign failed in its primary purpose: translating the use of force into a decisive political outcome. [...] Strategic airpower need not be decisive to matter. In the vast majority of cases, it cannot produce decisive effects in the first place."
I really fail to understand where the author is getting at. If strategic airpower is not decisive and cannot achieve its primary purpose of "translating the use of force into a decisive political outcome" what exactly is its purpose?
As Clausewitz stated, war is the continuation of politics by other means. War serves a political purpose and its participants usually have specific time horizons.
It;s even stranger how the Ukranian campaign against Russia's oil sector is translated in the campaign against Iran. Does the author really think that Ukraine and the US/Israel have the same time horizons and can absorb long-term significant (global) economic pain in order to achieve their purposes?
Unless the Iran War aim was "achieve a high score in things blown up" and strategic air campaign cannot achieve decisive political outcomes (especially in short time horizons) then it is the wrong tool for the job.
I am grateful that someone is writing about Ukraine given that the Iran war is consuming most of the media. It is interesting that Iran, a terrorist state itself is now the victim of terrorist attacks by the US and Israel.
I know Iran has been providing drones to Russia to help it battle Ukraine, and now it is supposedly receiving help from Russia and China. I would love to know more about how this is effecting Russia's ability to rearm. Is Russia in a position to help Iran with missiles and drones? Is the Iran war having a negative effect on Russia's ability to distribute oil? Or, are all the effects of the Iran war positively effecting Russia's ability to wage war on Ukraine, the non terrorist state in this equation?
The key difference between Ukraine and Iran wars is their geography, Ukraine will always be Russias neighbour and it’s ironic that one the reasons behind Putins war on Ukraine (the tariff disputes over pipeline gas transit fees leading to the Nord Stream story) has ironically resulted in Ukraine potentially hurting Russian hydrocarbon exports harder via drone technology and the like must be a salutary lesson for Russia. Leads to Russia pivoting more to the East (China)for that market. BRICs may offer more in the way of India etc if Putin wants to spread the risk of China domination.
Iran also has many geographically strategic advantages, terrain, Straits of Hormuz and embedded regime etc, putting secular differences between Muslims aside would go a long way to settling the Middle East, allowing the Kurds an identity would further settle and not allow Israel to continually disrupt and make trouble. US has no real business in the Middle East and should withdraw. GCC and Iran collectively can make up a sizeable bloc if only they would stop looking to other world powers for their defence and allowing religious differences to prevail.
Better all round if everyone got the message, stick to what you have and optimise, work with what you have in common and leverage assets with neighbours, collaborate don’t fight. Really glad Ukraine is teaching Russia a lesson and also glad Iran looks to be gaining the upper hand. I don’t like the Regime there much as I don’t like Putin but that is for Iranians and Russians to sort out. US needs to stop interfering where it doesn’t belong. In the words of the song, ‘wouldn’t it be luverly’ if that was what the outcome of these messes were to be?
Interesting analysis, in particular on the issue of Ukraine’s airstrikes on Russia’s air defence to facilitate the campaign. Maybe that would be a point worth investing more time into.
When assessing the Ukrainian attacks on the Russian oil industry, it is also important to keep the context in mind. Ukraine launched its so-called ‘DeepStrike’ campaign in August 2025 when demand in Russia was at its peak due to agriculture consumption and summer holiday travels. These drone strikes were furthermore coordinated with the significantly tightened U.S. sanctions regime which began with the executive order of 6 August to impose secondary tariffs on countries that import Russian oil, in particular India, and was followed by the designation of Rosneft and Lukoil by the U.S. Treasury in October 2025.
It was a comprehensive and rather stable strategy to deprive Russia of its most important income source. The harsh winter benefitted Ukraine’s purpose as it significantly disrupted Russia’s ability to export oil from its Baltic Sea ports while Ukraine spent its efforts on the Black Sea infrastructure where its armed forces hit every major terminal. That strategy was highly effective in disrupting export operations plus forcing Russia to offer significant discounts for what Moscow was able to ship.
That ended when the war in the Middle East began and oil prices surged. Ukraine, however, adapted quickly and started to focus heavily on Russia’s export terminals, first in the Black Sea and then in the Baltic Sea where Russia exports most of its oil from. Between 23 March and 7 April, the Ukrainian armed forces launched an unprecedented series of drone strikes on what are the most valuable Russian assets for seaborne crude and oil product exports. As you rightfully mentioned, it cut Russian oil exports by at least 40% based on the Reuters report. Notably, Ukraine also struck the refineries connected to its Baltic Sea infrastructure in Kirishi and Yaroslavl on 26 and 28 March.
I think that there are more parallels between Ukraine and Iran. In both cases the countries were attacked and have a determined population that can sustain significant hardship.
The goal of their drone/missile campaigns wasn’t to “win” the war, but to make a continuation of the adversary (Russia/USA) economically unattractive. Iran succeeded within weeks thanks to the Straight.
Ukraine first eliminated radars and then attacked Russia’s economic base (oil), aiming to create a negative flywheel. Brilliant tactic, not in the least as it avoids senseless killing of civilians.
I hope Ukraine will continue to divert significant resources to attacking Russian radars and defense systems in order to maintain/ increase the yield of their strikes. This will likely depend on the ferocity of Russian attacks this spring.
The Ukrainian military deserves all accolades for this campaign: amazing planning and execution.
"In that sense, the strategic air campaign failed in its primary purpose: translating the use of force into a decisive political outcome. [...] Strategic airpower need not be decisive to matter. In the vast majority of cases, it cannot produce decisive effects in the first place."
I really fail to understand where the author is getting at. If strategic airpower is not decisive and cannot achieve its primary purpose of "translating the use of force into a decisive political outcome" what exactly is its purpose?
As Clausewitz stated, war is the continuation of politics by other means. War serves a political purpose and its participants usually have specific time horizons.
It;s even stranger how the Ukranian campaign against Russia's oil sector is translated in the campaign against Iran. Does the author really think that Ukraine and the US/Israel have the same time horizons and can absorb long-term significant (global) economic pain in order to achieve their purposes?
Unless the Iran War aim was "achieve a high score in things blown up" and strategic air campaign cannot achieve decisive political outcomes (especially in short time horizons) then it is the wrong tool for the job.
I am grateful that someone is writing about Ukraine given that the Iran war is consuming most of the media. It is interesting that Iran, a terrorist state itself is now the victim of terrorist attacks by the US and Israel.
I know Iran has been providing drones to Russia to help it battle Ukraine, and now it is supposedly receiving help from Russia and China. I would love to know more about how this is effecting Russia's ability to rearm. Is Russia in a position to help Iran with missiles and drones? Is the Iran war having a negative effect on Russia's ability to distribute oil? Or, are all the effects of the Iran war positively effecting Russia's ability to wage war on Ukraine, the non terrorist state in this equation?
The key difference between Ukraine and Iran wars is their geography, Ukraine will always be Russias neighbour and it’s ironic that one the reasons behind Putins war on Ukraine (the tariff disputes over pipeline gas transit fees leading to the Nord Stream story) has ironically resulted in Ukraine potentially hurting Russian hydrocarbon exports harder via drone technology and the like must be a salutary lesson for Russia. Leads to Russia pivoting more to the East (China)for that market. BRICs may offer more in the way of India etc if Putin wants to spread the risk of China domination.
Iran also has many geographically strategic advantages, terrain, Straits of Hormuz and embedded regime etc, putting secular differences between Muslims aside would go a long way to settling the Middle East, allowing the Kurds an identity would further settle and not allow Israel to continually disrupt and make trouble. US has no real business in the Middle East and should withdraw. GCC and Iran collectively can make up a sizeable bloc if only they would stop looking to other world powers for their defence and allowing religious differences to prevail.
Better all round if everyone got the message, stick to what you have and optimise, work with what you have in common and leverage assets with neighbours, collaborate don’t fight. Really glad Ukraine is teaching Russia a lesson and also glad Iran looks to be gaining the upper hand. I don’t like the Regime there much as I don’t like Putin but that is for Iranians and Russians to sort out. US needs to stop interfering where it doesn’t belong. In the words of the song, ‘wouldn’t it be luverly’ if that was what the outcome of these messes were to be?
Good work Fabian, as always 👍. Detail on the economic after affects is especially appreciated.
DATELINE KYIV - DAY 1509 : 4435
Well done. Excellent analysis. Timely, insightful, and actionable.
Thank you.
V/r - IB
An American in Ukraine
(2019 - Present)
Interesting analysis, in particular on the issue of Ukraine’s airstrikes on Russia’s air defence to facilitate the campaign. Maybe that would be a point worth investing more time into.
When assessing the Ukrainian attacks on the Russian oil industry, it is also important to keep the context in mind. Ukraine launched its so-called ‘DeepStrike’ campaign in August 2025 when demand in Russia was at its peak due to agriculture consumption and summer holiday travels. These drone strikes were furthermore coordinated with the significantly tightened U.S. sanctions regime which began with the executive order of 6 August to impose secondary tariffs on countries that import Russian oil, in particular India, and was followed by the designation of Rosneft and Lukoil by the U.S. Treasury in October 2025.
It was a comprehensive and rather stable strategy to deprive Russia of its most important income source. The harsh winter benefitted Ukraine’s purpose as it significantly disrupted Russia’s ability to export oil from its Baltic Sea ports while Ukraine spent its efforts on the Black Sea infrastructure where its armed forces hit every major terminal. That strategy was highly effective in disrupting export operations plus forcing Russia to offer significant discounts for what Moscow was able to ship.
That ended when the war in the Middle East began and oil prices surged. Ukraine, however, adapted quickly and started to focus heavily on Russia’s export terminals, first in the Black Sea and then in the Baltic Sea where Russia exports most of its oil from. Between 23 March and 7 April, the Ukrainian armed forces launched an unprecedented series of drone strikes on what are the most valuable Russian assets for seaborne crude and oil product exports. As you rightfully mentioned, it cut Russian oil exports by at least 40% based on the Reuters report. Notably, Ukraine also struck the refineries connected to its Baltic Sea infrastructure in Kirishi and Yaroslavl on 26 and 28 March.
ukraines chipping away at russias oil and it air defence will eventually pay off really well, one complements the other
Appreciate the article and would like to know more comparing the two air campaigns
13.000 strikes on Iran compared to ? On Russia and ? on Germany
Tons of explosives delivered
Short against long
Effect on oil price, morale
Unorthodox tactics like open microwave ovens in Serbia
Etc