Where the war stands, talking about the war, and 2025

Picture: Ministry of Defense of Ukraine

Hi all, this post is a bit different from my previous (and future) ones. I want to share my thoughts on where I see the war heading and offer some personal reflections on discussing the war over the past years.

This diverges from my usual posts, where I focus on my two main areas of expertise—nuclear strategy and missile technology—, topics I believe provide the most value for your time. If this post isn’t what you signed up for, feel free to skip it, and I look forward to reconnecting in the new year.

Where the war stands at the end of 2024

In my view, what this year has made more clear than anything else is that both sides face the finite nature of their resources as the central issue. The media has finally started picking up on this, though almost entirely in the context of Ukraine’s increasingly severe manpower shortage.

To be clear, this is not an inaccurate assessment and does need to be highlighted. However, Russia is facing equally severe shortages, particularly in equipment and finances, while manpower issues are also becoming evident (hence the need to attract new recruits with signing bonuses of up to $40,000).

The key difference, for now, is that Moscow’s problems appear more latent than Kyiv’s. A manpower shortage on the frontline can have an immediate impact at the tactical and operational levels, especially if the adversary holds the initiative. However, at the strategic level, Russia’s outlook remains anything but optimistic; I would even argue it is exceptionally grim.

Like anyone else, I cannot pinpoint exactly when Russia’s resources will be exhausted—it could happen in 2026 or perhaps as late as 2030. But there is no question that Moscow’s capacity to wage war is finite, and Russia will eventually run out. The critical question is whether Ukraine can hold out until that point.

This is what Western decision-makers need to understand: at a strategic level, Russia is a dead man walking. 2024 has made this highly evident, most notably by Russia’s complete inability to expand itsforces to effectively respond to Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk. The West’s minimum objective for Ukraine should therefore simply be to ensure Ukraine can outlast Russia. This is entirely achievable, provided Europe and the United States maintain consistent support with equipment and Ukraine addresses its manpower challenges (a more realistic scenario if Ukraine’s partners uphold their commitments).

Unlike Russia, which is already incredibly overextended—indicated by severe labor shortages, rising inflation, and stagnant industrial output—North America and Europe possess substantial latent defense industrial capacity and much, much deeper pockets. The challenge lies in Western leaders finding the political will to activate these resources. Given that Russia will not be able to seize Ukraine’s land mass, doing so would effectively cut off Russia’s only realistic path to victory: outlasting the West in Ukraine and Ukraine itself.

If Western politicians and the public truly want a negotiated end to the war, and one that comes sooner rather than later, they need to make it clear to Putin that the longer he persists, the worse his situation will become. Simply calling for negotiations won’t do the trick.

Some personal reflections

Personally, I find it increasingly challenging to talk about the war, not because it is a difficult topic, but because I’m wondering how much purpose it holds. This has been my second year of actively commenting on the war’s developments in both national and international media. Journalists often reach out to me whenever Ukraine or Russia launches a new missile or when Putin resorts to nuclear saber-rattling. Occasionally, I’m also asked for my perspective on the broader war effort, and I respond if I feel I have something meaningful to contribute.

But it’s becoming increasingly draining. By the end of 2024, we should have a clear understanding of what’s at stake in Ukraine and what actions are necessary.

We should understand that supporting Ukraine is far less costly than dealing with the consequences of a Russian victory or even a precarious new status quo.

We should know that showing indecisiveness or weakness only emboldens Putin to continue his pursuit of Europe.

We should recognize that capitulating to Russian nuclear threats is not an option.

We should realize that European prosperity is intrinsically linked to Ukraine winning this war.

And above all, we should acknowledge that, regardless of our strategic interests, supporting a nation that has been invaded without just cause and is fighting a war for its survival is simply the right thing to do.

Yet, expressing these points increasingly feels like shouting into the void. Those who could be persuaded have likely already been convinced. Those who remain unconvinced are unlikely to change their stance.

Dont’ get me wrong, I’m not going to stop trying, but I’ve come to realize in 2024 that the West might need to do the right thing in Ukraine and help the Ukrainian people win, despite the opposition or apathy of large segments of its societies. This, in my view, is deeply disturbing and profoundly frustrating, but it’s the reality we are dealing with.

What to expect of 2025

I typically avoid speculating and am not interested in predicting the future. However, I will say that I don’t expect the war to end in 2025, regardless of how Trump’s policies may evolve.

On a personal note, I’ll be entering the final stage of my PhD toward the end of 2025, which means my posts may become less frequent at that point. I’ll keep you updated, but until then, I plan to continue posting once a week, primarily about missile technology developments and nuclear strategy.

I’m incredibly grateful for your support so far. Over the holidays, we reached the 2,000-subscriber milestone, and I cannot thank you enough. I hope you all have a fantastic start to 2025 and achieve your personal and professional goals.

All the best,
Fabian