- As evident by the Iran case, a state is quite vulnerable during the development phase. Ukraine does not have enrichment or plutonium reprocessing facilities and it is a member of the NPT. As correctly pointed out, in order to be able to move with weapon development, Ukraine would probably have to withdraw from NPT or be able to create secret enrichment facilities of a large scale (a tad order to achieve against Russia's reconnaissance capabilities). As a result, the most probable outcome is for its facilities to be bombed before it is able to actually produce the weapon(s). It took Iran years and massive resources to be able to enrich several hundred kilos of HEU to >60%.
- Even a limited nuclear arsenal does not provide for a reliable second strike capability. Russia should be able to carry out a neutralizing first strike even using conventional explosives (its ballistic missiles most definitely can carry enough firepower with enough accuracy to achieve that).
Even if that attack was partially successful what would Ukraine do in response, commit national suicide? Mind you that Ukraine's nuclear missiles would probably be of the MRBM variant which can certainly be more easily engaged by ABM defense compared to ICBMs. Which makes it possible that an Ukranian nuclear response would be intercepted while Russia's nuclear (much stronger) response would not.
Either NATO membership or a strong enough conventional deterrence capability seem the rational, viable options.
However, a future Ukraine that would have succeeded in preserving its independence at the outcome of this war may struggle financially to produce 1,000 long range cruise missiles
Thank you that is a very useful article that provides a much needed explanation of what Ukraine might or might not be able to do. How to deter Russia from a future invasion or a Round 3 is one of the big questions. I have concerns even about NATO membership being sufficient. I feel that, during the Cold War, it was the presence of US troops in Europe, and the direct link they provided to the US nuclear deterrent, that backstopped NATO's deterrent effect. Question: if Ukraine joins NATO, but there are no NATO troops on Ukrainian soil, does Article 5 risk becoming no different from all the other security guarantees Ukraine has been provided?
A Nuclear Deterrent involves two problems:
- As evident by the Iran case, a state is quite vulnerable during the development phase. Ukraine does not have enrichment or plutonium reprocessing facilities and it is a member of the NPT. As correctly pointed out, in order to be able to move with weapon development, Ukraine would probably have to withdraw from NPT or be able to create secret enrichment facilities of a large scale (a tad order to achieve against Russia's reconnaissance capabilities). As a result, the most probable outcome is for its facilities to be bombed before it is able to actually produce the weapon(s). It took Iran years and massive resources to be able to enrich several hundred kilos of HEU to >60%.
- Even a limited nuclear arsenal does not provide for a reliable second strike capability. Russia should be able to carry out a neutralizing first strike even using conventional explosives (its ballistic missiles most definitely can carry enough firepower with enough accuracy to achieve that).
Even if that attack was partially successful what would Ukraine do in response, commit national suicide? Mind you that Ukraine's nuclear missiles would probably be of the MRBM variant which can certainly be more easily engaged by ABM defense compared to ICBMs. Which makes it possible that an Ukranian nuclear response would be intercepted while Russia's nuclear (much stronger) response would not.
Either NATO membership or a strong enough conventional deterrence capability seem the rational, viable options.
They might want to think about Bio/Chemical option of push comes to shove.
Thanks for this analysis
Worthy of note: Japan seems to have decided on precisely this kind of non-nuclear deterrent vis-à-vis China. Tokyo announced in 2022 that it would deploy 1,000 long-range cruise missiles in its southern Kyushu island https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/08/21/national/japan-1000-long-range-missiles-china/
These missiles should be stealthier versions of Type 12 missile, with range extended to 900 ultimately 1,500 km https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_12_surface-to-ship_missile#Type_12_surface-to-ship_missile_(future_versions)
However, a future Ukraine that would have succeeded in preserving its independence at the outcome of this war may struggle financially to produce 1,000 long range cruise missiles
Excellent analysis. Talk about an Ukrainian nuclear weapon is premature given their lack of special nuclear material, as you note.
Thank you that is a very useful article that provides a much needed explanation of what Ukraine might or might not be able to do. How to deter Russia from a future invasion or a Round 3 is one of the big questions. I have concerns even about NATO membership being sufficient. I feel that, during the Cold War, it was the presence of US troops in Europe, and the direct link they provided to the US nuclear deterrent, that backstopped NATO's deterrent effect. Question: if Ukraine joins NATO, but there are no NATO troops on Ukrainian soil, does Article 5 risk becoming no different from all the other security guarantees Ukraine has been provided?