Russia is Preparing for the Next Missile War — Are We?

Some final words on Europe's missile conundrum

Picture: Bundeswehr/Francis Hildemann

Over the past weeks, I have written extensively about European missile production, focusing in particular on the shortcomings of European missile industrial output. In my view, this is one of the primary areas of rearmament — if not the main area — where European decisionmakers have failed to take the necessary steps.

I have just returned from a trip to Berlin, where I spoke with politicians and decisionmakers. It seems that progress in the missile domain remains stalled, at least nowhere near the pace required (and not only in Germany but across Europe). There is little point in repeating this argument until politicians find the will to act. That said, before moving on, I want to say my piece and set out, in context, just how dangerous the situation has become.

The missile gap

In the late 1950s, the widespread belief in a “missile gap” emerged, reflecting the fear that the Soviet Union had surpassed the United States in the number of ballistic missiles, resulting in a strategic imbalance.

This perception was driven by Soviet propaganda, misinterpretations of intelligence, and domestic political factors in the United States. However, subsequent intelligence — particularly from U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft overflights — revealed that the gap was largely illusory. As it turns out, the Soviet missile arsenal was significantly smaller than feared.

Today, the situation appears reversed. The material facts are well known: Russia produces an extraordinary number of missile systems, employs them almost daily in Ukraine — often simply to terrorize the civilian population — and places enormous emphasis on missile systems in its military planning.

Yet this reality has not prompted any meaningful action on our part. Europe is not producing the most relevant long-range strike weapons in significant numbers, nor has it begun to seriously consider the doctrinal implications of a war shaped by such weapons (yes, some countries more than others, but the general point stands). Unlike during the Cold War, when U.S. decision-makers acted on a myth, today the missile gap exists — and we simply choose to ignore it.

Russian stockpiles

Ukrainian intelligence estimates that Russia is producing roughly 1,200 land-attack cruise missiles per year, 400 short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, 6,000 Shahed long-range drones, and plans to add an additional 10,000 decoy drones annually to help saturate Ukrainian (and European) air and missile defenses.

Russia is actively seeking to increase these numbers. This is challenging, as its production facilities are already operating at maximum output. Further increases would require diverting financial investment, resources, and labor into the missile sector — likely at the expense of other industries. Even so, additional growth in missile production over the coming months and years cannot be ruled out.

Russia, based on what can be assessed from openly available sources, is not employing its full arsenal in Ukraine. On the contrary, a significant portion of newly produced missiles appears to have been placed in storage over the past year. This stockpile was not used over the winter to pressure Ukraine by targeting its electricity infrastructure during the most vulnerable period, as I and others had expected.

This points to only one conclusion: Russia is stockpiling missile systems for other contingencies, including a potential NATO-Russia confrontation in Europe.

Short and intense

People often assume that a war between NATO and Russia would resemble the conflict currently unfolding in Ukraine, only on a larger scale. But this is unlikely.

Russia has long understood — for decades — that it cannot prevail in a prolonged, drawn-out, and attritional war against NATO. This holds true regardless of whether the United States joins the fight in Europe. The reason is straightforward: Russia is economically and industrially far inferior to European states, leaving it without the warfighting capacity needed to sustain a long-term conflict. While Russian propagandists may say otherwise, Russian military strategists are well aware.

Russian planning, as reflected in publicly available strategy documents and relevant publications, therefore prioritizes a short but intense campaign designed to force NATO into submission — not by rendering it incapable of fighting, but by convincing it that further resistance is futile and will only escalate the costs.

Missile strikes — especially in the opening phase — play a central role in Russian strategy. In a confrontation with NATO, Russia would likely launch several successive missile salvos, perhaps starting with smaller ones but rapidly scaling up to convey that any prolonged resistance is futile and will only increase the suffering.

At present, European NATO states appear to counter this strategy almost entirely through missile defense. But that is a losing approach. If the objective is to intercept every incoming missile, then the current pace of interceptor production and procurement is wholly inadequate. Meeting that goal would require companies like Diehl Defence and MBDA to operate around the clock, producing IRIS-T SLM and Aster interceptors in three shifts, while also acquiring far more Patriot and NASAMS interceptors than we do today — and I mean far more.

Given the range of procurement priorities we already face, this does not appear feasible, even if the political will existed to commit fully to missile defense.

Winning the missile war

Effectively competing with Russia in the missile domain requires missile defenses — but it also demands a credible counterstrike capability. Drawing lessons from Ukraine, Europe must be able to rapidly implement a cost-imposition strategy once hostilities begin, targeting critical Russian infrastructure to make it impossible for Russian decision-makers to justify the costs of the fight.

This does not mean Europe should recklessly launch long-range strike weapons against Russian strategic-level targets in the event of war. It means, however, that Europe must retain the option to do so — either to symmetrically respond to Russian strikes on its own critical infrastructure, or as an asymmetric escalation tool if deemed necessary.

Competing with Russia in the missile domain therefore requires deep missile arsenals. The fact that Europe’s combined land-attack cruise missile production barely reaches 100 units per year, while ballistic missile production stands at zero, amounts — in my view — to a case of near-criminal neglect.