The Value of Striking Deep: How a Ukrainian Deep-Strike Campaign Can Change the War

Deep strikes may not deliver instant victory, but they will weaken Russia’s state capacity over time, tipping the balance in Ukraine’s favor.

Picture: Ministry of Defense of Ukraine

Like no other conflict in the past, Russia’s war against Ukraine has demonstrated the enormous utility of missile systems, including cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and long-range one-way-attack drones. While it is in theory possible to fight a modern high-intensity peer-on-peer conflict without access to deep stocks of missile systems, as Ukraine has successfully demonstrated in the first year of the war, doing so puts you at an immediate and severe disadvantage.

However, the true value of long-range strike weapons in modern war remains underappreciated, including in the Ukrainian context. This is highlighted in a recent Foreign Affairs piece by Stephen Biddle, titled ‘The False Promise of Ukraine’s Deep Strikes Into Russia’. Biddle argues that even if Ukraine were permitted to use Western long-range strike weapons for deep-strike purposes into Russia—a step the Biden Administration has long rejected due to fears of escalating the conflict into a broader NATO-Russia confrontation—it would offer limited utility to Kyiv.

Biddle argues that Ukraine would likely struggle to deploy long-range strike weapons at the necessary scale and to integrate and synchronize them with other force elements to effectively shape the battlefield. In addition, Biddle is skeptical that long-range strike weapons, employed for deep strike purposes into Russia, could achieve significant strategic-level effects, either by undermining Russia’s willingness to continue the fight, or removing its physical capacity to do so.

Overall, Biddle contends that “Giving Ukraine the means and permission to launch attacks deep into Russian-held territory would surely improve Ukrainian combat power. But the difference is unlikely to be decisive.” As a result, because of the modest military gains deep strikes would provide for, accepting the potential escalatory risks attached to their delivery may not be justified.

I disagree with Biddle’s analysis on the value of enabling a Ukrainian deep-strike campaign on two main points: one theoretical and the other empirical. First, Biddle puts the bar too high, and his understanding of strategic airpower does not take into account the medium to long-term strategic-level effects a deep-strike campaign can produce. This is arguably more relevant to the war in Ukraine than the type of decisive campaign Biddle envisions, either on the tactical-operational level or the strategic level. Second, Biddle misinterprets the empirical record on strategic bombing campaigns, particularly the Allied bombing of Nazi Germany’s industry, which in fact provides a great example for why Ukraine should forcefully go after Russian state capacity and industry.

Strategic Warfare and Strategic-Level Effects

Before proceeding it is important to define and delineate what is meant by the terms strategic warfare and strategic-level effect. This is too rarely done nowadays, which arguably contributes to the mystique that continues to surround this topic.

Military theory often categorizes the conduct of warfare into three levels: tactical, operational, and strategic. The tactical level of warfare involves the planning and execution of maneuvers, engagements, and battles by small units within short timeframes, typically aimed at achieving operational-level goals. The operational level, on the other hand, focuses on the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns. Unlike the tactical level, the operational level emphasizes the broader arrangement of forces, administrative tasks, logistics, fire support (including deep fires), and command and control. The strategic level, which is the highest level of warfare, is concerned with defining national policy. At this level, the state's sources of national power are developed and allocated to support national military policies, which are then translated into operational and tactical-level objectives.

Up until the 20^th century, reaching the enemy sources of national power, located at the strategic level, required warring parties to go through the tactical and operational levels of warfare. Think about Napoleon’s armies that had to defeat their enemies in a series of tactical and operational-level engagements on the field of battle before they were able to invade and occupy their enemies’ homeland territories and subjugate them strategically.

The allure of strategic warfare, for example facilitated by long-range strike weapons employed for deep-strike purposes to create strategic-level effects, is that they theoretically allow states to reach and destroy the enemies’ sources of national power, without necessarily having to first go through and defeat the enemy at the tactical and operational levels of warfare. Looking at how incredibly costly modern war at these lower levels has become, this is a welcome prospect.

A common misunderstanding in strategic warfare is the belief that this type of military conduct must be decisive to be successful. This misconception partly stems from early advocates of strategic air and naval power who claimed that strategic-level warfare would quickly bring the enemy to its knees. However, it has also been influenced by more contemporary writers who have discussed the supposedly decisive effects of American airpower in the modern era.

In reality, the historical record demonstrates that while strategic-level warfare can be decisive, it by no means has to. However, even where it is not decisive, it can still be highly successful. A prime example is the American strategic bombing campaign against Nazi Germany’s war industry (and that of Japan) during World War II.

Counter-Industry Bombing in World War II

The strategic bombing campaign against Nazi Germany, particularly raids on supposed “panacea targets” like ball-bearings, did not prove decisive. In addition, throughout the war, the Allies had to continue to engage the Germans at the tactical and operational levels. In other words, the strategic bombing did not prevent Allied forces from waging an attritional war, contrary to some pre-war proponents' arguments.

However, the strategic counter-industry bombing campaign drastically accelerated attrition on the German side. As the campaign intensified, more and more German equipment failed to reach the frontline or wasn't produced at all due to shortages of critical parts, components, raw materials, and electricity. The campaign also required a significant redistribution of resources on the German side to repair and rebuild destroyed industries and to protect critical industrial installations.

A common counterargument is that despite the Allies' tremendous efforts in the strategic bombing campaign, Germany's arms-industrial output still peaked in July 1944. However, what is often failed to mention is that, given the war's progression on the ground, German arms-industrial output would have peaked in 1944 regardless. The questions were only by how much and whether another peak would occur in 1945. Here the strategic air campaign had a tremendous impact. As Phillips O’Brien, explains in his book ‘How the War Was Won’: “… even when Germany reached its highest output of armaments in the summer of 1944, real production was significantly below possible production.” It is also widely known that after the last peak was reached in 1944, German industrial output crumbled quickly.

This type of strategic interdiction campaign pursued by the Allies did not single-handily win the war. However, it drastically accelerated the timeframe for Germany’s defeat and saved countless Allied lives by preventing the need to fight and destroy equipment that never arrived at the frontline. By going after a key source of national power, namely Germany’s arms related industries, the campaign produced a clearcut strategic-level effect. However, this strategic-level effect was persisting rather than fleeting, compounding over time rather than emerging rapidly. In other words, it was latent rather than decisive, but this didn’t make it any less devastating or war-winning (combined with other campaigns and force elements).

A Ukrainian Deep-Strike Campaign

Let's return to the war in Ukraine and the issue of enabling Ukrainian long-range strikes deep into Russia. Asking whether these deep strikes will completely cripple Russia's arms industry, enable decisive engagements on the tactical and operational levels, and secure victory for Ukraine are the wrong questions to ask. The effects will be relative, not absolute. Instead, we should ask to what extent deep strikes can disrupt and undermine Russia’s warfighting efforts, including in the medium to long-term. In my view, there is little doubt that if Ukraine is enabled to conduct a comprehensive strategic interdiction campaign against Russian arms manufacturing and state capacity, Russia’s war-industrial output will diminish over time.

Estimating the exact impact is challenging due to the range of factors involved. However, similar to the Allied strategic bombing campaign against Nazi Germany, a Ukrainian deep-strike campaign will reduce Russia’s arms-industrial output below its potential capacity. While this alone won't win Ukraine the war, it will aid Ukrainian troops operating along the frontline by reducing the quantity and quality of enemy equipment reaching their trenches.

This strategic interdiction approach does not depend on the element of surprise. Although Russia can relocate its fighter aircraft from frontline airbases if given adequate warning, Russia cannot easily move critical industrial and infrastructure assets out of harm’s way. In addition, Russia’s ability to adapt to a coordinated strategic interdiction campaign employed at scale is far inferior to that of Nazi Germany during World War II. Without access to Western manufacturing equipment and technology, which is hard (though not impossible) to come by for Russia, every strategic interdiction target destroyed will be enormously difficult, if not impossible to replace.

It is equally important to recognize that Ukraine is already executing an effective strategic interdiction campaign. Ukrainian long-range drones have repeatedly and successfully targeted Russian oil refineries and other critical infrastructure targets thousands of kilometers from the frontline. Despite their relatively unsophisticated nature, these drones have managed to breach Russian airspace on several occasions, including in areas heavily protected by modern Russian missile and air defense systems. In the medium to long term, these strikes will strain and diminish Russia’s warfighting budget, and accelerate Russian attrition.

As a result, providing Ukraine with the means to conduct an effective deep strike campaign is not about enabling a new capability; it’s about scaling an existing one. This can be achieved by allowing Ukraine to use current Western missile systems in its arsenal, such as ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG, for deep-strike purposes into Russia. Additionally, new systems like the German Taurus KEPD-350 or American JASSM and JASSM-ER land-attack cruise missiles could be provided. If this approach is considered too risky from an escalation management perspective, Ukraine could be given the tools to expand its own long-range strike weapons programs domestically. For instance, supplying critical components like sensors or turbojet engines, or providing computerized numerical control (CNC) machine tools for precision manufacturing, could accelerate Ukraine’s domestic missile and long-range drone production.

Few scholars or analysts would probably argue today that, from Ukraine’s perspective, providing Western long-range strike weapons hasn't significantly benefited the war's trajectory, and that accepting the associated escalation risks has proven worthwhile. I'm confident that in a year from today, if Ukraine is enabled to conduct a comprehensive deep-strike campaign into Russia for strategic interdiction purposes, the assessments will be similar.