Europe's Nuclear Latency Problem

European nuclear proliferation, extended deterrence, and non-nuclear alternatives

Picture: U.S. Navy / Ronald Gutridge

In recent weeks, European discussions on nuclear weapons have reached new heights, with debates over the costs and benefits of nuclear proliferation—the pursuit of a nuclear weapons program with the explicit intent to become a nuclear-armed state—having entered the mainstream like never before.

Unfortunately, from Germany to Norway, Finland, and Poland, these debates remain misinformed and fail to reflect the realities of Europe’s security environment. The nuclear option is often portrayed as a “quick fix” to Europe’s security challenges, when in reality, nothing could be further from the truth.

Europe faces a nuclear conundrum with no short-term escape. Proliferation cannot happen quickly, French extended nuclear deterrence lacks credibility—at least in its current form—and alternative solutions are suboptimal. This does not mean Europe cannot strengthen its position, but doing so will require both time and investment.

Rushing the bomb?

Commentators across Europe have called for a rapid push toward nuclear weapons. The problem: it’s not possible, at least in the short term. In addition, it would be dangerous.

No European non-nuclear weapon state—whether Germany, Italy, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Poland, or others—has the civilian nuclear infrastructure to quickly produce the fissile material required for a bomb.

First, European nuclear reactors are unsuitable for producing significant quantities of weapons-grade plutonium, and no plutonium reprocessing infrastructure exists to separate the necessary isotopes. Second, while some states have uranium enrichment facilities, these would need to be adapted for weapons-grade uranium production—a process that would take some time.

Even if these efforts were made, they could not remain secret due to IAEA oversight. Any direct step toward weaponization would be detected, potentially leading to political isolation, economic sanctions, or even preemptive strikes by Russia.

There is also the issue of delivery systems. Suppose Finland somehow acquires fissile material—then what? Integrating a warhead into a JASSM-ER would be impossible without Lockheed Martin and U.S. government support. Relying on gravity bombs would require modifying the F-35, which also depends on U.S. cooperation.

Analysts often overlook that having a nuclear deterrent does not necessarily mean having a robust one.

Take Germany as an example: it possesses several hundred kilograms of highly enriched uranium, which could, with effort, be turned into 5–15 nuclear warheads. These could be integrated into the Taurus cruise missile, but that would result in a small arsenal delivered by a relatively slow system with limited range.

Such an arsenal would lack survivability, meaning Germany’s retaliatory capability would be far from assured—at least until it could expand its stockpile and improve its delivery systems.

A French nuclear umbrella?

I wrote in detail last week about the challenges surrounding France’s nuclear deterrent. If you’re interested, you can access it here.

The main issue is that, unlike the U.S. nuclear deterrent—which since the 1960s has been explicitly designed not only to deter attacks on the U.S. homeland but also to extend nuclear protection over European allies—France’s arsenal was never built for that purpose.

The United States structured its arsenal to ensure it could fight and win a nuclear war at all levels if necessary. This meant not only threatening retaliation on behalf of allies—a prospect widely viewed as non-credible in Europe—but also having the capability to preemptively neutralize the Soviet, and later Russian, nuclear arsenal before it could be launched against European cities.

Filling this role is a major undertaking, and the French arsenal, in its current form, is simply not equipped for it. This is not a criticism of France’s nuclear deterrent, which is well-suited to its primary mission: deterring existential threats to France. But without significant adaptations (which I have outlined in last week’s post in detail), it cannot credibly extend protection to distant European allies.

Europe’s nuclear future

The reality is that there is no quick solution for Europe to fill the nuclear gaps emerging amid a potential U.S. withdrawal.

That does not mean the nuclear issue should be sidelined. European states should probably work to enhance their “nuclear latency”—the technical and material capacity to develop nuclear weapons within a short timeframe if a political decision is made.

This could involve developing European medium-range ballistic missiles and ensuring survivable basing options. For instance, if Germany were to develop a medium-range ballistic missile and explore the feasibility of launching it from a modified U-212CD submarine, its nuclear latency would increase significantly. Even a small number of warheads could provide a somewhat credible deterrent if paired with penetration aids and proper mission planning. (Note though that I have not looked into this specific example, and it may be incredibly unrealistic)

Non-nuclear priorities

Finally, what are the non-nuclear alternatives to counter Russia’s nuclear arsenal? The most immediate concern amid a potential U.S. withdrawal is Russia’s coercive leverage, stemming from its dominance at the non-nuclear strategic level.

Countering this on a non-nuclear level could involve two types of capabilities: forward defense and non-nuclear strategic attack.

First, in a wartime scenario, Russian doctrine suggests it would attempt to sanctuarize recently conquered territory through its non-strategic nuclear arsenal—essentially threatening nuclear escalation to deter any liberation efforts. Responding to this tactic is far more challenging without the ability to fight the Russians at the non-strategic nuclear level.

Short of developing a credible non-strategic nuclear arsenal, the best alternative is to prevent such an incursion and subsequent sanctuarization in the first place. This requires forward defense from day one—a difficult and costly endeavor. However, there is little choice for the European alliance but to pursue this goal, not least because of the suffering Russia inflicts on occupied territory,

Second, if retaliation with non-strategic nuclear weapons is not an option, there is an argument that punishment could instead be threatened using non-nuclear capabilities, most notably conventional long-range strike weapons.

This would mean convincing Russia that any use of non-strategic nuclear weapons would trigger massive conventional countervalue strikes against critical Russian infrastructure—both military and civilian—as punishment. If this threat were credible, it could serve as a deterrent, though it remains uncertain how seriously Russia would take it.

Ultimately, Europe can respond to Russia’s nuclear superiority by strengthening its non-nuclear capabilities. As the discussion on nuclear proliferation makes clear, it also has no choice but to do so—at least in the short term.