Some very good and valid points - but a few misunderstandings regarding France’s nuclear deterrence. For instance, I do not think France ever characterized the ASMPA as a "pre-strategic deterrent" - since Mitterrand, the nuclear doctrine is quite clear : there is no such thing as a pre/sub strategic deterrence, everything nuclear is strategic and any state actor (except covered by negative security assurances I guess) attacking France’s "vital interests", no matter the weapon and its yield, could face nuclear response. On ongoing discussions, I do not think France ever proposed to "extend its deterrence" but rather acknowledged that their "vital interest" have a European dimension and stated their availability for dialogue with interested European countries about this.
Hi Antoine, thanks for those clarifications! This is my second attempt at getting the French nuclear doctrine right and it looks I still made some mistakes. Different sources say different things here, which can be confusing. Let me see if I can adjust the text to make it better reflect the realities of French nuclear doctrine.
On the second point, the extended deterrence part is my interpretation. I.e., I think this is what Macron hints at when he talks about the vital interest dimension. In essence, this is about extending deterrence over more than just France to include European allies, though I agree that he hasn't used the exact term.
Thanks for the recommendation. I read his 2016 book "Le President et la Bombe", which I really liked. Though admittedly, some nuances may have been lost in translation.
As for the extended deterrence, i saw Macron"s impromptu conference on social medias yesterday, and he was asked this specific question.
His answer was that the vital interests of France were not limited to the French territory, and included Europe as well, but that the specific meaning of this will not be clarified, to maintain strategic ambiguity.
Regarding France's use of nuclear weapons, Macron has made a speech which spoke about French doctrine that you can find at this source:
- There is no concept of nuclear warheads for battles, nor any concept of graduated response. Nuclear weapons are all strategic.
- If one state underestimates French determination to preserve its vital interests, one non renewable nuclear warning could be shot against the agressor (whatever that means).
Quote in French: "En cas de méprise sur la détermination de la France à préserver ses intérêts vitaux, un avertissement nucléaire, unique et non renouvelable, pourrait être délivré à un agresseur étatique pour signifier clairement que le conflit vient de changer de nature et rétablir la dissuasion."
So given all of this, i'm not that much concerned about France and UK nuclear deterrence if the US pull out of NATO.
However, the state of European conventional armies is another matter altogether....
Fabian, thank you for this piece. I am wondering what a European solution to the loss of nuclear war fighting capability could look like. What in your view would prevent an approach that would see a European-only version of NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangement along these lines?
1. Current NATO nuclear-sharing recipients (BE, DE, IT, NL, TR) as well as a few key new participants (e.g. CZ, FI, PL, SE) commit to funding weapon development.
2. FR and UK jointly develop new nuclear weapons suitable for sub-strategic warfighting (and systems integration e.g. with Gripen, Typhoon) with recipients' funding.
3. Weapons are forward-deployed on (new or existing) FR or UK bases in or near recipients' countries.
4. Either FR or UK can grant weapons release to recipient country in case of war.
I'm acknowledging that timelines would be long (too long?) and costs high.
I agree with the lack of nuclear deterrence that caused by the lost of the US NATO Allie. Therefore another question was upraising, we discussed the probability of the strategic nuclear attack from Russia to Ukraine. It was concluded that it would not be a benefit for Russia to use the strategic nuclear bomb, as Russia would be isolated via the rest of the world. It would be interesting to analyse the difference of the new situation in this matter deeply. On the other hand we have midrange ballistic weapons like Taurus and Taurus Neo upcoming for deterence. Is the lack of strategic nuclear deterrence really problematic? I would appreciate to discuss more pro and cons arguments in this specific matter. Strategic nuclear deterrence vs strategic konventional deterrence. Let’s see what is possible.
I don't know precisely how such things are done, but Starmer and Macron need to immediately retarget their full nuclear arsenals on known locations where Putin might be in a crisis. They should convey to Putin that regardless of a possible US nuclear stand down they will take him out in any nuclear scenario. Both Article 5 and the US nuclear umbrella are inoperative with Trump in the White House. He will not defend Europe and no one will make him. On the positive side, this is exactly what the French and UK nuclear arsenals are for.
Some very good and valid points - but a few misunderstandings regarding France’s nuclear deterrence. For instance, I do not think France ever characterized the ASMPA as a "pre-strategic deterrent" - since Mitterrand, the nuclear doctrine is quite clear : there is no such thing as a pre/sub strategic deterrence, everything nuclear is strategic and any state actor (except covered by negative security assurances I guess) attacking France’s "vital interests", no matter the weapon and its yield, could face nuclear response. On ongoing discussions, I do not think France ever proposed to "extend its deterrence" but rather acknowledged that their "vital interest" have a European dimension and stated their availability for dialogue with interested European countries about this.
Hi Antoine, thanks for those clarifications! This is my second attempt at getting the French nuclear doctrine right and it looks I still made some mistakes. Different sources say different things here, which can be confusing. Let me see if I can adjust the text to make it better reflect the realities of French nuclear doctrine.
On the second point, the extended deterrence part is my interpretation. I.e., I think this is what Macron hints at when he talks about the vital interest dimension. In essence, this is about extending deterrence over more than just France to include European allies, though I agree that he hasn't used the exact term.
Thanks ! When you have some time to kill, I highly recommend Tertrais’ "handbook" on French nuclear deterrence published by the FRS in 2020 or 2021
Thanks for the recommendation. I read his 2016 book "Le President et la Bombe", which I really liked. Though admittedly, some nuances may have been lost in translation.
Hi Fabian,
As for the extended deterrence, i saw Macron"s impromptu conference on social medias yesterday, and he was asked this specific question.
His answer was that the vital interests of France were not limited to the French territory, and included Europe as well, but that the specific meaning of this will not be clarified, to maintain strategic ambiguity.
Regarding France's use of nuclear weapons, Macron has made a speech which spoke about French doctrine that you can find at this source:
https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2020/02/07/discours-du-president-emmanuel-macron-sur-la-strategie-de-defense-et-de-dissuasion-devant-les-stagiaires-de-la-27eme-promotion-de-lecole-de-guerre
Most important thing to note:
- There is no concept of nuclear warheads for battles, nor any concept of graduated response. Nuclear weapons are all strategic.
- If one state underestimates French determination to preserve its vital interests, one non renewable nuclear warning could be shot against the agressor (whatever that means).
Quote in French: "En cas de méprise sur la détermination de la France à préserver ses intérêts vitaux, un avertissement nucléaire, unique et non renouvelable, pourrait être délivré à un agresseur étatique pour signifier clairement que le conflit vient de changer de nature et rétablir la dissuasion."
So given all of this, i'm not that much concerned about France and UK nuclear deterrence if the US pull out of NATO.
However, the state of European conventional armies is another matter altogether....
Fabian, thank you for this piece. I am wondering what a European solution to the loss of nuclear war fighting capability could look like. What in your view would prevent an approach that would see a European-only version of NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangement along these lines?
1. Current NATO nuclear-sharing recipients (BE, DE, IT, NL, TR) as well as a few key new participants (e.g. CZ, FI, PL, SE) commit to funding weapon development.
2. FR and UK jointly develop new nuclear weapons suitable for sub-strategic warfighting (and systems integration e.g. with Gripen, Typhoon) with recipients' funding.
3. Weapons are forward-deployed on (new or existing) FR or UK bases in or near recipients' countries.
4. Either FR or UK can grant weapons release to recipient country in case of war.
I'm acknowledging that timelines would be long (too long?) and costs high.
Would be grateful for your thoughts.
I agree with the lack of nuclear deterrence that caused by the lost of the US NATO Allie. Therefore another question was upraising, we discussed the probability of the strategic nuclear attack from Russia to Ukraine. It was concluded that it would not be a benefit for Russia to use the strategic nuclear bomb, as Russia would be isolated via the rest of the world. It would be interesting to analyse the difference of the new situation in this matter deeply. On the other hand we have midrange ballistic weapons like Taurus and Taurus Neo upcoming for deterence. Is the lack of strategic nuclear deterrence really problematic? I would appreciate to discuss more pro and cons arguments in this specific matter. Strategic nuclear deterrence vs strategic konventional deterrence. Let’s see what is possible.
I don't know precisely how such things are done, but Starmer and Macron need to immediately retarget their full nuclear arsenals on known locations where Putin might be in a crisis. They should convey to Putin that regardless of a possible US nuclear stand down they will take him out in any nuclear scenario. Both Article 5 and the US nuclear umbrella are inoperative with Trump in the White House. He will not defend Europe and no one will make him. On the positive side, this is exactly what the French and UK nuclear arsenals are for.
“Losing” is too optimistic. It is lost, because its credibility is zero.
…Ukraine is much better partner
Thank you for the article and also robust discussions.