This is an exceptionally detailed and sobering analysis of the missile dynamics between Russia and Europe. The surge in Russian ballistic missile production combined with Europe’s current missile defense focus clearly reveals a growing strategic imbalance. It’s striking how, despite increased interceptor production, Europe still cannot keep pace with Russia’s offensive missile output — especially when factoring in the multiplier effect of using multiple interceptors per missile and additional threats like cruise missiles and drones.
Any reason that you don't include the Anglo-Italian CAMM family in your assessments? Already quite a large user-base, increasing production in the UK, Italy, and Brazil, and generally recognised as being markedly cheaper than the Aster family. Not currently supplied to Ukraine, but very relevant to Eastern Europe and Russian missiles given Poland will soon be a major user.
As I explained in greater detail in my response in Bluesky (https://bsky.app/profile/jmkorhonen.fi/post/3lteotf5yk22x), this only strengthens the case for NB8 countries starting a joint R&D program to acquire at least the readiness for not only conventional but nuclear deterrent of their own.
Even a victorious war of attrition against Russia would be an unmitigated disaster for us. Therefore we need a deterrent that is credible enough, in all circumstances including the fall of much of Europe under populist-isolationist rule, to deter the Kremlin from attacking us in the first place.
There is definitely an industrial aspect when considering the punishment-oriented approach. To quote Defense News from one of your links:
"Solid rocket motor production relies on several important components and materials, and regardless of the number of solid rocket motor providers that exist, we each require these same components and materials — and more significantly, the suppliers who produce them.”
With supply already constrained, it will take massive political effort to make the industry able to absorb orders for missile offense, on top of missile defense demand.
Yes, upgrading Europe's conventional long-range strike arsenals similarly involves significant industrial challenges and will not be a short-term solution. But it's at least more cost-effective.
Much appreciated, such overview was long overdue. As far as cruise missiles are concerned, NASAMS-2 and IRIS-T SLM, both operated by the AFU, should be sufficient, no?
But, as others have said before, shooting the archer would be better than trying to shoot ever more arrows.
It is painful to watch the foreshadowing force (terror) assymetry between Russia and Ukraine. Russia can with impunity launch ballistic missiles, probably straight from the production line, while Ukraine answers with (mainly) long range slow propeller drones. Just consider the physics of approaching the target with velocity measured in kilometers per second, versus kilometers per hour (YKWIM). This message needs to be shouted from the rooftops Fabian, which you actually do.
I prefer Israel’s approach to not targeting Iranian civilians. They targeted only military targets and anything else that was going to result in nuclear weapons going on missiles.
Counter-force uber counter-value.
But, do agree the Russians are outpacing Europe at speed, as is China and US allies in the Indo-Pacific.
This is an exceptionally detailed and sobering analysis of the missile dynamics between Russia and Europe. The surge in Russian ballistic missile production combined with Europe’s current missile defense focus clearly reveals a growing strategic imbalance. It’s striking how, despite increased interceptor production, Europe still cannot keep pace with Russia’s offensive missile output — especially when factoring in the multiplier effect of using multiple interceptors per missile and additional threats like cruise missiles and drones.
Any reason that you don't include the Anglo-Italian CAMM family in your assessments? Already quite a large user-base, increasing production in the UK, Italy, and Brazil, and generally recognised as being markedly cheaper than the Aster family. Not currently supplied to Ukraine, but very relevant to Eastern Europe and Russian missiles given Poland will soon be a major user.
I focused on ballistic missile defense, and then also not all systems (e.g. I ignore the Israeli systems in Europe).
Trying to keep things manageable in terms of length and readability, though this one already got extremely long.
Thank you for this very useful summary.
As I explained in greater detail in my response in Bluesky (https://bsky.app/profile/jmkorhonen.fi/post/3lteotf5yk22x), this only strengthens the case for NB8 countries starting a joint R&D program to acquire at least the readiness for not only conventional but nuclear deterrent of their own.
Even a victorious war of attrition against Russia would be an unmitigated disaster for us. Therefore we need a deterrent that is credible enough, in all circumstances including the fall of much of Europe under populist-isolationist rule, to deter the Kremlin from attacking us in the first place.
Sadly, that seems to require nuclear weapons.
This is a very important point: "...Europe must urgently reconsider its missile strategy and shift from a denial to a punishment posture."
Thank you for the article Fabian.
There is definitely an industrial aspect when considering the punishment-oriented approach. To quote Defense News from one of your links:
"Solid rocket motor production relies on several important components and materials, and regardless of the number of solid rocket motor providers that exist, we each require these same components and materials — and more significantly, the suppliers who produce them.”
With supply already constrained, it will take massive political effort to make the industry able to absorb orders for missile offense, on top of missile defense demand.
Yes, upgrading Europe's conventional long-range strike arsenals similarly involves significant industrial challenges and will not be a short-term solution. But it's at least more cost-effective.
Good analysis, but the picture is more dire! don't forget to add:
1. You may want to have at least 3:1 interceptors, explicitly
2
You have to intercept some Iran, NorthKorea, Jemen, Chinese rockets
3. You may want to interecept some other rockets here and there
Europe should aim at >2000 SAM rockets per y at least, as long as Ukraine war continues
Much appreciated, such overview was long overdue. As far as cruise missiles are concerned, NASAMS-2 and IRIS-T SLM, both operated by the AFU, should be sufficient, no?
But, as others have said before, shooting the archer would be better than trying to shoot ever more arrows.
It is painful to watch the foreshadowing force (terror) assymetry between Russia and Ukraine. Russia can with impunity launch ballistic missiles, probably straight from the production line, while Ukraine answers with (mainly) long range slow propeller drones. Just consider the physics of approaching the target with velocity measured in kilometers per second, versus kilometers per hour (YKWIM). This message needs to be shouted from the rooftops Fabian, which you actually do.
I prefer Israel’s approach to not targeting Iranian civilians. They targeted only military targets and anything else that was going to result in nuclear weapons going on missiles.
Counter-force uber counter-value.
But, do agree the Russians are outpacing Europe at speed, as is China and US allies in the Indo-Pacific.