Fabian, thanks for this pertinent analysis. I really enjoy reading Missile Matters. On this latest edition, and while I fully agree with next to all of your points, only two small observations: You write at the beginning as if the US had already effectively withdrawn its nuclear deterrence. While its credibility may have been damaged, this umbrella is still there.. to the best of my knowledge. But Europe needs to speed up - to be half way prepared for the moment where the US withdraws its nuclear deterrence. And then, the shift from "Massive Retaliation" to "Flexible Response" was not only a shift in US policy, but equally and perhaps more importantly, a shift is NATO strategy... after a long debate. best, Gerlinde
On the first point: I no longer believe that the United States extends its nuclear umbrella over Europe, at least its not a credible proposition. I can't see a scenario where Trump would employ nuclear weapons on behalf of Europe, so Europe should plan to fight without the United States at both the conventional and nuclear levels. But I have a reputation for tending to err on the side of pessimism.
On point two: Many thanks for pointing that out. I will see if I can clarify that in the text.
Thanks for this insightful article. Are there any open source or official estimates of what an adaptation of the FR deterrent towards extended deterrence for Europe would cost? And how long it would take. Many thanks, really enjoy reading your articles.
Hi, thanks a lot! I'm not aware of any official cost estimates. My personal estimate would be a low to medium billion euros sum, depending on the scale of the adaptations that are seen as necessary. In principle, producing more warheads is not the problem once the infrastructure is set up. The problem is setting up the infrastructure which has been largely dismantled in both countries. R&D and production of additional delivery vehicles would also be a major cost factor.
Macron's nice speeches at this point seem more about slowing down (or distracting from?) the emergence of new nuclear powers in Europe. Everybody saw the different fates of North Korea and Ukraine, there's simply no going back. Germany and Japan have enough unirradiated plutonium to quickly create a credible arsenal, and almost all modern countries have irradiated plutonium that can also be used for bombs, albeit with more steps. Non-proliferation could only work if nuclear states don't threaten to use them on non-nuclear ones, Russia and North Korea have long broken that pact.
The first thorn into credibility of French nuclear umbrella for Talinn is that the far right makes 30% of the votes on the first turn. And they sure as hell have already said that they don't want any part in risking destroying Paris for defending an attack on Talinn. The far left, which makes between 10 and 20% depending on the election, has also at best very mixed opinions about this.
So like the US, even if France guaranteed the Baltics, they would be always one election away from being defensless nuclear wise.
I agree 100% that the current nuclear capabilities of France makes it credible to defend its own territory, but not so much about the Baltics. Since France pushing the button means the destruction of both France and its agressor: there is no middle ground. It's credible if national territory is threatened that France would go that far, but for Baltics, far less so.
Maybe the solution would be to finance on a European level such additional deterrence? Curious about your opinion here, but seems also very complicated to implement.
I've also seen some comments from the Polish president where he said he wanted to have control over the launch of nuclear weapons: since the French government will surely never agree to this, looks like there is still a lot to be discussed behind closed doors before making the umbrella credible.
If I had to bet, Germany and / or Poland will launch their own nuclear program if the relationship with the US deteriorates to the point of no return.
Although Brit, I too live in France in French. The dangers to the rest of Europe of Marine Le Pen and her RN are real indeed, but first she may well be rendered ineligible to stand for President on March 31st when she is sentenced, and I don't see President Bardella (too inexperienced). She also has to explain away her previous financial support from Russia. That will not be easy. The French are currently no more pro Russia than the rest of Europe I feel.
Maybe this is an academic question, but does the French nuclear force need to fully replace all of the US nuclear force's "extended deterrence" capabilities? Specifically, I am not sure that a preemptive nuclear attack capability is necessarily part of a deterrent role. I understand it would be part of a larger NATO nuclear warfighting capability but certainly France could, with some adjustments as you note, pick up the "deter through retaliation" role for extended deterrence executed with regards to Eastern Europe.
Fabian, I believe there is a fundamental mistake in the analysis in this paper.
Your argument relies on the idea that France lacks a non-strategic nuclear capability, and this is not an accurate assessment.
While France no longer has any "tactical" warheads and vectors, as those were abandoned in the alte 1990s, the ASMP-A nuclear cruise missile used in the French airborne deterrent is capable of what would be designated in France as a "sub-strategic" strike, as the warhead can be set ot different levels of power, with a lowest possible yield at 110 kT, or possibly lower.
While this is a higher yield than what is usually considered to be "tactical" nukes, it is also substantially lower than the yield of strategic warheads. And the use of a cruise missile makes it suitable to tactical use, for instance to aim at an invading land force.
The absence of a clearly designed tactical category of weapons can play into France's approach of ambiguity.
Thus, I would argue that France has the means to enter a tactical game of deterrence.
Thank you for specifically mentioning Romania in the analysis. It usually gets totally omitted (as if doesn't exist) from analysis regarding Europe/Russia/Ukraine war despite its position, size, population, etc.
All aspects of the Romanian state are predicated on the model of the French state so here's hoping that what you suggest comes to pass
On the strictly nuclear front, this is convincing. Thank you Fabian. However There are a couple of points that I would like to add.
First and foremost the mere gesture of extending the French nuclear umbrella to the rest of Europe is highly significant even if it is much less powerful and versatile than that of the USA.
Clearly the UK needs to make the same commitment to defend Europe while talking to France about how to use French missiles (not American) in British submarines.
Lastly, this is going to cost big money. Despite its moans, the UK can up taxation a but. I doubt that France can, and have just added a post that breaks down the reasons why. However if France and the UK step in as suggested, it seems only fair that those covered by a European nuclear umbrella share some of the costs. If Oraban and co demur, they are out of cover.
Probably a very naive idea but, what about EU countries (especially those bordering Russia) buying nuclear weapons from France?
I think a long the lines of just a few missiles to solve the question of "does Tallinn worth Paris?".
Those weapons can have some mechanism that demands France involvement every X time to keep them active but no need to actually approve an attack. That way, France can be sure that no new crazy regime take power and get to be nuclear (as these things take some time...) while those countries have their own capabilities to inflict heavy damage on Russia if they attack.
Honestly they can also be programmed to detonate only in certain areas of the world, so that's an extra assurance against crazy new regimes (I guess they can anyway ;))
France selling nuclear weapons seem very unlikely: Poland and the Baltics are hawkish against Russia since decades, and often clash with France on this subject.
So the French military will surely think that giving the Baltics or Poland control of nuclear weapons is akin to the Soviets giving control of nuclear weapons to Cuba: you're afraid that the threshold for a nuclear war would be much, much lower.
Also to my understanding, French nuclear weapons are all strategic, as the very good article above said. There is no such thing as tactical nuclear weapons in France: either you collectively suicide with your ennemy, either you don't do anything with those.
I do visualize France giving them to Germany, even if unlikely as well. But i don't see how the government would accept to give them to Poland or Baltics.
The best thing is that there is now serious discussion of how best to extend the French nuclear deterrent to the rest of Europe. That Poland and the Baltic states are more hawkish than France is hardly surprising given the geography!
Fabian, thanks for this pertinent analysis. I really enjoy reading Missile Matters. On this latest edition, and while I fully agree with next to all of your points, only two small observations: You write at the beginning as if the US had already effectively withdrawn its nuclear deterrence. While its credibility may have been damaged, this umbrella is still there.. to the best of my knowledge. But Europe needs to speed up - to be half way prepared for the moment where the US withdraws its nuclear deterrence. And then, the shift from "Massive Retaliation" to "Flexible Response" was not only a shift in US policy, but equally and perhaps more importantly, a shift is NATO strategy... after a long debate. best, Gerlinde
Hi Gerlinde, many thanks for those comments.
On the first point: I no longer believe that the United States extends its nuclear umbrella over Europe, at least its not a credible proposition. I can't see a scenario where Trump would employ nuclear weapons on behalf of Europe, so Europe should plan to fight without the United States at both the conventional and nuclear levels. But I have a reputation for tending to err on the side of pessimism.
On point two: Many thanks for pointing that out. I will see if I can clarify that in the text.
Thanks for this insightful article. Are there any open source or official estimates of what an adaptation of the FR deterrent towards extended deterrence for Europe would cost? And how long it would take. Many thanks, really enjoy reading your articles.
Hi, thanks a lot! I'm not aware of any official cost estimates. My personal estimate would be a low to medium billion euros sum, depending on the scale of the adaptations that are seen as necessary. In principle, producing more warheads is not the problem once the infrastructure is set up. The problem is setting up the infrastructure which has been largely dismantled in both countries. R&D and production of additional delivery vehicles would also be a major cost factor.
Macron's nice speeches at this point seem more about slowing down (or distracting from?) the emergence of new nuclear powers in Europe. Everybody saw the different fates of North Korea and Ukraine, there's simply no going back. Germany and Japan have enough unirradiated plutonium to quickly create a credible arsenal, and almost all modern countries have irradiated plutonium that can also be used for bombs, albeit with more steps. Non-proliferation could only work if nuclear states don't threaten to use them on non-nuclear ones, Russia and North Korea have long broken that pact.
The first thorn into credibility of French nuclear umbrella for Talinn is that the far right makes 30% of the votes on the first turn. And they sure as hell have already said that they don't want any part in risking destroying Paris for defending an attack on Talinn. The far left, which makes between 10 and 20% depending on the election, has also at best very mixed opinions about this.
So like the US, even if France guaranteed the Baltics, they would be always one election away from being defensless nuclear wise.
I agree 100% that the current nuclear capabilities of France makes it credible to defend its own territory, but not so much about the Baltics. Since France pushing the button means the destruction of both France and its agressor: there is no middle ground. It's credible if national territory is threatened that France would go that far, but for Baltics, far less so.
Maybe the solution would be to finance on a European level such additional deterrence? Curious about your opinion here, but seems also very complicated to implement.
I've also seen some comments from the Polish president where he said he wanted to have control over the launch of nuclear weapons: since the French government will surely never agree to this, looks like there is still a lot to be discussed behind closed doors before making the umbrella credible.
If I had to bet, Germany and / or Poland will launch their own nuclear program if the relationship with the US deteriorates to the point of no return.
Although Brit, I too live in France in French. The dangers to the rest of Europe of Marine Le Pen and her RN are real indeed, but first she may well be rendered ineligible to stand for President on March 31st when she is sentenced, and I don't see President Bardella (too inexperienced). She also has to explain away her previous financial support from Russia. That will not be easy. The French are currently no more pro Russia than the rest of Europe I feel.
Maybe this is an academic question, but does the French nuclear force need to fully replace all of the US nuclear force's "extended deterrence" capabilities? Specifically, I am not sure that a preemptive nuclear attack capability is necessarily part of a deterrent role. I understand it would be part of a larger NATO nuclear warfighting capability but certainly France could, with some adjustments as you note, pick up the "deter through retaliation" role for extended deterrence executed with regards to Eastern Europe.
Fabian, I believe there is a fundamental mistake in the analysis in this paper.
Your argument relies on the idea that France lacks a non-strategic nuclear capability, and this is not an accurate assessment.
While France no longer has any "tactical" warheads and vectors, as those were abandoned in the alte 1990s, the ASMP-A nuclear cruise missile used in the French airborne deterrent is capable of what would be designated in France as a "sub-strategic" strike, as the warhead can be set ot different levels of power, with a lowest possible yield at 110 kT, or possibly lower.
While this is a higher yield than what is usually considered to be "tactical" nukes, it is also substantially lower than the yield of strategic warheads. And the use of a cruise missile makes it suitable to tactical use, for instance to aim at an invading land force.
The absence of a clearly designed tactical category of weapons can play into France's approach of ambiguity.
Thus, I would argue that France has the means to enter a tactical game of deterrence.
Thank you for specifically mentioning Romania in the analysis. It usually gets totally omitted (as if doesn't exist) from analysis regarding Europe/Russia/Ukraine war despite its position, size, population, etc.
All aspects of the Romanian state are predicated on the model of the French state so here's hoping that what you suggest comes to pass
On the strictly nuclear front, this is convincing. Thank you Fabian. However There are a couple of points that I would like to add.
First and foremost the mere gesture of extending the French nuclear umbrella to the rest of Europe is highly significant even if it is much less powerful and versatile than that of the USA.
Clearly the UK needs to make the same commitment to defend Europe while talking to France about how to use French missiles (not American) in British submarines.
Lastly, this is going to cost big money. Despite its moans, the UK can up taxation a but. I doubt that France can, and have just added a post that breaks down the reasons why. However if France and the UK step in as suggested, it seems only fair that those covered by a European nuclear umbrella share some of the costs. If Oraban and co demur, they are out of cover.
Probably a very naive idea but, what about EU countries (especially those bordering Russia) buying nuclear weapons from France?
I think a long the lines of just a few missiles to solve the question of "does Tallinn worth Paris?".
Those weapons can have some mechanism that demands France involvement every X time to keep them active but no need to actually approve an attack. That way, France can be sure that no new crazy regime take power and get to be nuclear (as these things take some time...) while those countries have their own capabilities to inflict heavy damage on Russia if they attack.
I think that is heading in the right direction
Honestly they can also be programmed to detonate only in certain areas of the world, so that's an extra assurance against crazy new regimes (I guess they can anyway ;))
France selling nuclear weapons seem very unlikely: Poland and the Baltics are hawkish against Russia since decades, and often clash with France on this subject.
So the French military will surely think that giving the Baltics or Poland control of nuclear weapons is akin to the Soviets giving control of nuclear weapons to Cuba: you're afraid that the threshold for a nuclear war would be much, much lower.
Also to my understanding, French nuclear weapons are all strategic, as the very good article above said. There is no such thing as tactical nuclear weapons in France: either you collectively suicide with your ennemy, either you don't do anything with those.
I do visualize France giving them to Germany, even if unlikely as well. But i don't see how the government would accept to give them to Poland or Baltics.
The best thing is that there is now serious discussion of how best to extend the French nuclear deterrent to the rest of Europe. That Poland and the Baltic states are more hawkish than France is hardly surprising given the geography!