Very happy to see that you started a sub-Stack. I've been following your reporting on Twitter for a few years now and it is always great work. I absolutely agree with you that restrictions on Ukraine striking into Russia need to be lifted. They should have been lifted long ago or even never imposed. That said, I would argue that all we are really talking about here is operational-level deep strike, not strategic. The range of even the longest range Stormshadow/SCALP or ATACMs places them at the operational level of war. Granted, there are Russian industries and other strategic targets located within range of those missiles. However, the bulk is further out. Still, unleashing the ability to strike deeper into Russia would complicate Russia's C2, logistics and its air campaign: all necessary goals if Ukraine is going to be able to retake any of the occupied territories. This is very important; I just don't see it as a strategic campaign given the western armaments Ukraine currently has. I'm also concerned that the restrictions will be lifted just as Ukraine begins to run low on Stormshadow/SCALP/ATACMS. But, then again, I'm a cynic.
Many thanks for your support throughout all this time!
I think generally speaking, range is a poor indicator of strategic target or strategic effect. I think whether something represents a strategic target or destroying it creates strategic effect relates largely to functional requirements. Quite often, strategic targets are actually not located too far behind the border, especially in the Russian context where most high-value objects are concentrated in the Western part of the country anyways.
This being said, I think if Western LRS are cleared to strike into Russia, we will first and probably for a long time only see them used against direct military infrastructure. Critical infrastructure and industry targets will probably out of the question for a long time. That's why scaling Ukraine's domestic production is so incredibly important. Because they can strike what they want.
Thank you for an excellent article. It is indeed very unfortunate how woefully the term "strategy" is misused in public discourse related to the Russia-Ukraine war.
I look forward to your next piece and continued insightful commentry on twitter. Hals- und beinbruch for the substack!
To be honest, the ability of Ukraine (that is, NATO) to strike deep into Russia will accomplish one thing - it will wear down Russia's ability to fight NATO when they decide to enter the conflict fully. Since both Ukraine and NATO have admitted that this war is all about weakening Russia, even at the expense of a Ukrainian nation, the prolonged missile war will test Russia's determination to de-nazify Ukraine. To me, that is impossible, as Nazi ideology permeates Europe and can easily carry on without Ukraine, which it will do. The US and UK promote this development, so this "war" will go on for years unless Russia or NATO surrender.
Why don't you go "ruminate" on Twitter, for example, where there are enough bots spendingthe the same lies you all could get together and throw a party?
BTW, posting this as a reply to Fabian's excellent article has, I suspect, a very low ROI 😀
Saying that a long-range campaign will diminish the Russian warfighting capacity is a truism - even the Ukrainian drone campaign does that, albeit on a minuscule scale. Destroying even one workshop diminishes the Russian warfighting capacity.
Whether Ukraine using Western weapons can do that on a meaningful scale is the real question. And that question remains unanswered. How many missiles can the West provide? What is their range? How many get attrited on the way to the target? What is their precision and payload? How hardened are the Russian targets?
Ultimately, how quickly can Russia rebuild the damaged capacity? We have been repeatedly assured by top-level experts that Russia produced single-digits of ballistic and cruise missiles per month in 2022, and that this number will plummet once the sanctions are introduced.
Today conservative estimates are that Russia produced 150+ such missiles. The West has been massively underestimating the Russian war production.
Very happy to see that you started a sub-Stack. I've been following your reporting on Twitter for a few years now and it is always great work. I absolutely agree with you that restrictions on Ukraine striking into Russia need to be lifted. They should have been lifted long ago or even never imposed. That said, I would argue that all we are really talking about here is operational-level deep strike, not strategic. The range of even the longest range Stormshadow/SCALP or ATACMs places them at the operational level of war. Granted, there are Russian industries and other strategic targets located within range of those missiles. However, the bulk is further out. Still, unleashing the ability to strike deeper into Russia would complicate Russia's C2, logistics and its air campaign: all necessary goals if Ukraine is going to be able to retake any of the occupied territories. This is very important; I just don't see it as a strategic campaign given the western armaments Ukraine currently has. I'm also concerned that the restrictions will be lifted just as Ukraine begins to run low on Stormshadow/SCALP/ATACMS. But, then again, I'm a cynic.
Many thanks for your support throughout all this time!
I think generally speaking, range is a poor indicator of strategic target or strategic effect. I think whether something represents a strategic target or destroying it creates strategic effect relates largely to functional requirements. Quite often, strategic targets are actually not located too far behind the border, especially in the Russian context where most high-value objects are concentrated in the Western part of the country anyways.
This being said, I think if Western LRS are cleared to strike into Russia, we will first and probably for a long time only see them used against direct military infrastructure. Critical infrastructure and industry targets will probably out of the question for a long time. That's why scaling Ukraine's domestic production is so incredibly important. Because they can strike what they want.
Gratuliere zum ersten Substack-Beitrag - Du bist der Grund, warum ich mich heute hier angemeldet habe
Vielen Dank, das freut mich sehr zu hören.
Thank you for an excellent article. It is indeed very unfortunate how woefully the term "strategy" is misused in public discourse related to the Russia-Ukraine war.
I look forward to your next piece and continued insightful commentry on twitter. Hals- und beinbruch for the substack!
To be honest, the ability of Ukraine (that is, NATO) to strike deep into Russia will accomplish one thing - it will wear down Russia's ability to fight NATO when they decide to enter the conflict fully. Since both Ukraine and NATO have admitted that this war is all about weakening Russia, even at the expense of a Ukrainian nation, the prolonged missile war will test Russia's determination to de-nazify Ukraine. To me, that is impossible, as Nazi ideology permeates Europe and can easily carry on without Ukraine, which it will do. The US and UK promote this development, so this "war" will go on for years unless Russia or NATO surrender.
Why don't you go "ruminate" on Twitter, for example, where there are enough bots spendingthe the same lies you all could get together and throw a party?
BTW, posting this as a reply to Fabian's excellent article has, I suspect, a very low ROI 😀
Saying that a long-range campaign will diminish the Russian warfighting capacity is a truism - even the Ukrainian drone campaign does that, albeit on a minuscule scale. Destroying even one workshop diminishes the Russian warfighting capacity.
Whether Ukraine using Western weapons can do that on a meaningful scale is the real question. And that question remains unanswered. How many missiles can the West provide? What is their range? How many get attrited on the way to the target? What is their precision and payload? How hardened are the Russian targets?
Ultimately, how quickly can Russia rebuild the damaged capacity? We have been repeatedly assured by top-level experts that Russia produced single-digits of ballistic and cruise missiles per month in 2022, and that this number will plummet once the sanctions are introduced.
Today conservative estimates are that Russia produced 150+ such missiles. The West has been massively underestimating the Russian war production.