Picture: European Defence Agency
Europe stands at a point of no return. A war rages in the East, and a potentially hostile America rises in the West. Whatever slumber Europe indulged in over the past 35 years, it must now wake up—or perish. This is no exaggeration. In my view, Europe faces two possible futures: one where it regains its strength and asserts itself, or one where it capitulates and fades into irrelevance—or, worse, ceases to exist as we know it.
To secure the first future and prevent the second, three steps are essential: First, Europe must rebuild and modernize its military strength. Second, it must regain its confidence and act with resolve on the international stage. Third, it must restore and reinforce its economic power. All three steps build on and draw from each other, none are optional.
Material strength
Europe has not been spending enough on defense. That’s no secret. Europe’s arsenals are depleted, and its armies have been hollowed out by decades of neglect. That, too, is no secret. As a result, Europe has become materially weak—or at least far weaker than its size and wealth should warrant.
A major issue holding many European nations back (excluding those in the East and Northeast) is the failure to view military spending as a core function of statecraft. Instead, investing in defense is still perceived by too many governments and societies as a temporary nuisance—something to tolerate for now but abandon as soon as possible. After all, there are "bigger" priorities for public spending.
Nothing exemplifies this mindset better than the ongoing debate on military spending following Trump’s recent (and rightful) demands for increased European defense budgets. While politicians and governments in several countries have voiced support for higher spending, the primary goal seems to be satisfying Trump’s demands rather than recognizing defense as a fundamental, long-term priority. In other words, military spending is still seen as a short-term tool to achieve immediate objectives, not as a critical investment in national security for decades to come.
This short-term thinking—and the idea that an urgent external force must justify defense spending or else its a waste—continues to hold Europe back. Among other consequences, it makes it exceedingly difficult to build and sustain a robust defense industry. Why invest in such an industry when it is widely assumed that neglect will return as soon as the current crises subside? Europe not only needs to rebuild its material strength, but it must also rediscover the purpose behind doing so. By investing in defense, we invest in our future and ensure we retain the luxury to focus on other priorities.
Building confidence
Material strength means nothing without the confidence to assert your interests, if necessary, even with military force. Lack of resolve—the willingness to stand firm as crises and conflicts escalate—is perhaps an even greater issue than a lack of capability, undermining Europe’s position internationally and leaving it vulnerable to threats and coercion from abroad.
Throughout the war in Ukraine, key European states, with Germany leading the way, have repeatedly signaled a severe lack of resolve. Above all else, decision-makers have prioritized avoiding risks to their own societies, focusing on minimizing potential costs of military aid. While this approach may seem intuitively understandable, it remains a suboptimal strategy on the international stage. Consistently conveying risk aversion and an unwillingness to endure hardship signals weakness. And weakness invites attack.
That said, it’s important not to generalize too broadly. Some European states have demonstrated remarkable resolve in confronting Russian aggression and taking risks to support Ukraine. The Baltic states and Poland stand out in particular. However, on the international stage, Europe is seen as a bloc, and its perceived resolve is defined by its weakest link. This is why I remain concerned about Russia employing a rapid cost-imposition strategy to pursue aggression against Europe and why I believe Trump feels confident in his ability to bully Denmark and Europe into submission over Greenland.
Europe’s weakest members must step up, or they risk dragging the entire continent down with them. Much like the victim of high school bullying, they must recognize that constant retreat will not bring relief. Step back too many times, and eventually, you may fall off the cliff without needing a push.
Economic prowess
Finally, Europe must regain its economic strength. A sustainable, long-term military buildup can only be financed if Europe achieves consistent economic growth. Moreover, acting assertively on the international stage—particularly in matters of security—becomes far easier with a strong economy as a foundation.
I am not an economist, so I will (rather conveniently, I admit) defer to experts to provide detailed strategies for restoring Europe’s innovativeness and competitiveness on the global stage. However, I will say that competitiveness and innovation must be central objectives in the years ahead, even taking precedence over other priorities.
This is not to dismiss the importance of other goals, like sustainability and the green transition, which are of major importance for Europe and the world. But recent years have shown that Europe cannot lead by ideals alone. The world has not followed suit and has instead capitalized on Europe’s competitive retreat to advance its own agendas.
Ultimately, without security, everything else is meaningless. And without a strong economy, Europe cannot rebuild the strength needed to guarantee its security. The priority list, therefore, should be clear: we invest in security so that we have the luxury to focus on everything else.
Well put: "...failure to view military spending as a core function of statecraft." We continuously spend x% of GDP on public health (also outside the flu season) and y% on energy production (and keep the power stations running outside the heating season); z% of GDP continuous spending on "production of security" is an equivalent necessary function of the state. I refer those who (erraneously) think that wars are exceptional anomalies to Richard Overy's recently published "Why War?". (And to European experience over millenia.)
Agree with all of this, and as a Canadian I'm embarrassed to say all the criticism applies just as much to my own country.
I do hope however, that Europe -- Germany, Austria, Spain, and Belgium especially -- connects the energiewende with Putin's deep pockets in Feb 2022. Phase out nuclear, and there's literally no alternative to natgas other than coal. If renewable energy worked as advertised, Germany's energy policy up to Feb 24 2022 would not have revolved around Siberian gas. And Merkel would never have had to suffer the shame and humiliation of having to cut public long term gas supply deals with a known war criminal who likes making people squirm.
Poland and Finland, NATO's east flank, understand these realities, which is why Finland toughed through the Olkiluoto ordeal and Poland will build an AP1000. It's also why Ukraine will resume nuclear plant construction when and if the war
ends favourably.