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Kostas K's avatar

A Nuclear Deterrent involves two problems:

- As evident by the Iran case, a state is quite vulnerable during the development phase. Ukraine does not have enrichment or plutonium reprocessing facilities and it is a member of the NPT. As correctly pointed out, in order to be able to move with weapon development, Ukraine would probably have to withdraw from NPT or be able to create secret enrichment facilities of a large scale (a tad order to achieve against Russia's reconnaissance capabilities). As a result, the most probable outcome is for its facilities to be bombed before it is able to actually produce the weapon(s). It took Iran years and massive resources to be able to enrich several hundred kilos of HEU to >60%.

- Even a limited nuclear arsenal does not provide for a reliable second strike capability. Russia should be able to carry out a neutralizing first strike even using conventional explosives (its ballistic missiles most definitely can carry enough firepower with enough accuracy to achieve that).

Even if that attack was partially successful what would Ukraine do in response, commit national suicide? Mind you that Ukraine's nuclear missiles would probably be of the MRBM variant which can certainly be more easily engaged by ABM defense compared to ICBMs. Which makes it possible that an Ukranian nuclear response would be intercepted while Russia's nuclear (much stronger) response would not.

Either NATO membership or a strong enough conventional deterrence capability seem the rational, viable options.

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Cameron Forster's avatar

They might want to think about Bio/Chemical option of push comes to shove.

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