Well put: "...failure to view military spending as a core function of statecraft." We continuously spend x% of GDP on public health (also outside the flu season) and y% on energy production (and keep the power stations running outside the heating season); z% of GDP continuous spending on "production of security" is an equivalent necessary function of the state. I refer those who (erraneously) think that wars are exceptional anomalies to Richard Overy's recently published "Why War?". (And to European experience over millenia.)
Agree with all of this, and as a Canadian I'm embarrassed to say all the criticism applies just as much to my own country.
I do hope however, that Europe -- Germany, Austria, Spain, and Belgium especially -- connects the energiewende with Putin's deep pockets in Feb 2022. Phase out nuclear, and there's literally no alternative to natgas other than coal. If renewable energy worked as advertised, Germany's energy policy up to Feb 24 2022 would not have revolved around Siberian gas. And Merkel would never have had to suffer the shame and humiliation of having to cut public long term gas supply deals with a known war criminal who likes making people squirm.
Poland and Finland, NATO's east flank, understand these realities, which is why Finland toughed through the Olkiluoto ordeal and Poland will build an AP1000. It's also why Ukraine will resume nuclear plant construction when and if the war
I agree with this--albeit in agonizing sorrow and fury, because I'm American.
It seems to me, however, that Europe's institutions are inadequate to the task. The EU's institutions were built under assumptions that no longer obtain. I hardly need to rehearse the evidence that these institutions do *not* lend themselves to responding to emergencies quickly, decisively, and radically. In particular, they don't lend themselves to the formation of a common (and credible) defense policy.
So the question is not so much, "What should Europe do?" as "What institutions does Europe need to build, immediately, if it is to do this?"
Excellent article, thank you. There has been so much time to make a cource correction, and yet the urgency to act has been largely absent going beyond the states bordering Russia. This state of affairs has been depressing to follow, even before 2014.
About 20-20% of people in Western Europe would go to war to defend their country. I would suspect the number would be even lower for the EU as an institution. You can’t come back from this.
Not all European countries are sloths when it comes to defence spending, and some are moving more quickly than others. Agree with you on Poland and the Baltics and Nordics.
But to concentrate on France and Germany for a moment, it was Macron back in 2018 who said that NATO was “brain dead” and that Europe needed “strategic autonomy”. France has a powerful defence industry and a nuclear deterrent, its defence spending has increased consistently over the past three years, despite a fiscal deficit. infantry and artillery regiments that were facing closure are now being boosted. A refurbished gunpowder factory has recently been opened. So, at least there is a realisation that defence is an essential expenditure and Macron is putting money where his mouth is.
Germany is of course hobbled by its history and the post WW2 consensus that German forces would not intervene in conflict zones. That consensus is slowly changing even if the famous “Zeitenwende” trumpeted by Scholz is little more than rhetoric at the moment. After the wake up call issued by Trump to Merkel during his first mandate, Germany is now preparing to post troops permanently in Lithuania under a NATO arrangement and it has plenty of fiscal leeway that the probable future Chancellor, Merz, wants to unlock.
So things are moving.
But in what configuration can Europe possibly intervene in Ukraine? Not as the EU because of opposition from Putin supporters like Hungary and Slovakia and because it would exclude the UK and Norway. Not as NATO either if Trump says no. So some kind of “coalition of the willing” will be necessary and it will need time and a lot of negotiation to take shape.
And if Europe does proceed to boost its strategic autonomy, how will Trump react when Europeans prefer to purchase their home grown defence technology rather than buying it from America ? Not well, I fear !!
Your comments on all these issues would be very welcome.
Well put: "...failure to view military spending as a core function of statecraft." We continuously spend x% of GDP on public health (also outside the flu season) and y% on energy production (and keep the power stations running outside the heating season); z% of GDP continuous spending on "production of security" is an equivalent necessary function of the state. I refer those who (erraneously) think that wars are exceptional anomalies to Richard Overy's recently published "Why War?". (And to European experience over millenia.)
Very good examples! I agree.
Agree with all of this, and as a Canadian I'm embarrassed to say all the criticism applies just as much to my own country.
I do hope however, that Europe -- Germany, Austria, Spain, and Belgium especially -- connects the energiewende with Putin's deep pockets in Feb 2022. Phase out nuclear, and there's literally no alternative to natgas other than coal. If renewable energy worked as advertised, Germany's energy policy up to Feb 24 2022 would not have revolved around Siberian gas. And Merkel would never have had to suffer the shame and humiliation of having to cut public long term gas supply deals with a known war criminal who likes making people squirm.
Poland and Finland, NATO's east flank, understand these realities, which is why Finland toughed through the Olkiluoto ordeal and Poland will build an AP1000. It's also why Ukraine will resume nuclear plant construction when and if the war
ends favourably.
I agree with this--albeit in agonizing sorrow and fury, because I'm American.
It seems to me, however, that Europe's institutions are inadequate to the task. The EU's institutions were built under assumptions that no longer obtain. I hardly need to rehearse the evidence that these institutions do *not* lend themselves to responding to emergencies quickly, decisively, and radically. In particular, they don't lend themselves to the formation of a common (and credible) defense policy.
So the question is not so much, "What should Europe do?" as "What institutions does Europe need to build, immediately, if it is to do this?"
Any thoughts?
Excellent article, thank you. There has been so much time to make a cource correction, and yet the urgency to act has been largely absent going beyond the states bordering Russia. This state of affairs has been depressing to follow, even before 2014.
About 20-20% of people in Western Europe would go to war to defend their country. I would suspect the number would be even lower for the EU as an institution. You can’t come back from this.
Oh, there is already aggression against Europe by Russia. Pray, tell more!
Fabian,
Quickly, ASAP, change your drug dealer - last trip was bad.
Good article, thanks, but it does lack nuance!
Not all European countries are sloths when it comes to defence spending, and some are moving more quickly than others. Agree with you on Poland and the Baltics and Nordics.
But to concentrate on France and Germany for a moment, it was Macron back in 2018 who said that NATO was “brain dead” and that Europe needed “strategic autonomy”. France has a powerful defence industry and a nuclear deterrent, its defence spending has increased consistently over the past three years, despite a fiscal deficit. infantry and artillery regiments that were facing closure are now being boosted. A refurbished gunpowder factory has recently been opened. So, at least there is a realisation that defence is an essential expenditure and Macron is putting money where his mouth is.
Germany is of course hobbled by its history and the post WW2 consensus that German forces would not intervene in conflict zones. That consensus is slowly changing even if the famous “Zeitenwende” trumpeted by Scholz is little more than rhetoric at the moment. After the wake up call issued by Trump to Merkel during his first mandate, Germany is now preparing to post troops permanently in Lithuania under a NATO arrangement and it has plenty of fiscal leeway that the probable future Chancellor, Merz, wants to unlock.
So things are moving.
But in what configuration can Europe possibly intervene in Ukraine? Not as the EU because of opposition from Putin supporters like Hungary and Slovakia and because it would exclude the UK and Norway. Not as NATO either if Trump says no. So some kind of “coalition of the willing” will be necessary and it will need time and a lot of negotiation to take shape.
And if Europe does proceed to boost its strategic autonomy, how will Trump react when Europeans prefer to purchase their home grown defence technology rather than buying it from America ? Not well, I fear !!
Your comments on all these issues would be very welcome.