This is an exceptionally detailed and sobering analysis of the missile dynamics between Russia and Europe. The surge in Russian ballistic missile production combined with Europe’s current missile defense focus clearly reveals a growing strategic imbalance. It’s striking how, despite increased interceptor production, Europe still cannot keep pace with Russia’s offensive missile output — especially when factoring in the multiplier effect of using multiple interceptors per missile and additional threats like cruise missiles and drones.
Any reason that you don't include the Anglo-Italian CAMM family in your assessments? Already quite a large user-base, increasing production in the UK, Italy, and Brazil, and generally recognised as being markedly cheaper than the Aster family. Not currently supplied to Ukraine, but very relevant to Eastern Europe and Russian missiles given Poland will soon be a major user.
As I explained in greater detail in my response in Bluesky (https://bsky.app/profile/jmkorhonen.fi/post/3lteotf5yk22x), this only strengthens the case for NB8 countries starting a joint R&D program to acquire at least the readiness for not only conventional but nuclear deterrent of their own.
Even a victorious war of attrition against Russia would be an unmitigated disaster for us. Therefore we need a deterrent that is credible enough, in all circumstances including the fall of much of Europe under populist-isolationist rule, to deter the Kremlin from attacking us in the first place.
There is definitely an industrial aspect when considering the punishment-oriented approach. To quote Defense News from one of your links:
"Solid rocket motor production relies on several important components and materials, and regardless of the number of solid rocket motor providers that exist, we each require these same components and materials — and more significantly, the suppliers who produce them.”
With supply already constrained, it will take massive political effort to make the industry able to absorb orders for missile offense, on top of missile defense demand.
Yes, upgrading Europe's conventional long-range strike arsenals similarly involves significant industrial challenges and will not be a short-term solution. But it's at least more cost-effective.
If a long-range suicide drone costs €20k, then €20bn would buy a million of them. That amount of money is about 1/3rd of what UK spends on defence in a year so Europe together could certainly afford it. I think a million drones could seriously fuck up Russia’s infrastructure and ability to manufacture weapons or wage war.
But it's a lot more likely, is it not, that if anyone's going to buy a million drones instead of a million super-expensive precision-guided stand-off missiles & the aircraft to launch them, it is going to be Russia.
Saturating and overwhelming a BMD system inherently favors the lower tech aggressor, doesn't it?
Historically, the counter to that was simply for the opponent to build more offensive missiles. All they have to be able to do is hit a target on the land--no complex equations to solve in order to intercept things in space. And thus cheaper--relatively speaking--to build than interceptors.
But today's interceptors are much, much better than those that existed during the debate over Ronald Reagan's "Star Wars" *and* it appears taxpayers are willing to pay for lots of interceptors. Americans didn't get a defense budget decrease under Biden or Obama and they're certainly not going to get one under today's Republicans. And in Europe there has been a true watershed moment--whatever the term in German was.
Between America, W. Europe, and Japan . . . we could probably build 2,000 interceptors/year. And Russia's economy can't compete with such a reality.
Maybe China's can.
In 25 years we probably aren't going to be talking much about Russia--when we do, it will be first & foremost in terms of their relationship to China; and they will be to China like Belarus today is to them.
So by 2027, not even 2029, the West should be producing 1,330 PAC & Aster interceptors . . . but the Russians will be producing at least ~1,000 Iskanders & Kinzhals? Perhaps the Russians will be making more if they can keep their production rates increasing--and you have to consider imports from Iran & NK. Okay.
But the historic argument *against* missile defense is that it's an extremely expensive contest against an adversary that merely has to build more offensive missiles (or MIRV them) to hit static targets . . . something we've been able to do since 1944. The aggressor doesn't have to master the complexities of missile defense.
Missile defense technology has improved dramatically in the last 25 years (esp. against cruise) . . . it would appear we might be at the point where--if there is the political will to spend the money on interceptors--the tech is mature *enough* that the defender can now win the numbers game?
Your analysis of Israel's performance against the Iranians suggests so. And when it comes to far more sophisticated ballistic missiles, are we not seeing similar success in Ukraine? Wouldn't Ukrainian casualties be much, much higher if it were not for effective missile defense?
It would seem to me that conventionally-tipped ballistic missiles against land targets are now of very limited value if the defender has an adequate missile defense network. The network must be obviously technologically sophisticated enough and consist of enough interceptor rounds. But it would appear that taxpayers are now willing to pay for both.
Wow, I had no idea Patriot & other systems were being produced in such numbers as we speak, let alone in a few years from now. That's great news.
However, at any given moment in a conflict what matters--of course--is not how many examples of "Weapon System X" exist, but how many are available to a combatant in a given geographic place at a given time. So, for a given chunk of the European battlespace in some future NATO-Russia war, for example, if 300 interceptors are available at any given time, 400 offensive missiles will be potentially devastating.
Of course, as those 300 interceptors are being expended, replacements would hopefully be on their way and ideally not traveling too far at all. I realize this is a bit simplified, but what is most definitely *not* is the missile defense scenario at sea. When a carrier strike group or (especially) task force's interceptors are out, they're out . . . even replenishment at sea requires there to be surviving ships to replenish!
Much appreciated, such overview was long overdue. As far as cruise missiles are concerned, NASAMS-2 and IRIS-T SLM, both operated by the AFU, should be sufficient, no?
But, as others have said before, shooting the archer would be better than trying to shoot ever more arrows.
It is painful to watch the foreshadowing force (terror) assymetry between Russia and Ukraine. Russia can with impunity launch ballistic missiles, probably straight from the production line, while Ukraine answers with (mainly) long range slow propeller drones. Just consider the physics of approaching the target with velocity measured in kilometers per second, versus kilometers per hour (YKWIM). This message needs to be shouted from the rooftops Fabian, which you actually do.
I prefer Israel’s approach to not targeting Iranian civilians. They targeted only military targets and anything else that was going to result in nuclear weapons going on missiles.
Counter-force uber counter-value.
But, do agree the Russians are outpacing Europe at speed, as is China and US allies in the Indo-Pacific.
This is an exceptionally detailed and sobering analysis of the missile dynamics between Russia and Europe. The surge in Russian ballistic missile production combined with Europe’s current missile defense focus clearly reveals a growing strategic imbalance. It’s striking how, despite increased interceptor production, Europe still cannot keep pace with Russia’s offensive missile output — especially when factoring in the multiplier effect of using multiple interceptors per missile and additional threats like cruise missiles and drones.
Any reason that you don't include the Anglo-Italian CAMM family in your assessments? Already quite a large user-base, increasing production in the UK, Italy, and Brazil, and generally recognised as being markedly cheaper than the Aster family. Not currently supplied to Ukraine, but very relevant to Eastern Europe and Russian missiles given Poland will soon be a major user.
I focused on ballistic missile defense, and then also not all systems (e.g. I ignore the Israeli systems in Europe).
Trying to keep things manageable in terms of length and readability, though this one already got extremely long.
Thank you for this very useful summary.
As I explained in greater detail in my response in Bluesky (https://bsky.app/profile/jmkorhonen.fi/post/3lteotf5yk22x), this only strengthens the case for NB8 countries starting a joint R&D program to acquire at least the readiness for not only conventional but nuclear deterrent of their own.
Even a victorious war of attrition against Russia would be an unmitigated disaster for us. Therefore we need a deterrent that is credible enough, in all circumstances including the fall of much of Europe under populist-isolationist rule, to deter the Kremlin from attacking us in the first place.
Sadly, that seems to require nuclear weapons.
This is a very important point: "...Europe must urgently reconsider its missile strategy and shift from a denial to a punishment posture."
Thank you for the article Fabian.
There is definitely an industrial aspect when considering the punishment-oriented approach. To quote Defense News from one of your links:
"Solid rocket motor production relies on several important components and materials, and regardless of the number of solid rocket motor providers that exist, we each require these same components and materials — and more significantly, the suppliers who produce them.”
With supply already constrained, it will take massive political effort to make the industry able to absorb orders for missile offense, on top of missile defense demand.
Yes, upgrading Europe's conventional long-range strike arsenals similarly involves significant industrial challenges and will not be a short-term solution. But it's at least more cost-effective.
How dependent is russian ballistic missile production on Western components?
If a long-range suicide drone costs €20k, then €20bn would buy a million of them. That amount of money is about 1/3rd of what UK spends on defence in a year so Europe together could certainly afford it. I think a million drones could seriously fuck up Russia’s infrastructure and ability to manufacture weapons or wage war.
Yes, a million drones would do that to Russia.
But it's a lot more likely, is it not, that if anyone's going to buy a million drones instead of a million super-expensive precision-guided stand-off missiles & the aircraft to launch them, it is going to be Russia.
Saturating and overwhelming a BMD system inherently favors the lower tech aggressor, doesn't it?
Good analysis, but the picture is more dire! don't forget to add:
1. You may want to have at least 3:1 interceptors, explicitly
2
You have to intercept some Iran, NorthKorea, Jemen, Chinese rockets
3. You may want to interecept some other rockets here and there
Europe should aim at >2000 SAM rockets per y at least, as long as Ukraine war continues
Three interceptors for every incoming, yes?
Historically, the counter to that was simply for the opponent to build more offensive missiles. All they have to be able to do is hit a target on the land--no complex equations to solve in order to intercept things in space. And thus cheaper--relatively speaking--to build than interceptors.
But today's interceptors are much, much better than those that existed during the debate over Ronald Reagan's "Star Wars" *and* it appears taxpayers are willing to pay for lots of interceptors. Americans didn't get a defense budget decrease under Biden or Obama and they're certainly not going to get one under today's Republicans. And in Europe there has been a true watershed moment--whatever the term in German was.
Between America, W. Europe, and Japan . . . we could probably build 2,000 interceptors/year. And Russia's economy can't compete with such a reality.
Maybe China's can.
In 25 years we probably aren't going to be talking much about Russia--when we do, it will be first & foremost in terms of their relationship to China; and they will be to China like Belarus today is to them.
So by 2027, not even 2029, the West should be producing 1,330 PAC & Aster interceptors . . . but the Russians will be producing at least ~1,000 Iskanders & Kinzhals? Perhaps the Russians will be making more if they can keep their production rates increasing--and you have to consider imports from Iran & NK. Okay.
But the historic argument *against* missile defense is that it's an extremely expensive contest against an adversary that merely has to build more offensive missiles (or MIRV them) to hit static targets . . . something we've been able to do since 1944. The aggressor doesn't have to master the complexities of missile defense.
Missile defense technology has improved dramatically in the last 25 years (esp. against cruise) . . . it would appear we might be at the point where--if there is the political will to spend the money on interceptors--the tech is mature *enough* that the defender can now win the numbers game?
Your analysis of Israel's performance against the Iranians suggests so. And when it comes to far more sophisticated ballistic missiles, are we not seeing similar success in Ukraine? Wouldn't Ukrainian casualties be much, much higher if it were not for effective missile defense?
It would seem to me that conventionally-tipped ballistic missiles against land targets are now of very limited value if the defender has an adequate missile defense network. The network must be obviously technologically sophisticated enough and consist of enough interceptor rounds. But it would appear that taxpayers are now willing to pay for both.
Wow, I had no idea Patriot & other systems were being produced in such numbers as we speak, let alone in a few years from now. That's great news.
However, at any given moment in a conflict what matters--of course--is not how many examples of "Weapon System X" exist, but how many are available to a combatant in a given geographic place at a given time. So, for a given chunk of the European battlespace in some future NATO-Russia war, for example, if 300 interceptors are available at any given time, 400 offensive missiles will be potentially devastating.
Of course, as those 300 interceptors are being expended, replacements would hopefully be on their way and ideally not traveling too far at all. I realize this is a bit simplified, but what is most definitely *not* is the missile defense scenario at sea. When a carrier strike group or (especially) task force's interceptors are out, they're out . . . even replenishment at sea requires there to be surviving ships to replenish!
Much appreciated, such overview was long overdue. As far as cruise missiles are concerned, NASAMS-2 and IRIS-T SLM, both operated by the AFU, should be sufficient, no?
But, as others have said before, shooting the archer would be better than trying to shoot ever more arrows.
It is painful to watch the foreshadowing force (terror) assymetry between Russia and Ukraine. Russia can with impunity launch ballistic missiles, probably straight from the production line, while Ukraine answers with (mainly) long range slow propeller drones. Just consider the physics of approaching the target with velocity measured in kilometers per second, versus kilometers per hour (YKWIM). This message needs to be shouted from the rooftops Fabian, which you actually do.
I prefer Israel’s approach to not targeting Iranian civilians. They targeted only military targets and anything else that was going to result in nuclear weapons going on missiles.
Counter-force uber counter-value.
But, do agree the Russians are outpacing Europe at speed, as is China and US allies in the Indo-Pacific.